David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.
Counterinsurgency
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Editorial Reviews
Review
Praise for The Accidental Guerrilla: "For a wider perspective on the lessons drawn over the past seven years of the 'war on terror', the reader can do no better than turn to Mr. Kilcullen's excellent book." --The Economist
"Should be required reading foranyone involved in the war on terror. Kilcullen's central concept of the 'accidental guerrilla' is brilliant and the policy prescriptions that flow from it important." --Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek
"Kilcullen's ideas...are likely to shape U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan for the immediate future." --Laura Miller, Salon.com
"The Accidental Guerrilla is a master class in counterinsurgency from a man who, as much as anyone, is responsible for recent successes in Iraq." --The Boston Globe
"Kilcullen's influence on how the U.S. military thought about counterinsurgency campaigning cannot be overstated." --Tom Ricks, author of The Gamble and Fiasco
"There are some standard texts on [counterinsurgency]. The Accidental Guerrilla is sure to become one." --The Wall Street Journal
"This book is essential.... Kilcullen skillfully interprets the future of counterinsurgency, the proper use of military force and what we must learn from our losses and mistakes. After reading The Accidental Guerrilla, one is left to wonder why the Pentagon did not listen to his sage advice back in 2003." --New York Times Book Review --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
"Should be required reading foranyone involved in the war on terror. Kilcullen's central concept of the 'accidental guerrilla' is brilliant and the policy prescriptions that flow from it important." --Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek
"Kilcullen's ideas...are likely to shape U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan for the immediate future." --Laura Miller, Salon.com
"The Accidental Guerrilla is a master class in counterinsurgency from a man who, as much as anyone, is responsible for recent successes in Iraq." --The Boston Globe
"Kilcullen's influence on how the U.S. military thought about counterinsurgency campaigning cannot be overstated." --Tom Ricks, author of The Gamble and Fiasco
"There are some standard texts on [counterinsurgency]. The Accidental Guerrilla is sure to become one." --The Wall Street Journal
"This book is essential.... Kilcullen skillfully interprets the future of counterinsurgency, the proper use of military force and what we must learn from our losses and mistakes. After reading The Accidental Guerrilla, one is left to wonder why the Pentagon did not listen to his sage advice back in 2003." --New York Times Book Review --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.
About the Author
David Kilcullen was formerly the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus in Iraq and later an advisor to General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan. He is currently an advisor to NATO. Kilcullen is also Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
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More About the Author
David Kilcullen is at once part of General David Petraeus' brain trust in Baghdad, an Australian anthropologist, a Pentagon-based counterinsurgency theorist, and an on-the-ground officer/military advisor who has worked in hotspots ranging from East Africa to the Javanese highlands to the jungles of the Philippines. The "go-to guy" for journalists when it comes to counterinsurgency, he was interviewed for a full-hour on Charlie Rose , was the subject of a full-length profile in the New Yorker written by George Packer, and he's quoted frequently in The New York Times . David Kilcullen is a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute.
Customer Reviews
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
46 of 47 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback
In the epilogue of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T.E. Lawrence states after reading, `Super flumina Babylonis,' he had a longing to feel himself the node of a national movement.
David Kilcullen should take satisfaction in knowing he achieved Lawrence's longing with his contribution to the United States military re-focus on Counterinsurgency during the recent and ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Kilcullen's interest in the subject is stimulated by his service as an Australian officer with experience in East Timor and Indonesia. He has done an enormous amount of interesting work on the title topic (he has a doctorate in politics from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, focusing on the effects of guerrilla warfare on non-state political systems in traditional societies).
He covers writing of the "28 articles," a concise practical guide for junior officers and non-commissioned officers engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I first read the articles in an email chain in 29 Palms after my first deployment to Ar Ramadi, Iraq as a Marine infantry officer. The email had gone viral and I assume every officer who had been or was going to Iraq or Afghanistan not only read it but printed it, highlighted it, wrote notes next to the points and tucked it away in their platoon commander's note book for future reference.
Kilicullen brilliantly takes the complex theories of counterinsurgency and boils them into simple title phrases that can be easily recalled.
#7- Train the squad leaders then trust them
# 13- build trusted networks
These were not just read and forgot but read, digested and implemented at the company and platoon level. My company commander on my second tour to Ar Ramadi in 2007, Marcus Mainz, took # 8 - Rank is nothing talent is everything and frocked two NCOs to lieutenants to run combined action teams living 10 Marines to 100+ Iraqi Police.
Kilcullen also offers an analytical approach on measuring progress in Afghanistan. My twin brother (a Marine JAG officer) who is currently serving in Afghanistan under General McChrystal has relayed to me the CGs emphasis on a new operation culture stressing the importance of measurable metrics. What does the price of exotic vegetables have to do with fighting the Taliban? Everything, Kilcullen tells us.
