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Cosmos and the Creator

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In his small but dense book, The Cosmos and the Creator: An Introduction to the Theology of Creation [Not to be confused with Hugh Ross's The Creator and the Cosmos: How the Latest Scientific Discoveries of the Century Reveal God, first published in 1993, rev eds. 1995, 2001], David A. S. Fergusson seeks to satisfy two ambitions; first, to argue that "the doctrine of creation must remain a distinctively Christian article of faith." "However," he continues with the second, "it must also recognize and accommodate some of the criticisms that have been laid at the door of its traditional formulations together with the best insights from other disciplines" (3).

Fergusson opens his book by looking at the doctrine of creation in the context of the Old Testament, including the Genesis account as it relates to alternative Ancient Near-Eastern creation myths. He writes, "Scholarship in the history of religions has shown that stories of creation are found throughout the world in the oldest cultures," but advises against "the temptation to search frantically for distinctive elements within the ancient Hebrew account of Creation" (5). Although Fergusson does go on to observe some differences (7-8), it needs to be pointed out that the History of Religions school, from which these alleged parallels are frantically produced, is not a credible source [He's clearly referencing the 19th century German think-tank religionsgeschichtliche Schule. Chief among their aims was to identify and collect such parallels in an attempt to explain the evolutionary origins of contemporary religions. Characteristic of the History of Religions school was what Samuel Sandmel has called "parallelomania," or "that extravagance among scholars which first overdoes the supposed similarity in passages and then proceeds to describe source and derivation as if implying literary connection flowing in an inevitable or predetermined direction." See his "Parallelomania," Journal of Biblical Literature 81 (1962), 1]. And, moreover, the distinctions need not be searched for `frantically'. They couldn't be more stark [See Copan and Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Baker, 2004), ch. 1].

Fergusson moves on and briefly considers the issue of modern science and the literal reading of the days in Genesis, finding it wanting. Following this is a somewhat tangential discussion on our "current educational scene" (11). He closes the section by noting and endorsing the claim that Gen 1:1 does not provide support for the notion of creation out of nothing (12-13) and even says of Gen 1:2 that "the presence of primeval chaos seems to precede and menace the creative activity of God" (7). These remarks are dark. Scholarship and tradition are not in his favor [Again see Copan and Craig (ibid.), as well as Genesis 1-11: A Continental Commentary (Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 1994); Sailhammer, Kaiser, et al., Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers: Expositor's Bible Commentary (Zondervan, 1990); Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 1: Genesis 1-15 (Thomas Nelson, 1987)].

Next Fergusson shifts focus to the concept of the image of God and the problem of domination (13), concluding that the former should be understood "not substantively in terms of the possession of an immortal soul, but relationally in terms of the role that human beings play before God and before the rest of creation" (14), and the latter in terms of responsible stewardship. He closes the chapter by situating the doctrine of creation in the theological context of redemption, concluding that "creation and incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection are intimately connected" (22).

Fergusson begins the second chapter, "Creation and Cosmology," with a statement already found unsubstantiated: "The doctrine of creation out of nothing us not explicitly taught in Scripture. The opening chapter of the Bible seems to presuppose a formless waste out of which the heaven and the earth are created" (23). Ferguson thus proceeds to consider what historic factors explain the quick and sudden acceptance of the doctrine of creation out of nothing (24-25), traditional interpretations of it (25-28), and its confession in all three Abrahamic faiths (28-29). Regarding the lattermost, Ferguson points out "strong Trinitarian reasons within Christian theology for affirming the doctrine," and, in the end, affirms its Biblical basis (29-31). Next, Ferguson considers a range of criticisms the doctrine encounters today, arguing that while "not cogent" they do "point to some puzzling aspects of the doctrine" (32). Much of these criticisms stem from process theology and God's freedom to create (32-36). As Ferguson addresses these criticisms, I found it ironic that he says "There is much at stake in the way in which we conceive of the relationship between God and the world" (34-35), when, in the previous chapter, he dismissed translational issues of Gen 1:1, on which hangs the difference between creation ex nihilo and ex materia, "for theologically it makes little difference" (12).

