Customer Reviews

The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual

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Whether you pick the book up expecting to agree with its conclusion or detest the same, you'll not be a better man for having made it through all 190 snotty pages.

The book (really a collection of essays, with each chapter written by a different author) is presented as a foil to FM 3-24, the US Army-Marine Corps Joint Manual on Counterinsurgency. However, it's really a commentary about US foreign policy and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are a few worthy points from which I learned something. The section on the permanent narrowing of physics research as a result of the Manhattan Project was instructive and made the authors' concerns about bastardization of anthropology seem less paranoid. David Price brings up some legitimate concerns about plagiarism and the scholarship underlying FM 3-24 (Though his critique would carry less weight were it not for the publication of an open-source edition of FM 3-24 through the University of Chicago Press. I guess it's a criticism the military brought on themselves.).

However, you'll have to wade through an awful lot of unprofessionalism to find those worthy points.

The authors treat FM 3-24 not strictly as the doctrinal manual it is but as prescriptive foreign policy. FM 3-24 is just what it says it is: A military manual on how to perform population-centric counterinsurgency that may or may not be useful/heartwarming. It is not a prescription for when and if counterinsurgency should be performed, much less when the US should intervene in the affairs of other states. It's a guide for battalion commanders for whom counterinsurgency is a fact with which they have no choice but to deal (unless they're willing to do prison time for disobeying orders, which of course is not out of the question).

There are lots of logical holes in the philosophy underlying the book's message, chief among them that the existence of counterinsurgency is used as proof of the inherent unjustness of counterinsurgency. Since FM 3-24, and counterinsurgency doctrine generally, are treated as proxies for "imperialist" foreign policy, the authors see no logical flaw in including a chapter on the creation of AFRICOM that does not directly address counterinsurgency practice on the African continent. The word "undoubtedly" is thrown around when the authors lack the evidence to back up their claims, or when they're predicting the future.

Throughout the book, US military operations are treated as inherently bad while insurgencies (being directed, as they are, against governments) are treated as inherently just. The only exception I can recall is on page 181, in which the Taliban are obligatorily described as "repugnant" (though not, by implication, as repugnant as the US military).

There is a generous dose of sniping at groups not limited to the military, making it appear that the authors relish the idea of having archenemies and casting doubt on the health of their discipline's culture. On page 84, Greg Feldman actually throws a tantrum over the fact that the author of FM 3-24's introduction had the audacity to describe the manual as "radical" (as in, a radical departure from the American way of war, which it is to the degree that military commanders actually follow its tenets) when the "far left" already claimed that word for themselves. That should give you a pretty good idea of the caliber of argumentation we're talking about here.

The tone is one of overbearing self-importance, not to mention moral certainty. It made me wonder just what it is anthropologists do that the military couldn't pick up elsewhere. The authors come off as immature jerks whose self-proclaimed expertise in cross-cultural communication clearly does not extend to most citizens of the United States.

The point is that there are clear guidelines for every profession. A doctor is obligated by their oath to provide care for someone in need in an emergency situation, whether or not they will be paid, etc. Psychologists must follow the ethical guidelines for psychologists or they can even be stripped of their qualifications.

*Anthropologists are to observe and NOT interfere, in ANY circumstance. You cannot remain unbiased if you are involved. We actually practice this in college, through case studies. These prepare for any situation, including whether an anthropologist should admit to the police if they witnessed a murder or tell them who the murderer was.

*Anthropologists are trained to look at things from BOTH sides of the lens, and try to understand situations from the "others'" point of view, even if the "other" is an insurgent. Remember- completely UNBIASED.

*Anthropologists are trained in how to gain the trust of those being observed, so that they may be accepted into a culture and fully observe and report on what they discover.

Observing, being unbiased, and using the information that you gain in a professional, ethical manner, is the ENTIRE point of being an anthropologist. These skills can be dangerous if misused, which is why anthropologists are so concerned with ethics, AND why the government is trying to exploit social scientists to gain an advantage. The use of ethnographic information against the "other" or to benefit one side over the other, is considered extremely unethical in our profession. And in this case the government is using "unbiased" anthropologists as part of a surveillance system to plan attacks, which kill people. Imagine a person who has become a psychiatrist simply so that they can take advantage of their helpless patients! Of course anthropologists are going to have a problem with it. And yes, anthropology IS for anthropologists alone. You are correct in saying that the military has many bright, educated people in it- they can figure it out themselves, leave the anthropology out of it.

Honestly, you can't complain about anthropologists having a problem with the government misusing their skills.

I was hoping for something that would provide alternative ideas to the current COIN strategy being employed in Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead the book was filled with wild claims, inaccuracies, and blatant lies about operations and how social science has been used in overseas contingency operations. As someone who's been there, I can honestly say this is a whole lot of worthless.

Clearly compiled by a group of people who do not understand the mission of the military. They believe the province of anthropology is theirs alone and can't be employed by others except as the group approves. Moreover, they believe it's their mission to inject into the defense establishment only those methodologies they find acceptable.

Note to anthropologists: The military is comprised of some very bright officers who understand research and scholarship. Most have graduate degrees. They really don't need the guidance of a bunch of social engineers.