5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Evening the Score, January 16, 2007
This review is from: Coronel and the Falklands (Paperback)
In the Preface, the author (Geoffrey Bennett) noted that within three months after the outbreak of the First World War the incomparable reputation of the Royal Navy suffered a bitter blow when a British cruiser squadron was decisively defeated by a superior force from the "new-born" German Navy.
In Part One, the text narrates the 1 November 1914 naval battle off the Chilean coast at Coronel including the events leading up to the battle. Most interesting is the text's account of the command organization of the combatants. Amazing, in August 1914 Germany's naval war plans were far more advanced and thorough that those of the Royal Naval. A major weakness of the British Admiralty was the lack of a large and efficient staff organization.
The outbreak of WWI found Germany's China Squadron off the coast of China. The squadron commanded by German Admiral von Spee included the powerful armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Berlin had signaled von Spee "Chile is a friendly neutral"; when the Japanese entered the war with the allies, the China Squadron proceeded to the west coast of America while the light cruiser Emden was sent to the Indian Ocean where, before being destroyed by the British, Emden sank several merchant ships and conducted shore bombardment. The text provides a good but brief account of Admiral von Spee's voyage to the west coast of Chile.
The text gives a good review of the British Admiralty's indecisiveness and its tragic aftermath. British Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was assigned command of a squadron consisting of armoured cruisers Monmouth and Good Hope (Cradock's flagship), light cruiser Glasgow and an armed liner Otranto. Cradock was ordered to engage the German China Squadron. Since Cradock's squadron would have been outgunned, his squadron was assigned the fifteen year old battleship Canopus.
The Canopus could not keep up with Cradock's cruisers so Cradock assigned it a support position south of the squadron. Though outgunned without Canopus, Cradock felt that his orders were still to engage von Spee. In late afternoon on 1 November 1914, the two squadrons met in the South Atlantic off Coronel, Chile. Admiral von Spee opened fire on Cradock at 07:00 p.m. Disaster struck the British with the Good Hope sunk with all hands including Cradock at 07:57 p.m. and the Monmouth sunk at 9:18 p.m. Though damaged, Glasgow escaped along with the armed liner Otranto.
The text gives an interesting analysis of why the disaster occurred. The Admiralty "allowed the Allied warship in Far East waters to be employed on other less vital tasks" and for deciding von Spee was heading west not east so that Cradock was not reinforced. After the war a British admiral stated that the Admiralty had lacked a large and efficient staff organization. It would seem that there was enough blame to go around for everyone.
Part Two of the text is devoted to the battle off the Falklands. The author notes that "....it must have been clear that the British would react to the news of Coronel by dispatching strong reinforcements to hunt him: the sooner the German squadron entered the South Atlantic the better would be its chances." Berlin signaled Admiral von Spee "You are advised to try and break through with all yours ships and return home." However, over thirty days passed before Admiral von Spee reached the South Atlantic and attacked the British at the Falklands. Erroneous intelligence convinced von Spee of the absence of British warships at the Falklands so von Spee's proposed to destroy the Falklands wireless station and coal docks; a fatal error. The British Admiralty's First Lord (Churchill) and the First Sea Lord (Fisher) had acted in concert to avenge the first defeat the Royal Navy had suffered in more than 100 year. While, First Sea Lord Fisher loathed Admiral Sturdee who would command the naval force at the Falklands, nevertheless Fisher assigned two modern battle-cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, to Sturdee's command. The text gives an interesting account of the battle which began shortly after 09:00 a.m. on December 8, 1914. The Scharnhorst with all hands, including Admiral Spee was sunk at 04:17 p.m.; by 08:35 p.m. the Gneisenau, the Nurnberg and the Leipzig had all been sunk. By all accounts, this was a brilliant victory.
Unfortunately, the German light cruiser Dresden escaped. The text narrates the interesting "cat-and-mouse" game as the British sought-out the Dresden. During the night of 8th March anchored in Cumberland Bay of Mas a Tierra off the Chilean coast, the Dresden was discovered by British cruisers and sunk. Thus after more than four months, the defeat at Coronel had been avenged.
Interestingly, 35 years later in December 1939, the German pocket battleship named Graf Spee for the victor at Cornel, was scuttled off Montevideo when cornered in the South Atlantic by the Royal Navy.
Appendix II COMMUNICATIONS is most interesting. WWI navies did not have the reliable and secure communications ability with their admiralty's in London or Berlin. Few wireless shore wireless stations could broadcast messages to ships at sea without requiring them to break wireless silence. Messages were frequently handled by combinations of cable and wireless.
. This is an excellent text which both the World War I and naval buffs will find interesting.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Precise Analysis, September 5, 2007
This review is from: Coronel and the Falklands (Paperback)
Geoffrey Bennett's 1962 book "Coronel and the Falklands" remains a naval warfare classic. The 2000 edition authoritatively presents six chapters (over 180 pages) of thorough rendering with various period black and white photos, letters, maps, an appendix (charting the captains and their ships), and an informative bibliography.
Bennett's study is accurate and convincing. He presents both World War 1 sea battles with precision, reviewing German and British battle prep, each side's tactical advantages, and how the winner won the encounter. Bennett also suggests looser responsibility. Ultimately, he says, that the British Admiralty (Churchill) is responsible for the 1914 loss at Coronel while the German High Seas Command (von Tirpitz) bears that weight for the Falklands.
Although somewhat technical, Bennett's is an informative read for anyone interested in sea battles, tactics on the high seas, and the history of the First World War. It will be a good read for you.
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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Colonel and the Falklands, February 6, 2007
This review is from: Coronel and the Falklands (Paperback)
This work provides a fairly complete history of the history of the Imperial German East Asiatic Squadron at the outbreak of WWI and the British efforts and final success in destroying it.
The text provides an interesting format for relaying the above history to those who do not have an extensive background in technology of the time and it's impact on naval operations. There is enough technical background on these issues to inform the reader but not to the point of becoming hard to read. There is also a brief description of the cruise of the SMS Emden as it relates to the pursuit of her and the effects of her cruise on the pursuit of the rest of the squadron.
This book also contains updates since it's original publishing that are used to clear up some minor errors.
There is comparatively little written about these battles and the changes in naval warfare brought on by them and this book deals with The Battles of Coronel and the Falklands in a clear and easy to read and understand format. A good primer for anyone wishing to read naval history of the last one hundred years.
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