Customer Reviews

A Crisis in Confederate Command: Edmund Kirby Smith, Richard Taylor, and the Army of the Trans-Mississippi

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First let me state that while this is, indeed, a wonderful book, it is NOT for the casual reader, nor is it meant to be the first book one ever reads about the Civil War. Most people know nothing of the war beyond Lee, Grant, and the fact that there was fighting in, and around, Virginia. If that's you, stop here.....There was a whole different theatre of operations called the Trans-Mississippi Department, commanded by a little known Floridian, General Edmund Kirby Smith. From his headquarters in Shreveport, LA, Smith oversaw Confederate operations in Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, and what is now Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. Didn't know the Civil War involved Oklahoma? It's quite a story, complete with the first American Indian General. Were there Confederate Mexicans? Sure were, some with high rank.

General Smith was as much a Governor-General as he was a General, and he faced impossible conflicting demands from different parts of his domain. Part of his difficulty was that many of his senior leaders were Robert E. Lee's incompetent rejects. This book is mainly about Smith's problems with the one who was NOT incompetent, Lieutenant General Richard Taylor. Before the war, Taylor was a rich, high society Louisiana plantation owner. His father was President Zachary Taylor, and his sister was Jefferson Davis' late first wife. Taylor was a vain and unpleasant man, but a tough fighter. Smith and Taylor were like gasoline and fire. They were both loyal to the South, and wanted victory, but had fundamentally different views on how victory could best be won. Basically, Smith wanted to concentrate on Arkansas and Missouri, Taylor on Louisiana. Dick Taylor's Red River campaign was a masterpiece, but he blamed Smith for lack of the support needed to make his victory complete. Finally Taylor's insubordination went too far, and he was relieved. Had these two great men been able to cooperate, would the final outcome of the war been different? Who knows, but I doubt it. For all their problems, the Department lasted till the very end, and was the last to surrender. After the war, Taylor got into politics, and continued to sling mud at Smith until he died in 1879. Kirby Smith lived till 1893, the last full General to cross the river; he spent his last 18 years as mathematics professor at the University of the South, accorded the status of "grand old man" [ though he wasn't that "old"]. He maintained his bearing as a Christian gentleman, and never spoke out against Taylor, or anyone else. The whole business is a sad, but fascinating, chapter of the war.

Jeff Prushankin has written a winner, fully deserving five stars. It is for the specialist, not the general reader [as my son says, for people like me] With that caveat in mind, if this is your cup of tea, get it and prepare to enjoy.

Compared to Civil War operations in Northern Virginia, comparatively little has been published regarding operations west of the Mississippi River. In this work, the author Jeffery Prushankin provides a comprehensive overview of the events in the Trans-Mississippi area as viewed by Department Commander General Edmund Kirby Smith and by his subordinate General Richard Taylor. The text offers an informative account of the antagonistic relationship between these two generals and the consequent military results.

The text opens with a brief narrative of the backgrounds of the two generals. Taylor received a political commission as a colonel of the Ninth Louisiana Infantry. He was promoted to brigadier general and briefly served under General Stonewall Jackson. Under Jackson, Taylor adopted Jackson's philosophy that "The value of the initiative in war cannot be overstated" resulting in the tactical strategy that the best defense is a good offense. Kirby-Smith graduated from West Point in 1845 and served in the war in Mexico. In May 1861, he received an appointment as chief of staff to General Joseph F. Johnson. He learned from Johnson and adopted Johnson's tactical and strategic philosophies. The opposing tactical/strategic philosophies of Smith and Taylor, was one of the items contributing to the many confrontations between Smith and Taylor.

As a brigadier general Smith was sent to command the Department of East Tennessee where he promptly repeated the mistake of his predecessor by concentrating on Arkansas."His propensity to favor the defensive often led to sluggish or ill-timed concentration that made his strategy ineffective." Taylor assigned to Louisiana, by October 1862 was operating as an independent command thereby setting the stage for confrontations.

The text narrates how in 1863 with the mounting threat to Vicksburg and reduced Federal threat in central Louisiana, Smith chose a politically expedient path and ordered Taylor to strike the Federals west of the Mississippi. Their consequent failures along the Mississippi subsequently reflected badly on both Smith and Taylor and only added to the burgeoning dispute between Smith and Taylor. By mid-1863 Smith was not providing the type of leadership required in the Trans-Mississippi. Smith's failure to support Taylor lead to serious problems for the Confederates in 1864 and also resulted in additional serious problems between the generals.

