Customer Reviews

The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360

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The Fourteenth Century is "my" century, and in my career I've been a professional military officer, Medieval historian and author. Perhaps that's why I admire Lt-Col Alfred H. Burne, D.S.O. and Fellow, Royal Historical Society, who wrote this valuable history book back in the 1950s using his own combination of skills as historian, professional military tactician in the British Army, and story-teller. After nearly 50 years THE CRECY WAR remains the best retelling I've read of the English military campaigns in France during the first half of the Fourteenth Century. No other book written in English approaches it for insight as well as information.

Like certain other Medievalists who served in World War II, Burne was assigned to the Allied staff developing the strategy of "Operation Overlord" -- the Normandy Invasion -- since the landings were planned for the La Manche coast near Cotentin, a few miles from the 1346 landfall of the English army. The entire 1944 buildup to D-Day, not only the landing site but the earlier diversions, intelligence gathering and disinformation campaign, were deliberately patterned after Edward III's successful Normandy invasion of 1346. Unfortunately the WWII forward thrust through France was a great deal more difficult and costly than the 1346 chevauchee that led to England's overwhelming victory at Crecy, then to the capture of Calais in 1347.

I share Burne's dubious, occasionally hostile, opinion of King Edward III of England. Edward's obsession with the throne of France caused social, economic and political upheavals throughout Europe and the unnecessary loss of tens of thousands of lives, with the suffering falling most heavily upon the poor of France. Burne even compares the English king to Hitler. Edward's motives were primarily those of self-aggrandizement, and he was not a particularly talented battle leader, commanding the Reserve division at Crecy, which meant that he stayed out of the fight and watched it from a tall windmill (rebuilt in our time as an observation tower for tourists). The king had the good luck to possess brilliant and loyal kinsmen and noblemen, and from them he chose as his field commanders some of the finest Britain has ever known.

One of Edward's leading generals was his first cousin, William Bohun, Earl of Northampton (1312?-1360), 29 or 30 years old when he led the English to a stunning victory at Morlaix in Brittany in 1342. Morlaix was the first English victory in France, other than in English-held Gascony, since Richard the Lion-Heart's campaigns. At Crecy, William Bohun was still only 34 years old when Edward chose him as co-commander of the Second "Battle" (or division) during the battle. He was in fact the lead commander of the Second, since his colleague was the Earl of Arundel, a mediocre soldier whose personal scandals had made him unpopular with other magnates, but who had to be placated since his vast wealth helped to finance the invasion and the king was deeply indebted to him. (Northampton also owed Arundel. Primary sources indicate that he was almost always heavily in debt.)

A few historians like T.F. Tout have recognized Northampton's prowess as both strategist and leader of troops. He never lost a battle. Oddly, he was the quiet one of a pair of twins -- the other died very young in the wars in Scotland -- who might never have been noticed for command if his affable twin had lived. Burne's contribution is to give us valuable glimpses into the warrior career of this unobtrusive "unknown soldier." These include crossing a broken bridge over the Seine on a 1-foot-wide plank, taking the French by surprise and assuring the English command of the right bank. Northampton's genius lay not in swashbuckling, however, but in strategic planning. Early on he recognized the excellence of his grandfather Edward I's tactic of massed Welsh and English archers, unused between Edward I's death in 1307 and the early 1330s, during the border wars with Scotland. During these campaigns, while still only a youthful knight in his early 20s, Tout believed that William Bohun began drilling his men in combined formations: massed archers working alongside unmounted knights whose swords protected the archers and "hedges" of pikemen similar to the schiltrons of Robert Bruce. His armies became expert at planting hidden "booby-traps." These combinations proved formidable against armored cavalry and resulted in English victories not only at Crecy but earlier at Halidon and Morlaix, and (resuscitated by Northampton's great-grandson Henry V) at Agincourt. Of the major English land victories in this period, only the Black Prince's generalship at Poitiers and Najera made use of old-fashioned cavalry, and Poitiers was won more by luck than skill.

Burne was the first to give us details of Northampton's swift march over the mountains of Brittany to catch the French by surprise, the archery-dominated battle of Morlaix, the battle and aftermath of Crecy, his leadership during the siege of Calais, and his service as a diplomat, up to the invasion of France in 1359-60 when he suddenly drops out of history, either ill or wounded. Perhaps because he died so young, under the age of 50, Northampton is forgotten. Even in his own day he was so retiring that he was passed over as one of the Founder knights of the Order of the Garter (ca. 1348), and had to wait in line for his nomination despite overwhelming qualifications. One historian (not Burne) has speculated that King Edward preferred amusing courtiers and that William Bohun may have inherited his father's melancholy personality. Even so, this Fourteenth Century Earl of Northampton might be ranked the greatest general, next to Wellington, that England has ever produced.

I've owned a hardback copy of THE CRECY WAR for years and am delighted that this fine book has been reprinted. My old copy is dogeared, yellowed, underlined to death, and otherwise difficult to read straight through -- so here's our chance to buy an inexpensive paperback of a valuable resource. Anyone with the slightest interest in Medieval warfare should do the same.

An excellent look at the Battle of Crecy. While strictly an history of the battle and campaign, this book is unencumbered enough to allow lessons learned to be considered for contemporary strategic thinkers/leaders.

Burne's writing is clear, but his 1940s English attitude makes for some odd turns of phrase. More troublesome, his penchant for creative interpretation of primary sources leads him to some unfounded conclusions. For example, his novel assertion that English archers were deployed in "wedges" within the overall battle line has been repudiated by professional historians including David Nicolle and Matthew Bennett. As one of the many amateur soldier-historians of the post-WWII era, Burne's conclusions are interesting military opinions but not quite academic-level scholarship.