Fergusson then turns to the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is this section Fergusson is perhaps most dismissive. He writes the kalam cosmological argument, perhaps the most widely-discussed cosmological argument in contemporary natural theology [See the various works of William Lane Craig. E.g., The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Wipf and Stock, ed. 2000), Craig and Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (Clarendon Paperbacks) (Oxford, 2003). See also Mark Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God (Studies in Analytic Philosophy) (Prometheus, 2007)] off in two sentences: "The difficulty with this argument as a proof is that it is hard logically to exclude an everlasting temporal series of causes stretching endlessly backwards. It is also difficult conclusively to refute the hypothesis that the world may have no efficient cause, i.e. it sprang into being uncaused" (36). Having demolished the most widely defended cosmological argument to date, Fergusson next looks at the Leibnizian cosmological argument. His dismissal of this argument, also defended at length today [See the various works of Alexander Pruss. E.g., The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (Cambridge, 2006) and his "Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 24-100], is with a single question: "Can it refute the tough-minded opponent, like David Hume, who simply denies that the universe itself must have a sufficient explanation?" (37). Ultimately Ferguson finds sympathy with Swinburne's inductive cosmological argument, but even then claims it rests on an intuition non-theists aren't likely to have (39).

Unimpressed by cosmological arguments in philosophy, Ferguson then surveys recent advances in Big Bang cosmology. In this context, I found his remarks on how the steady-state model is compatible with the Christian doctrine of creation quite fascinating (43), although his comment that "there is no relationship of necessary entailment between big bang cosmology and the doctrine of creation out of nothing" is, unfortunately, confused [Consider astrophysicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler's description of the standard big bang model: "At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo." The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford Paperbacks) (Oxford, 1986), 442]. In light of recent cosmological findings, he concludes that "there is some convergence between theology and modern science..." (43). Ferguson closes the chapter looking forward to the next, the subject of which is possible scientific support for the doctrine of creation in other areas, such as design.

The strength of the book is found in its chapter "Creation and Evolution." Fergusson opens with a brief description of evolutionary theory as proposed by Darwin and its contemporary variants (46-49) in order to set the stage for his section on what he calls "the creationist controversy" (49). He prefaces the discussion by reviewing the Creationism's historical roots, finding particularly relevant in this regard Protestant convictions about the inerrancy and character of scripture (50-51). By `creationism,' it is clear that Fergusson has in mind the view advocated by, say, the Answers in Genesis folk. Fergusson pulls no punches. So understood, "creationism is at odds with current scientific orthodoxy" (52), is "scientifically untenable and theologically misguided" (53), and is "an impossible position to adopt, and in any case it is religiously unnecessary (55). Fergusson naturally follows this with a favorable "dialogue with evolutionary theory" (56), in which the explanations of chance and design are analyzed and compared (56-61). Here Fergusson claims that the so-called anthropic principle raises the likelihood of design.

But the likelihood of design does not eliminate chance from playing a significant role, fergusson says. Fergusson considers how chance can find a home in theistic worldview as "part of God's design and oversight rather than in conflict with it" (61). The alternative to this view would be a hard-core theological determinism with respect to the natural world, according to which "nothing happens...that is not already built into the blueprint for the creation from the beginning" (62). Fergusson suggests several ways of countering this alternative, including appeals to quantum theory, open theism, scientific support for apparent randomness in evolutionary processes, and chaos theory (61-65). But ultimately, thinks Fergusson, the only adequate theology of nature will have to make reference to Christian doctrines outside the scope of science (66-67).

In the final section of the chapter Fergusson explores what role animals play in the doctrine of creation. Contrary to the low status attributed to animals throughout much of theological tradition, Ferguson argues that Scripture places a high value on animal life and that the doctrine of creation has much to offer contemporary issues in animal welfare. However, this does not mean or entail uncritically supporting animal-rights and environmental activists that have displaced gradations of value. The special role of humans in God's creation should not be overlooked or depreciated. In Fergusson's words, "we have a central place in God's creation but not an exclusive one" (73). Fergusson completes the chapter by comparing and contrasting humans with animals and how unique value premiums belong to each, which are themselves fundamentally tied to Christ as the source and redeemer of the natural order (73-76).

