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The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy)

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Written at the end of his career and on the eve of the Holocaust, the Crisis stands, I believe, as one of the greatest one volume educations in print today. Unlike his more "technical" works which rigorously deal with phenomenology in itself, the Crisis is more of a look at the need for phenomenology and phenomenological psychology in modern humanity's life. Looking at the history of science and philosophy, Husserl traces the development and "success" of scientism and materialism. In doing so phenomenologically, Husserl makes a very strong case for the need of phenomenology in order to overcome the lifelessness of materialism and inaugurate a "heroism of reason" and humanism. Anyone interested in philosophy, science, sociology, civil rights, etc. I urge to read this book actively and critically. For non-specialists and people who aren't "scholars" of any kind or degree may find the language a bit dense or heavy at times, but ! . . . it's good for you. The volume also features appendices which include the classic Vienna Lecture as well as other essays and lectures. The Crisis is a classic and brilliant look into science, philosophy and society which, unlike a lot of theory today, offers a cohesive system grounded in humanism, to wit, Husserlian phenomenology. Please read this book.

It is somewhat ironic that Phenomenology, as a term or as a philosophical school, has yet to really reach the popular consciousness, given that phenomenology is in many respects a study of consciousness and how reality impacts consciousness. Phenomenology in the most formal sense of being a school of philosophy is largely traced to Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl's great work at the turn of the last century, Logical Investigations, set the stage for the development of phenomenology as a way of seeing, a descriptive study with roots in empiricism going back to inspiration from Aristotelian ideas. This is a key word - description. Rather than being a set of constructs and principles typical of previous philosophical systems, Phenomenology attempts to describe reality fully as reality is presented to our senses.

Phenomenology is different from scientific study in that it does not pretend toward a universal truth or experience unmediated through our subjectivity (a principle modern science seems to be incorporating more and more). Editor Dermot Moran has a solid introduction to the subject, including distinctions of different kinds of study, some of the personalities involved in the development of phenomenology, and the current state of the discipline.

This book by Husserl is one written late in his career. The Nazi party was well on its way to taking complete power in Germany, and other forces of despair were very present in the Western culture. Husserl's protege Heidegger had gone from phenomenology to existentialism, a philosophical framework that Husserl distrusted, but understood as completely in keeping with the overall crisis of meaning and purpose that he saw taking root in society at its very core.

Husserl's work from 1900 forward was always involved in recasting and adapting phenomenology to the current culture; each of his books in that time had as a title or subtitle 'An Introduction to Phenomenology', and this particular text was no different. Often overlooked in this text's presentation is that it was actually unfinished at Husserl's death, and had once again taken phenomenology in new directions. Perhaps the most radical departure of this version of phenomenology to Husserl's earlier constructs is the incorporation of psychological ideas.

Husserl's concern is to overcome the lack of meaning found in science and technology, the lack of telos and the lack of an inherent moral structure. Husserl traces the history of ideas and search for meaning in intellectual enterprise, and ends with a sense of a 'life-world' that draws closer to the aims of existentialism than he had ever done before.

This is a fascinating text.

Husserl is a tremendous apologist of "philosophy as rigorous science." This volume ("The Crisis") serves as the philosopher's clearest and most distinct exposition of the problems that beset modern Civilization and that still prevent many of us from appreciating an understanding of reality unmediated by empiricist and historicist biases. Most succinctly, Husserl has shown how and why it is possible for practical judgment to remain unbiased, and for theoretical/pure reason to remain in touch with life.

Husserl has helped later generations re-discover a rational/classical alternative to both modern reason and modern irrationalism. With Husserl, the critique of modernity points to a reason above "the machine." That is why Husserl rejected the anti-rationalist disposition displayed by his brilliant student, Martin Heidegger, whose inconclusive turn to pre-Socratic Wisdom arguably suffered from an inadequate understanding of the Socratic/"mediating/moderating" Quest for wisdom.

With Husserl, two options were disclosed to public attention: 1) a "new [atheistic, nihilistic] thinking" finding its core representation in Heideggerian "Existentialism"; 2) Classical (pre-Cartesian, non-Machiavellian) Rationalism, or "rational life" not subject to the Cartesian tendency to decay into the historicization and mechanization of reason/philosophy.

Most scholars today have found a way to dilute "Existentialism" to a degree that makes it possible to place "Existentialism" at the service of the powers that be (conformism). Among the very few who prefer to seek out a classical, non-historicist understanding of reason and history, we find two of Husserl's students--Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss. The first helped expose the essential link between Husserl's teachings and classical Socratic/Platonic philosophy; the second, inaugurated an exceptional return OF classical political rationalism--of a School of Philosophy, in the Platonic sense--at a time when the "temple" of science (the Academy) had become a sea of suspicion-breeding sophisticated ideologies.

It need not surprise the disinterested bystander that Strauss has henceforth become target of many an ideological reprisal. What is perhaps most "disturbing" about Strauss is that he makes it extremely difficult to critique rationalists such as Husserl for their (unremarkable?) inadequacies. That is because with Strauss such a critique presupposes access to a degree of speculative reason that is higher, and NOT lower, than the one exemplified by Husserl: one must understand an author as well as he understood himself, BEFORE claiming to understand him "better."

Edmund Husserl's "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology" resonates well. The following are my impressions and reflections after reading this very interesting book.

Every object-subject composite (relation) is a "phenomenon", and Husserl begins his phenomenology from Descartes' doubt that cannot be doubted. Husserl notes that the phenomenon is open to exploration. We explore so we can discover what is pregiven, so we can find our preconditions. Husserl reminds us that Kant was sterred from his slumber by Hume's skepticism. Kant's "appearance" is embedded in a space-time manifold, and as such it represents a phenomenon that hides the "thing-in-itself". The phenomenon is a composite uniting the provisional with the universal, and Kant had to feel it to be so reactive once Hume and Leibniz made their points known. Husserl reminds us to look beyond the ego-soul of Descartes, and to look beyond the dualism where Kant got stuck.