The text provides a brief account of the Red River campaign which Taylor executed receiving inconsistent support from Smith. Disobeying orders, on April 8, 1864, Taylor attached the Federal Army under General Banks at Mansfield, Louisiana, stopping the Federal advance. The next day Taylor fought and defeated Banks at Pleasant Hill after which the Federals began to retreat pursued by Taylor. Meanwhile, Smith following his Arkansas strategy didn't support Taylor and withdrew infantry and cavalry from Taylor for Smith's pursuit of Union General Steele back to Little Rock. Taylor pursued General Banks to Alexandria, but lacked the necessary manpower to defeat Banks; Banks ultimately escaped. Smith's campaign against Union General Steele resulted in victory at the battle of Jenkins' Ferry, but it did not "enhance the condition of the Confederacy in the Trans-Mississippi." The dispute between Smith and Taylor became quite bitter with Taylor blaming Smith for the escape of General Banks and the Federal Fleet under Admiral Porter.

Taylor asked to be relieved from command. Smith removed Taylor from command on June 10, 1864. Amazingly, on July 18 Taylor was promoted to lieutenant general and was reassigned as commander of the Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana. The author gives a short narration of Taylor's effort to cross the Mississippi and assume his new command together with a brief summary of his and Smith's activities to the end of the war. Smith surrendered in Galveston on June 2, 1865 while Taylor had surrendered May 6, 1865 at Citronelle, Alabama. After surrendering Taylor went to Washington to lobby for the release of Jefferson Davis after which he worked as a lobbyist for the Democratic Party and as an outspoken critic of the Ku Klux Klan. Smith traveled first to Mexico City where he was unwelcome, then traveled to Cuba eventually returning home.

In 1879 Taylor published his memoir titled Destruction and Reconstruction which helped nurture the Lost Cause myth. In his memoir Taylor described Smith's policy as one of "sheer stupidity and pig-headed obstinacy...." His memoirs were relied on by countless former Confederates "for their own reminiscences of the war."

Despite their acrimonious relationship, Smith and Taylor produced a great Confederate military accomplishment in the Red River campaign against a superior Union force. Unfortunately, Smith's cavalry raid on St. Louis resulted in little of military value.

The reader of this book will find it a source of much information on an often neglected area of operations. It gives fascinating portraits of opposing strategies and personalities. With the Red River campaign a great Confederate accomplishment, one can only speculate on what would have been accomplished if Taylor and Smith had worked harmoniously together.

The war between general officers can be as interesting as the war between the armies. Bragg's problems as commander of the Army of Tennessee with Polk and Hardee, Hood undercutting Johnston in 1864, the often-contentious HR problems of the Army of Northern Virginia, the Pope McClellan feud and Halleck maneuvering against Grant are well known. Each of these is the subject of books or devoted chapters in numerous histories of the war. The concentration on the war east of the Mississippi misses one of the worst feuds between generals during the war. Richard Taylor and Edmund Kirby Smith were both proud, competent men that were sure they knew what was best. After the fall of Vicksburg, the Trans-Mississippi became Kirby Smithdom. Isolated from the Confederacy, subject to conflicting demands and directives from Richmond that might be impossible these two men fought the Union Army and each other to a standstill. This is their story both during and after the war.

Neither man seems to have had real warm feelings for the other. Taylor was responsible for Louisiana and reported to Smith who commanded the Trans-Mississippi. The author gives us a full and careful review of the two men, their war experiences and political support. This allows the reader to fully understand the root of the problems and appreciate the extant of their bitterness. Taylor's handling of CSA forces during the Red River Campaign is brilliant. He defeats a much larger combined arms force isolating each and almost destroying both. Smith may or may not have robbed Taylor of victory by removing troops to defeat an army advancing in Arkansas.

This book assumes the reader knows very little and carefully explains the position of the parties, their options and the results of the choice made. This is one of the strongest parts of the book and keeps the reader fully informed, allowing us to make informed decisions. A second strong point is covering the post-war history of both men and how the story grew and changed. This is being done more often in better histories, is well handled and very valuable.

Richmond is part of the problem and the shadowy presence over the Trans-Mississippi. The source of power, Smith and Taylor supporters battle there too. However, Richmond has an agenda that fully supports neither and causes problems for both. In the end, as was done elsewhere, Richmond refuses to support either side. This book is not an expose of the Confederate Departmental system but it shows all the problems this system caused and that Richmond refused to resolve.

This is not an easy read but it is a worthwhile read. The author's words do not jump off the page, grab you and pull you in. They build a solid reliable narration that is full of information and is very logical. This is a book that those interested in the Trans-Mississippi and/or the Confederate high command should read.

