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8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
When Titans Collide......., June 2, 2007
This review is from: A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi (Hardcover)
First let me state that while this is, indeed, a wonderful book, it is NOT for the casual reader, nor is it meant to be the first book one ever reads about the Civil War. Most people know nothing of the war beyond Lee, Grant, and the fact that there was fighting in, and around, Virginia. If that's you, stop here.....There was a whole different theatre of operations called the Trans-Mississippi Department, commanded by a little known Floridian, General Edmund Kirby Smith. From his headquarters in Shreveport, LA, Smith oversaw Confederate operations in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, and what is now Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. Didn't know the Civil War involved Oklahoma? It's quite a story, complete with the first American Indian General. Were there Confederate Mexicans? Sure were, some with high rank.
General Smith was as much a Governor-General as he was a General, and he faced impossible conflicting demands from different parts of his domain. Part of his difficulty was that many of his senior leaders were Robert E. Lee's incompetent rejects. This book is mainly about Smith's problems with the one who was NOT incompetent, Lieutenant General Richard Taylor. Before the war, Taylor was a rich, high society Louisiana plantation owner. His father was President Zachary Taylor, and his sister was Jefferson Davis' late first wife. Taylor was a vain and unpleasant man, but a tough fighter. Smith and Taylor were like gasoline and fire. They were both loyal to the South, and wanted victory, but had fundamentally different views on how victory could best be won. Basically, Smith wanted to concentrate on Arkansas and Missouri, Taylor on Louisiana. Dick Taylor's Red River campaign was a masterpiece, but he blamed Smith for lack of the support needed to make his victory complete. Finally Taylor's insubordination went too far, and he was relieved. Had these two great men been able to cooperate, would the final outcome of the war been different? Who knows, but I doubt it. For all their problems, the Department lasted till the very end, and was the last to surrender. After the war, Taylor got into politics, and continued to sling mud at Smith until he died in 1879. Kirby Smith lived till 1893, the last full General to cross the river; he spent his last 18 years as mathematics professor at the University of the South, accorded the status of "grand old man" [ though he wasn't that "old"]. He maintained his bearing as a Christian gentleman, and never spoke out against Taylor, or anyone else. The whole business is a sad, but fascinating, chapter of the war.
Jeff Prushankin has written a winner, fully deserving five stars. It is for the specialist, not the general reader [as my son says, for people like me] With that caveat in mind, if this is your cup of tea, get it and prepare to enjoy.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Command Confrontation in the Trans-Mississippi, April 30, 2007
This review is from: A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi (Hardcover)
Compared to Civil War operations in Northern Virginia, comparatively little has been published regarding operations west of the Mississippi River. In this work, the author Jeffery Prushankin provides a comprehensive overview of the events in the Trans-Mississippi area as viewed by Department Commander General Edmund Kirby Smith and by his subordinate General Richard Taylor. The text offers an informative account of the antagonistic relationship between these two generals and the consequent military results.
The text opens with a brief narrative of the backgrounds of the two generals. Taylor received a political commission as a colonel of the Ninth Louisiana Infantry. He was promoted to brigadier general and briefly served under General Stonewall Jackson. Under Jackson, Taylor adopted Jackson's philosophy that "The value of the initiative in war cannot be overstated" resulting in the tactical strategy that the best defense is a good offense. Kirby-Smith graduated from West Point in 1845 and served in the war in Mexico. In May 1861, he received an appointment as chief of staff to General Joseph F. Johnson. He learned from Johnson and adopted Johnson's tactical and strategic philosophies. The opposing tactical/strategic philosophies of Smith and Taylor, was one of the items contributing to the many confrontations between Smith and Taylor.
As a brigadier general Smith was sent to command the Department of East Tennessee where he promptly repeated the mistake of his predecessor by concentrating on Arkansas."His propensity to favor the defensive often led to sluggish or ill-timed concentration that made his strategy ineffective." Taylor assigned to Louisiana, by October 1862 was operating as an independent command thereby setting the stage for confrontations.
The text narrates how in 1863 with the mounting threat to Vicksburg and reduced Federal threat in central Louisiana, Smith chose a politically expedient path and ordered Taylor to strike the Federals west of the Mississippi. Their consequent failures along the Mississippi subsequently reflected badly on both Smith and Taylor and only added to the burgeoning dispute between Smith and Taylor. By mid-1863 Smith was not providing the type of leadership required in the Trans-Mississippi. Smith's failure to support Taylor lead to serious problems for the Confederates in 1864 and also resulted in additional serious problems between the generals.