The Australian combat academic has a gift for straightforward style and also covers Globalization, Bottom up State Formation and Countering Global Insurgency in this definitive indispensable work on counterinsurgency.
David Kilcullen should take satisfaction in knowing he achieved Lawrence's longing with his contribution to the United States military re-focus on Counterinsurgency during the recent and ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Kilcullen's interest in the subject is stimulated by his service as an Australian officer with experience in East Timor and Indonesia. He has done an enormous amount of interesting work on the title topic (he has a doctorate in politics from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, focusing on the effects of guerrilla warfare on non-state political systems in traditional societies).
He covers writing of the "28 articles," a concise practical guide for junior officers and non-commissioned officers engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. I first read the articles in an email chain in 29 Palms after my first deployment to Ar Ramadi, Iraq as a Marine infantry officer. The email had gone viral and I assume every officer who had been or was going to Iraq or Afghanistan not only read it but printed it, highlighted it, wrote notes next to the points and tucked it away in their platoon commander's note book for future reference.
Kilicullen brilliantly takes the complex theories of counterinsurgency and boils them into simple title phrases that can be easily recalled.
#7- Train the squad leaders then trust them
# 13- build trusted networks
These were not just read and forgot but read, digested and implemented at the company and platoon level. My company commander on my second tour to Ar Ramadi in 2007, Marcus Mainz, took # 8 - Rank is nothing talent is everything and frocked two NCOs to lieutenants to run combined action teams living 10 Marines to 100+ Iraqi Police.
Kilcullen also offers an analytical approach on measuring progress in Afghanistan. My twin brother (a Marine JAG officer) who is currently serving in Afghanistan under General McChrystal has relayed to me the CGs emphasis on a new operation culture stressing the importance of measurable metrics. What does the price of exotic vegetables have to do with fighting the Taliban? Everything, Kilcullen tells us.
The Australian combat academic has a gift for straightforward style and also covers Globalization, Bottom up State Formation and Countering Global Insurgency in this definitive indispensable work on counterinsurgency.
28 of 28 people found the following review helpful
By Trav Hallen
Format:Paperback
In order to form a rational opinion on the West's involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan it is necessary to have at least a basic idea of what counterinsurgency operations are all about. Without an understanding of the type of operations being conducted and their aims, it is not possible to make a considered determination of whether we are winning or losing, or whether we should get out or stay in for the long haul. Therefore a primer on counterinsurgency written by one of the world leading authorities (both practical and academic) is sorely needed as the West reconsiders its options. Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency" hits the mark accurately and with power, but it is not without fault.
For those trying to come to grips with all the talk and debate over the progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easily to become swayed by the reports in the media. Without understanding how to measure success in an insurgency and what is trying to be achieved, the general public and the media continue to view progress through the lens of conventional military operations. Killcullen's book provides the background necessary to understand what the West should try to do, why they should try to do it, how to do it, and (very importantly) how to know what you are doing is having the desired effect. This sort of information presented in language that is easy to read and understand has been sorely missing to date, and Kilcullen has done an excellent job of providing an entry level book on counterinsurgency for the layman.
As a primer the book is excellent as it draws together a diverse range of Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency, from his work in Indonesia and East Timor, to the famous "Twenty-Eight Articles". It is therefore a one-stop shop to get your head around the big issues. However, as Kilcullen has included the articles in their original state, the book offers very little for those who are familiar with Kilcullen's work. This is unfortunate and represents a missed opportunity. Instead of updating the texts, Kilcullen has added a number of "author's notes" to highlight changes in his thinking or in the situation after the article was written. I am hard pressed to understand why the author didn't re-edit and update the articles themselves. This would have added significant value to the work rather than letting the reader know that what they have just read is no longer completely accurate. This is very disappointing.
Despite having articles that are now out-dated, the diversity of the writings that have been included provide a variety of perspectives on the issues involved in counterinsurgency. The book is more than simply a look at Iraq and Afghanistan, it contains insights into the challenges of combating a global insurgency as well as examining counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Indonesians soon after gaining independence. One article that I thought was an interesting inclusion was Kilcullen's report on the Mootain Bridge engagement following the UN intervention in East Timor. This was not so much an insight into insurgencies perse, but rather an example of the power of the media and the need for the troops to think strategically. This is something that is vital in current counterinsurgency operations.
In summary:
An excellent primer on counterinsurgency for those trying to understand it, but offers little to the seasoned campaigner.
I would recommend this book to:
(1) Journalists
(2) New military recruits
(3) Politicians
(4) The general public who wish to make an informed judgment of current operations.
