Customer Reviews

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study-, (2008) (Volume 4)

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Early on, the author takes a swipe at John Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife." To my mind, Mr. Jones missed something basic about that excellent volume and its focus, painting its entirety with a single quotation taken out of context in order to make a point. That swipe gave me pause as I read the balance of this work. I hope that did not color my overall experience.

There is much value here. I believe that value could have easily been put forward in a less redundant manner. Although no major paradigm shifts are offered, Mr. Jones identifies key areas where more focus will be beneficial (perhaps vital), if time, resources and cultural patterns allow. Featured among these are his views on the importance of developing the Afghan National Police. There are specifics regarding who can contribute to a broader training effort, but no real attention is given to how to deal with the cultural and security issues that need to be tackled for successful, broader deployment of ANP in contested zones. Recommendations for the areas of Information Operations and Civil/Military Affairs are concise but with valuable specifics. After correctly featuring the need/value of indigenous force development, however, Mr. Jones has very little specific about Afghan forces in the Command and Control section of Recommendations. Perhaps I am missing his intended scope in that section. The need to integrate/coordinate military, political and developmental efforts is a basic one. Nothing cohesive is advanced as to how to achieve this broad unity of effort (a goal that may not be attainable in any event) between international parties, the central government of Afghanistan, militaries, and diverse, local power brokers.

The study points out that Afghanistan has traditionally suffered from weak, inefficient central government. Classic counterinsurgency theory holds beneficial central governance as a pillar for success; rightfully so. The recent presidential election in Afghanistan may force the US and our allies to make a fundamental reassessment of whether clinging to that paradigm is mission effective. It is likely that a policy reliant on creating a state that functions effectively in some form of our own image is unrealistic in Afghanistan, and will not achieve the primary mission goal of depriving Al Qaeda and other Jihadists of safe havens. To compete effectively with Pakistani ISI, Iran, and Jihadists in the tribal, warlord, tariqa.... arenas will require a deeper cultural penetration on our part. It has been my experience that US efforts overseas generally base from islands rather than immersion - a psychological distance that hinders us in a counterinsurgency. I would have liked Mr. Jones to articulate more on the intellectual and cultural dexterity needed to more successfully impact Afghan society. US success in Afghanistan may ultimately come down to developing greater ability to effectively interact with Afghan cultural realities - not an easy task while in harm's way. The Information Operations section of Recommendations has many very good points, but focuses solely on getting our message out, not a word about how to better hear the Afghan people - who are the key playing field. Being a good listener is valuable in all relationships, critical for any chance of success in an Afghan counterinsurgency scenario where borders cannot be secured and central government is worm eaten with corruption.

Does a nice job of breaking down challenges in plain speak, but with enough scholarly insight to ensure the important issues are addressed.