The author has written a fine book on Trans-Mississippi Theater during the last half of the Civil War. Although the prose is excellent, this is not a book for a beginner -- the reader needs a substantial amount of knowledge of the Civil War and particularly the actions from Wilson's Creek to Prairie Grove and of the problems facing the Confederates in Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas. After Vicksburg the area west of the Mississippi was essentially cut off from the remainder of the Confederacy, and to a large sense, could have been occupied fully by federal troops after that time without affecting or advancing the outcome of the war.

Given that the West was not important, except to isolate and draw off confederate resources, the conflicts between Kirby Smith and Taylor's successes in the Red River campaign are only marginally interesting except to the most serious Civil War historians and descendants of those residing in the four states during the war.

That being said, this work advances the understanding of the conflict by drawing attention to the type of interpersonal squabbling between general officers that so characterized the armies and command structures on both sides and in all theaters. In the Confederacy the conflicts between Johnston and Davis, Longstreet and Bragg, (Bragg and about everyone), Hood and Johnston, and others below Army level often negatively affected confederate army performance. On the Federal side there were many more simply because there were more generals, and it must be remembered that both sides were made up of similar stock and trained in the same schools and pre-war service.

I noticed that one reviewer called both generals (Smith and Taylor) flawed, but the war produced no perfect generals at the army level, not even Lee. (My favorite general is Pat Cleburne, but even he had difficulties with some of his superiors.) Here we have Richard Taylor, a commander who learned his trade under Stonewall Jackson, and Kirby Smith who actually saw little direct action during the war and was thrust into a high command position through a series of fortunate (for him) circumstances.

Of the two, Taylor was much more aggressive, but Smith had more responsibility and his attention was diffused on a greater number of issues. Taylor absolutely was insubordinate to Smith and could easily have been relieved, but victories can outweigh a number of sins. Nonetheless, the author is careful to point out that Taylor's victory at Mansfield (Pleasant Hill) and subsequent operations were not the total defeat of Banks as often depicted, and not all of the reasons Taylor was not more successful were due to Kirby Smith. I thought the author was as even-handed as possible in his presentation, and for that he is to be commended. There were also failures by Taylor's subordinates and by Taylor himself, as well as solid work by some federal officers below Banks. Nonetheless, Smith and Taylor probably did about as well as could be expected in any case, and their troops were never able to be made available to confederate armies in the decisive theaters. Even if Taylor had been able to destroy all of Banks's army, the effect on the outcome of the war would have been negligible. And it must be remembered, there was never a case in the war where an army of over 5,000 men was destroyed by the opposing force in the field (only in sieges: Donelson, Vicksburg, and Harpers Ferry and the final capitulations.)

In short, I very much liked this book, the scholarship by the author, and his handling of the main characters. Perhaps there could have been more information concerning the federal forces engaged, but after all, this work was focused on the confederate command structure, and the relationship between Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor. What was done was done well, and I recommend this book unreservedly to Civil War readers.

The book is about the conflict between Kirby Smith, the Commander of the Confederate Trans Mississippi, and Richard Taylor, the Commander of the Confederate Army in Louisiana. Both learned their trade working with Stonewall Jackson before they were sent west. Kirby Smith wants to draw the Union Army into the interior and then concentrate his forces to defeat them. Taylor wants to attack quickly and defeat them before they can do any damage. This difference in vision leads finally to a complete breakdown in communication and trust between the two generals. The book was easy to follow. I was interested in the military aspects of the campaign, which were not covered because the author did not consider them as important to the conflict between Smith and Taylor. There were several maps that gave a good background for the campaigns. There were several battle maps, but only those battles where either Smith or Taylor was in command were included. Its outstanding feature is the study of Kirby Smith in command of a huge department and his inability to see the big picture outside the Arkansas Front. I would not recommend this book as an introduction to the Red River Campaign or the Civil War in Lousiana. It is an excellent study in command, demonstrating how the lack of trust can destroy military oppertunities.
The South won this campaign because the Union forces also fell into a similar pattern of distrust between General Banks and Admiral Porter who did not cooperate and distrusted each other. They were also at the end of a long supply line and the water level was falling

The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi, especially after the fall of Vicksburg, has gotten relatively little attention from historians. This book deals with the conflict between the two key leaders of Confederate troops in the region. Richard Taylor comes across as an aggressive fighter, but is also an impossible subordinate and anything but a team player. Edmund Kirby Smith is somewhat like McClellan...a good administrator but a disastrous field general. The author's prose is somewhat dry and the battle descriptions are sometimes a bit circuitous. However, he shows good insight into several personalities and understands the political dimensions of the war in this region. This is not the book to read as an introduction to tbe Civil War west of the Mississippi. However, it will be of interest to those with a strong general background and specialized interests.

Okay, so I am biased. The author is a friend. But I read a LOT of history, and very little of it is nearly as well written.