"The greatest difficulty facing any theology of creation is to provide an account of evil" (76). Such is how the final chapter titled "Creation, Evil and the End of Life" opens. Fergusson continues, "The love and power of God raise the question of why natural and moral evil are permitted to exist in such excessive qualities in the created universe" (76). To this effect Fergusson quotes Hume's famous statement of the logical problem of evil. Fergusson then moves on to discuss the nature of evil and how the doctrine of the Fall and its "theodical function" has played a key role in the church's response to it (78-79). Following this is a survey of contemporary problems facing the doctrine of the Fall, in particular that of scientific evidence which suggests "created life was characterized by suffering, disease, struggle, and death before the appearance of human beings on our planet" (80).

After noting that contemporary theologies of evil are largely inadequate and provide insufficient resources for acceptable theodicies (80-81), Fergusson makes mention of the free-will defense [Though "the free will defense" is a name for a technical argument of Alvin Plantinga's, whom Ferguson does not mention]. and what he calls the "instrumental theodicy" (81), more commonly known as the soul-making theodicy. Fergusson concludes that "the overriding difficulty" accounts such as these face is that they cannot accommodate the excess, quality and depth of evil we see in the world. He thus moves into the terrain of the evidential problem of evil. That Fergusson sees this as a difficulty with the aforementioned accounts is odd, given that their aim is not at countering the evidential problem of evil, but the logical problem. But Fergusson is also unimpressed by any attempt to answer the evidential problem, noting that theodicies in this context sometimes seem "morally corrupting." He continues, "To justify a world in which such things occur is to compromise one's ethical sensibilities. Theodicy attempts to justify the unjustifiable" (83), and even more strongly, "No theory will justify the excessive quantity of evil and none will be appropriate as a pastoral response." Here I'm afraid Fergusson is conflating the intellectual problem of evil, which is the problem of reconciling the existence of God with existence and nature of evil, with the emotional problem evil evokes. At any rate, Fergusson's sketch of theodicy and defense against the intellectual problem of evil in either form is extremely thin and under-appreciative. "A more adequate response," says Fergusson, "must seek not to justify but to assist every initiative for overcoming suffering and resisting evil" (83). Next Fergusson considers how to make theological room for such evil, such as a modified version of open theism which sees God as voluntarily removing or limiting his sovereign control (84-85). But, as has been typical of Fergusson throughout the book, he concludes by tying the subject, in this case evil, to Christian doctrines such as Christ's death and resurrection (87).

In the next section, Fergusson looks at scientific eschatology, or what contemporary scientific theories suggest about the end of the universe. He identifies two main theories. Either the universe will re-contract in a "big crunch" or it will expand forever and dissipate in heat death (87-88). Fergusson wonders how these theories can be reconciled with the Christian eschatological hope, finding suggestions made by Freeman Dyson, Frank Tipler, Paul Davies, and John Polkinghorne illuminating (88-92). The final section of the book in on Biblical eschatology. Fergusson writes: "The end of creation is Christ-shaped, as was its beginning. He is the one by whom and for whom all things were created." But Fergusson worries about whether the notion of such divine sovereignty "promotes relationships of power found in patriarchal attitudes" (94) that lead to the devaluing of creation, turning to the work of Sallie McFague to find a clear development of this worry (95). Contra McFague, Fergusson argues, as he did in the first chapter, that Christian theology has more than enough resources for a robust ethic of responsible stewardship. He then closes the chapter with a brief discussion of the "already-but-not-yet" nature of the Christian hope (96-97) as it is developed in Christian theology.

While Fergusson succeeds in showing where issues relating to the doctrine of creation intersect with the Christian faith, nowhere does he really argue that it "must remain a distinctively Christian article of faith." So I must judge his first ambition unsatisfied. What about his second ambition? Fergusson certainly succeeds in recognizing criticisms that have been `laid at the door of [the doctrine of creation's] traditional formulations.' He also succeeds, at least personally, in accommodating them in many places (that is, revising the traditional doctrine in order to accommodate respective criticisms). His second ambition therefore seems satisfied. I, however, do not find the reasons Ferguson provides to justify such accommodations worth following in many places.