The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) [Hardcover]

Barrie A. Wigmore (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0313245746 | ISBN-13: 978-0313245749 | Publication Date: December 23, 1985

This is the first book to focus on the broader structural changes which took place in the financial industry over the full period of decline from the Stock Market Crash in 1929 to the end of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "One Hundred Days" in 1933. The basis for many of Wigmore's comments is an analysis of 142 leading companies whose stocks constituted approximately 77 percent of the market value of all New York Stock Exchange stocks. Wigmore also examines the various bond markets and relates the money market to the bond market, monetary policy, business conditions, and the problems of the banking system. Treating each year from 1929 to 1933 separately, Wigmore shows the interrelation between the stock, bond, and money markets and events in politics, the economy, international trade and finance, and monetary policy. The Statistical Appendix of 41 tables consolidates financial statistics which have hitherto been widely dispersed, permitting in-depth study.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“In this large volume Wigmore analyzes the infamous 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent depression in the US from 1929 through 1933. The focus is on the role of banks and the turbulent behavior of the securities' markets, but the author includes interesting and relevant discussion of both US and foreign government attempts to contain this collapse of economic activity. The detailed study (year by year, sector by sector, and market by market) supports one clear and convincing thesis: The "Great Depression" was not caused by faulty monetary policy, but was the result of fundamental imbalances and speculation on real goods and services as well as financial markets. Contributing to the debacle were attempts to set unrealistic exchange rates and allowing the disequilibrium to grow between international and domestic markets. Political goals and policies incompatible with reality were situations that no monetary policy could remedy; security markets simply reflected that state of affairs...a valuable source of data and analysis.”–CHOICE

“The Crash and Its Aftermath is an excellent work of reference on the Great Contraction. It will be useful both to people with only a passing curiosity about the Crash and to those for whom the Great Depression is a major scholarly concern.”–Business History

“From now on any serious student of the Depression will be obliged to consult this work for a sense of securities price movements, investor attitudes, and relevant contemporary sources.”–Journal of Economic History

Product Details

• Hardcover: 731 pages
• Publisher: Greenwood Press (December 23, 1985)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0313245746
• ISBN-13: 978-0313245749
• Product Dimensions: 9.5 x 6.4 x 1.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.9 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,519,665 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Great Unraveling, March 12, 2006

By 

Melvin Sico "melvinsico" (Singapore) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) (Hardcover)

Wigmore stresses that the Great Depression was not solely attributable to ill-advised monetary policy, but was primarily due to instabilities in the US economy. The 1929 stock market crash was the culmination of the speculative excesses of the 1920s: according to Wigmore, stock prices peaked at 30 times earnings and reached levels in excess of 400% of aggregate book value while return on equity was only about 16.5%. Wigmore studies the performance of the US banking system, and analyzes the measures the US government employed to address the crisis, such as the establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the promulgation of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Exacerbating and prolonging the Depression were singularly unfortunate policy choices, such as the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act which seemed tailor-made to widen the disparity between US and overseas markets. Anyone interested in the monetarist-Keynesian debate as to how the Depression began or in the emergence of bureaucratic sprawl created in the wake of the New Deal will find this volume insightful.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Wonderful, packed with data, April 17, 2009

By 

Integrity Reviews (USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) (Hardcover)

Wigmore is a financial professional who has created a magnificent work of scholarship. Twelve years in the writing, written about 20 years ago, it makes for amazing reading after the Crash of 2008. An essential book for any serious student of the Great Depression and the history of financial markets.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Hard reading, but mostly worth the effort, July 2, 2004

By 

Peter McCluskey (San Bruno, CA USA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The Crash and Its Aftermath: A History of Securities Markets in the United States, 1929-1933 (Contributions in Economics and Economic History) (Hardcover)

This is a rather dry and verbose but also careful and thorough financial and economic history.
I particularly like his explanation of why there was a banking crisis in 1933. Most other authors seem confused about this crisis, but Wigmore explains how the hints that Roosevelt planned to devalue the dollar, combined with a system under which bank deposits were tied to paper dollars but could be withdrawn as gold, made it safer to hold gold than to leave one's money in a bank.