For those trying to come to grips with all the talk and debate over the progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is easily to become swayed by the reports in the media. Without understanding how to measure success in an insurgency and what is trying to be achieved, the general public and the media continue to view progress through the lens of conventional military operations. Killcullen's book provides the background necessary to understand what the West should try to do, why they should try to do it, how to do it, and (very importantly) how to know what you are doing is having the desired effect. This sort of information presented in language that is easy to read and understand has been sorely missing to date, and Kilcullen has done an excellent job of providing an entry level book on counterinsurgency for the layman.
As a primer the book is excellent as it draws together a diverse range of Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency, from his work in Indonesia and East Timor, to the famous "Twenty-Eight Articles". It is therefore a one-stop shop to get your head around the big issues. However, as Kilcullen has included the articles in their original state, the book offers very little for those who are familiar with Kilcullen's work. This is unfortunate and represents a missed opportunity. Instead of updating the texts, Kilcullen has added a number of "author's notes" to highlight changes in his thinking or in the situation after the article was written. I am hard pressed to understand why the author didn't re-edit and update the articles themselves. This would have added significant value to the work rather than letting the reader know that what they have just read is no longer completely accurate. This is very disappointing.
Despite having articles that are now out-dated, the diversity of the writings that have been included provide a variety of perspectives on the issues involved in counterinsurgency. The book is more than simply a look at Iraq and Afghanistan, it contains insights into the challenges of combating a global insurgency as well as examining counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Indonesians soon after gaining independence. One article that I thought was an interesting inclusion was Kilcullen's report on the Mootain Bridge engagement following the UN intervention in East Timor. This was not so much an insight into insurgencies perse, but rather an example of the power of the media and the need for the troops to think strategically. This is something that is vital in current counterinsurgency operations.
In summary:
An excellent primer on counterinsurgency for those trying to understand it, but offers little to the seasoned campaigner.
I would recommend this book to:
(1) Journalists
(2) New military recruits
(3) Politicians
(4) The general public who wish to make an informed judgment of current operations.
17 of 19 people found the following review helpful
Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase
For students and practitioners of statecraft, nation building, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, David Kilcullen is a living legend.
His main claim to fame is as author of the modern classic 'Twenty-Eight Articles', the writing of which apparently started on a whim in a Washington area Starbucks early one March 2006 evening and finished on his laptop at home the wee hours of the following morning. Emailed to a few colleagues for comment that early morning, the article went viral (even I received a copy!) and has now been read in its hundreds of thousands of copies, perhaps millions, translated into multiple languages and a freely available download if one but types its name into an internet search.
An experienced army officer and academic, so steeped in counterinsurgency to have written such a masterwork of community-level operations as 'Twenty-Eight Articles', must have more to say if given book-length scope to say it. 'Counterinsurgency' is David Kilcullen's second book-length opportunity to do so. I was disappointed to discover that it is not really a book but a loosely connected patchwork of his previously published articles, including a repeat of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', each with a patina of his annotations.
An initial point, tantalizingly dangled and then abruptly left hanging, is that the only two hard rules of counter-insurgency are (1) an absolute need to respect non-combatants and (2) to beware of template approaches, given that successful counterinsurgencies are ultimately custom built to fit a particular situation and may involve doing precisely the opposite of a solution that worked in a different insurgency.
The patchwork of articles approach frustrated me as it only partially illustrated any conclusions, and even that was too frequently left to the reader's own inferences. Beyond the author being a key participant and that it allowed the reprinting of a previously published article, I ended confused, for example, as to the logic behind including a 40 page discussion (about 20% of the book) on a minor 1999 engagement during East Timor's separation from Indonesia. If there were broad conclusions that could be drawn from that engagement - the Australian Army, in this instance, was arguably an ultimately successful UN-sponsored insurgent force against the counterinsurgent Indonesian Army - the conclusions should have been spelled out. I was too thick to detect them.
Even the title, 'Counterinsurgency', seems to bait and switch diplomats, aid workers and soldiers hungry for knowledge in advance of a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. One of the points the author seems guide the reader toward is that if the issue is seen as a counterinsurgency, rather than a competition between systems within which an insurgency operates, the effort may be doomed to defeat itself.
Notwithstanding the lack of organizing frame and direction, the book contained much of value. The brief, stark and sober chapter on measuring performance in Afghanistan was itself worth the price of the book. Likewise, the final chapter contained promising ideas, vexingly only partially developed, about insurgencies as systems best dealt with on a systems level. That concept, more fully elaborated, may have been the great book I was hoping for.
Perhaps my expectations were raised too high by the elegance and blinding clarity of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', but 'Counterinsurgency' ultimately disappoints as a stock and workmanlike addition to the genre, interrupted by brief flashes of blinding insight.