The text provides a brief account of the Red River campaign which Taylor executed receiving inconsistent support from Smith. Disobeying orders, on April 8, 1864, Taylor attached the Federal Army under General Banks at Mansfield, Louisiana, stopping the Federal advance. The next day Taylor fought and defeated Banks at Pleasant Hill after which the Federals began to retreat pursued by Taylor. Meanwhile, Smith following his Arkansas strategy didn't support Taylor and withdrew infantry and cavalry from Taylor for Smith's pursuit of Union General Steele back to Little Rock. Taylor pursued General Banks to Alexandria, but lacked the necessary manpower to defeat Banks; Banks ultimately escaped. Smith's campaign against Union General Steele resulted in victory at the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, but it did not "enhance the condition of the Confederacy in the Trans-Mississippi." The dispute between Smith and Taylor became quite bitter with Taylor blaming Smith for the escape of General Banks and the Federal Fleet under Admiral Porter.
Taylor asked to be relieved from command. Smith removed Taylor from command on June 10, 1864. Amazingly, on July 18 Taylor was promoted to lieutenant general and was reassigned as commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. The author gives a short narration of Taylor's effort to cross the Mississippi and assume his new command together with a brief summary of his and Smith's activities to the end of the war. Smith surrendered in Galveston on June 2, 1865 while Taylor had surrendered May 6, 1865 at Citronelle, Alabama. After surrendering Taylor went to Washington to lobby for the release of Jefferson Davis after which he worked as a lobbyist for the Democratic Party and as an outspoken critic of the Ku Klux Klan. Smith traveled first to Mexico City where he was unwelcome, then traveled to Cuba eventually returning home.
In 1879 Taylor published his memoir titled Destruction and Reconstruction which helped nurture the Lost Cause myth. In his memoir Taylor described Smith's policy as one of "sheer stupidity and pig-headed obstinacy...." His memoirs were relied on by countless former Confederates "for their own reminiscences of the war."
Despite their acrimonious relationship, Smith and Taylor produced a great Confederate military accomplishment in the Red River campaign against a superior Union force. Unfortunately, Smith's cavalry raid on St. Louis resulted in little of military value.
The reader of this book will find it a source of much information on an often neglected area of operations. It gives fascinating portraits of opposing strategies and personalities. With the Red River campaign a great Confederate accomplishment, one can only speculate on what would have been accomplished if Taylor and Smith had worked harmoniously together.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Who is the enemy?, September 1, 2007
This review is from: A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi (Hardcover)
The war between general officers can be as interesting as the war between the armies. Bragg's problems as commander of the Army of Tennessee with Polk and Hardee, Hood undercutting Johnston in 1864, the often-contentious HR problems of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Pope McClellan feud and Halleck maneuvering against Grant are well known. Each of these is the subject of books or devoted chapters in numerous histories of the war. The concentration on the war east of the Mississippi misses one of the worst feuds between generals during the war. Richard Taylor and Edmund Kirby Smith were both proud, competent men that were sure they knew what was best. After the fall of Vicksburg, the Trans-Mississippi became Kirby Smithdom. Isolated from the Confederacy, subject to conflicting demands and directives from Richmond that might be impossible these two men fought the Union Army and each other to a standstill. This is their story both during and after the war.
Neither man seems to have had real warm feelings for the other. Taylor was responsible for Louisiana and reported to Smith who commanded the Trans-Mississippi. The author gives us a full and careful review of the two men, their war experiences and political support. This allows the reader to fully understand the root of the problems and appreciate the extant of their bitterness. Taylor's handling of CSA forces during the Red River Campaign is brilliant. He defeats a much larger combined arms force isolating each and almost destroying both. Smith may or may not have robbed Taylor of victory by removing troops to defeat an army advancing in Arkansas.
This book assumes the reader knows very little and carefully explains the position of the parties, their options and the results of the choice made. This is one of the strongest parts of the book and keeps the reader fully informed, allowing us to make informed decisions. A second strong point is covering the post-war history of both men and how the story grew and changed. This is being done more often in better histories, is well handled and very valuable.
Richmond is part of the problem and the shadowy presence over the Trans-Mississippi. The source of power, Smith and Taylor supporters battle there too. However, Richmond has an agenda that fully supports neither and causes problems for both. In the end, as was done elsewhere, Richmond refuses to support either side. This book is not an expose of the Confederate Departmental system but it shows all the problems this system caused and that Richmond refused to resolve.
This is not an easy read but it is a worthwhile read. The author's words do not jump off the page, grab you and pull you in. They build a solid reliable narration that is full of information and is very logical. This is a book that those interested in the Trans-Mississippi and/or the Confederate high command should read.
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