Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study-, (2008) (Volume 4) [Paperback]

Seth G. Jones (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0833041339 | ISBN-13: 978-0833041333 | Publication Date: June 6, 2008 | Edition: 1

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. It argues that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable and legitimate local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.

Editorial Reviews

Review

What are the major factors that allow an insurgency to develop and stick? Native lawlessness and a foreign safe haven for resting and resupply. The mujahadeen hid from the Soviets in Pakistan, now Pakistan also protects the Taliban. Jones, who has made repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India since 2004, stresses the importance of involving local populations in counterinsurgency operations. The history and strategies in this book are important for understanding the nature of unconventional warfare, no matter where in the world it is. Libraries and bookstores can't go wrong with [this] volume. [It is] indispensable for historians, journalists, academics, and policy makers.
ForeWord Magazine , August 2008

From the Inside Flap

An examination of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan illustrates that successful counterinsurgency requires effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable local government; and the suppression of external support for insurgents.

Product Details

• Paperback: 176 pages
• Publisher: Rand Corporation; 1 edition (June 6, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0833041339
• ISBN-13: 978-0833041333
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 11.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,070,646 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Seth G. Jones serves as an advisor and plans officer for the Commanding General, U.S. Special Operations Forces, in Afghanistan. He lives outside of Washington, DC, and contributes regularly to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. Jones was named one of 2008's 'Best and Brightest' young policy experts by Esquire.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

19 of 20 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, September 21, 2009

By 

Robert Berg (La Luz, NM) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study-, (2008) (Volume 4) (Paperback)

Early on, the author takes a swipe at John Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife." To my mind, Mr. Jones missed something basic about that excellent volume and its focus, painting its entirety with a single quotation taken out of context in order to make a point. That swipe gave me pause as I read the balance of this work. I hope that did not color my overall experience.

There is much value here. I believe that value could have easily been put forward in a less redundant manner. Although no major paradigm shifts are offered, Mr. Jones identifies key areas where more focus will be beneficial (perhaps vital), if time, resources and cultural patterns allow. Featured among these are his views on the importance of developing the Afghan National Police. There are specifics regarding who can contribute to a broader training effort, but no real attention is given to how to deal with the cultural and security issues that need to be tackled for successful, broader deployment of ANP in contested zones. Recommendations for the areas of Information Operations and Civil/Military Affairs are concise but with valuable specifics. After correctly featuring the need/value of indigenous force development, however, Mr. Jones has very little specific about Afghan forces in the Command and Control section of Recommendations. Perhaps I am missing his intended scope in that section. The need to integrate/coordinate military, political and developmental efforts is a basic one. Nothing cohesive is advanced as to how to achieve this broad unity of effort (a goal that may not be attainable in any event) between international parties, the central government of Afghanistan, militaries, and diverse, local power brokers.

The study points out that Afghanistan has traditionally suffered from weak, inefficient central government. Classic counterinsurgency theory holds beneficial central governance as a pillar for success; rightfully so. The recent presidential election in Afghanistan may force the US and our allies to make a fundamental reassessment of whether clinging to that paradigm is mission effective. It is likely that a policy reliant on creating a state that functions effectively in some form of our own image is unrealistic in Afghanistan, and will not achieve the primary mission goal of depriving Al Qaeda and other Jihadists of safe havens. To compete effectively with Pakistani ISI, Iran, and Jihadists in the tribal, warlord, tariqa.... arenas will require a deeper cultural penetration on our part. It has been my experience that US efforts overseas generally base from islands rather than immersion - a psychological distance that hinders us in a counterinsurgency. I would have liked Mr. Jones to articulate more on the intellectual and cultural dexterity needed to more successfully impact Afghan society. US success in Afghanistan may ultimately come down to developing greater ability to effectively interact with Afghan cultural realities - not an easy task while in harm's way. The Information Operations section of Recommendations has many very good points, but focuses solely on getting our message out, not a word about how to better hear the Afghan people - who are the key playing field. Being a good listener is valuable in all relationships, critical for any chance of success in an Afghan counterinsurgency scenario where borders cannot be secured and central government is worm eaten with corruption.

5.0 out of 5 stars A must read for military heading to Afghanistan, December 28, 2010

By 

Jeff - See all my reviews

This review is from: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study-, (2008) (Volume 4) (Paperback)

Does a nice job of breaking down challenges in plain speak, but with enough scholarly insight to ensure the important issues are addressed.