His main claim to fame is as author of the modern classic 'Twenty-Eight Articles', the writing of which apparently started on a whim in a Washington area Starbucks early one March 2006 evening and finished on his laptop at home the wee hours of the following morning. Emailed to a few colleagues for comment that early morning, the article went viral (even I received a copy!) and has now been read in its hundreds of thousands of copies, perhaps millions, translated into multiple languages and a freely available download if one but types its name into an internet search.
An experienced army officer and academic, so steeped in counterinsurgency to have written such a masterwork of community-level operations as 'Twenty-Eight Articles', must have more to say if given book-length scope to say it. 'Counterinsurgency' is David Kilcullen's second book-length opportunity to do so. I was disappointed to discover that it is not really a book but a loosely connected patchwork of his previously published articles, including a repeat of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', each with a patina of his annotations.
An initial point, tantalizingly dangled and then abruptly left hanging, is that the only two hard rules of counter-insurgency are (1) an absolute need to respect non-combatants and (2) to beware of template approaches, given that successful counterinsurgencies are ultimately custom built to fit a particular situation and may involve doing precisely the opposite of a solution that worked in a different insurgency.
The patchwork of articles approach frustrated me as it only partially illustrated any conclusions, and even that was too frequently left to the reader's own inferences. Beyond the author being a key participant and that it allowed the reprinting of a previously published article, I ended confused, for example, as to the logic behind including a 40 page discussion (about 20% of the book) on a minor 1999 engagement during East Timor's separation from Indonesia. If there were broad conclusions that could be drawn from that engagement - the Australian Army, in this instance, was arguably an ultimately successful UN-sponsored insurgent force against the counterinsurgent Indonesian Army - the conclusions should have been spelled out. I was too thick to detect them.
Even the title, 'Counterinsurgency', seems to bait and switch diplomats, aid workers and soldiers hungry for knowledge in advance of a deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. One of the points the author seems guide the reader toward is that if the issue is seen as a counterinsurgency, rather than a competition between systems within which an insurgency operates, the effort may be doomed to defeat itself.
Notwithstanding the lack of organizing frame and direction, the book contained much of value. The brief, stark and sober chapter on measuring performance in Afghanistan was itself worth the price of the book. Likewise, the final chapter contained promising ideas, vexingly only partially developed, about insurgencies as systems best dealt with on a systems level. That concept, more fully elaborated, may have been the great book I was hoping for.
Perhaps my expectations were raised too high by the elegance and blinding clarity of 'Twenty-Eight Articles', but 'Counterinsurgency' ultimately disappoints as a stock and workmanlike addition to the genre, interrupted by brief flashes of blinding insight.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
This book is an excellent data base for scientific research
Contenporary international security environment requires detail analysis in order provide scientific solutions for sophisticated metodology pertaining for modeling and simulation. Read more
Published 1 month ago by jerry
4.0 out of 5 stars
Supplementary reading material
This is a well-written analysis on the principles of counterinsurgency and the development of this kind of warfare to our days. Read more
Published 5 months ago by Andrius Bivainis
5.0 out of 5 stars
WINNING THE WAR IN THE GHAN
David Kilcullen backs up his first book here with Counterinsurgency which goes into great detail about how to treat civilians and the enemy in an insurgency, such as Afghanistan. Read more
Published 13 months ago by Jamie Michael Norris
5.0 out of 5 stars
Outstanding
This should be one of the textbooks the military uses and references throughout officer and senior NCO schooling. Read more
Published 13 months ago by Hello
5.0 out of 5 stars
Relevant
This is a great book for anyone interested in either guerilla warfare, insurgencies, or counter insurgencies. Kilcullen knows his topic very well. Read more
Published 16 months ago by Shaun Paul Narzynski
5.0 out of 5 stars
Read this book
If you are interested in (or worried about) insurgencies and related topics, this is a good book to read. Read more
Published 20 months ago by Dean S. Hartley
5.0 out of 5 stars
Good Text Book
Over the past ten years our television screens have been filled with images of Afghanistan and Iraq. This oonflict has been described as an insurgency. Read more
Published 22 months ago by Thomas M. Magee
5.0 out of 5 stars
Greeat backgrounder
This book covers the in and outs of counterinsurgency in plain English. If you want to see what mistakes are being made in the field and in politics, just read this book and then... Read more
Published on May 8, 2011 by W. F. Sijtsma
5.0 out of 5 stars
John Boyd would be proud
I really liked reading this book. It was one of the most riveting and surprisingly useful books I read all year. Read more
Published on December 8, 2010 by Dan Bergevin
4.0 out of 5 stars
Useful, but Also Somewhat Disjointed
Insurgency is the most widespread form of warfare today, and throughout history. 'Counterinsurgency' is an umbrella term that describes the range of measures used to defeat... Read more
Published on August 16, 2010 by Loyd E. Eskildson
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