Every feeling is such a composite, so every feeling is also a phenomenon. Every feeling holds the slightest spark of awareness. I might add that every law of nature given by an equation is experiential in the sense that the law is first conceived in the mind, and then later is it empirically verified. Therefore, the law as an equation is abstraction that forgets the experiential. Because natural laws are experiential they involve feelings, and therefore these laws are phenomenological too. It is not surprising that Husserl is very critical of objective philosophy and positive science that has lost track of the subjective ingredients that come with all phenomenon.

Husserl tells us that meaning may become lost in history, and meaning relates to the preconditions of history which has to do with the geometrical horizons that history grows into. Husserl (page 49) is translated to write: "The geometry of idealities was preceded by the practical art of surveying, which knew nothing of idealities. Yet such a pregeometrical achievement was a meaning-fundament for geometry, a fundament for the great invention of idealization; the latter encompassed the invention of the ideal world of geometry, or rather the methodology of the objectifying determinations of idealities through the construction which create `mathematical existence.'"

Science grew out of traditions, and geometry is no less a tradition. The pregivens are found sleeping, Husserl tells us that the pregivens are taken for granted. Husserl (page 69) writes: "Only a radical inquiry back into subjectivity - and specifically the subjectivity which ultimately brings about all world-validity, with its content and in all its prescientific and scientific modes, and into the `what' and the `how' of the rational accomplishments - can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the ultimate ontic meaning of the world."

In Husserl day (right before World War II) positivist science and existential philosophy lost their meaning (I add that the meaning is still lost today), as these were all about extensions of the status quo that were no longer connected to their original preconditions.

To find the original meaning there must be a reactivation of the construction of geometry, among other exercises. Husserl tells us that meaning is discovered by reactivating the construction that have hid themselves in history. This leads us to what is self evident and beyond doubt.

The precondition of history is the stark reminder that the universal has connected with the provisional; this is the stark mystery of life, the relation again.

Husserl's phenomenology studies the precondition as it is, rather than through presumptions that derive from an extended historicism that has lost its meaning.

Husserl has much to say about intentionality, and the validation that is always sought when truth statements are attempted. And we all see people that seek validation; the pay received for a hard days work; the affirmation that is required when gifts are exchanged; the suicide note that betrays its own reason for being, as no message is needed to announce a departure unless the issue of validation is found even in the confused.

We see the need for validation in others, but can we also see it in ourselves too? Ask yourself if you seek validation in all your activities? Am I to expect an angry reaction, a denial? If so, an emotional reaction (the phenomenon again) that denies validation is an emotion that is found announcing its need for validation. In which case, the announcement is only concealed from you, but the meaning is clear to me and others that the answer is found to be yes again. If emotion is not expressed, and the answer is - yes -, then there is no disagreement. Therefore, the challenge remains to answer - no - while expressing a more reflective emotion. This challenge may be impossible to meet, as a calm denial today may follow by an angry release tomorrow, and this will cause me to return to my original conclusion: that the intentionality that seeks validation is a universal, and leads to Husserl's intersubjective person. But note also the emotional issues. It is no wonder that Husserl takes his phenomenology into psychology.

This drive to seek validity is what gives birth to our "objective" meanings, according to Edmund Husserl, but note I put objective in quotations to refer to the observation that I am referring to a subjective transcendentalism rather than an objectivity that Husserl tells us is illusory. Science and logic can give us no help if the emotional temperament is missing, yet scientism is found today expressing its need for validation. Dawkins's "The God Delusion" is an expression that is asking religiosity to love science too. But how can religion love science if scientism lacks the emotional certitude to deal with its own pregivens? It is not unsurprising that atheist Sam Harris is now making a call for contemplation within atheistic circles. Contemplation delivers the reflective capacity to deal with our drive for validation, for both believer and nonbeliever.

Husserl (page 168) writes on elementary intentionalities that seek validity: "The being of these intentionalities themselves is nothing but one meaning-formation operating together with another, `constituting' new meaning through synthesis. And meaning is never anything but meaning in modes of validity. Intentionality is the title which stands for the only actual and genuine way of explaining, making intelligible."

All objective philosophy and positive science are unreal, that is, they all depend on pregivens that are subjective in nature. To question the pregivens is to enter phenomenology, and it is here that psychology transforms itself into Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. All "objective" science requires its purification by a transcendental psychology. Husserl (page 257) writes: "a pure psychology as positive science, a psychology which would investigate universally the human beings living in the world as real facts in the world, similarly to other positive sciences (both sciences of nature and humanistic disciplines), does not exist. There is only a transcendental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philosophy."

All of our beliefs are dependent on Husserl's pregivens, and to explore the pregivens is to enter the transcendental world that rediscovers hidden meanings of dimensionality. This activity engages our emotions, and so it is that the innate feeling is found supporting a universal grammar. As long as we remain true to our purpose, to love our self, to love others, to love God, we may always re-look at our slumber and find the hidden dimensions in our own mistakes; we can always overcome our feelings of doubt in this way, finding a deeper feeling expressed in a deeper beauty. This allows us to purify our feelings, by referring to the original intention that was never meant to do harm to ourselves, others or God. Husserl's universal drive that seeks affirmation is no more than the past that seeks wholeness with the present, it is no more than what I call the affirmation of Trinity, it is the work of the Holy Spirit among our vast plurality. This insight was meant to be shared, but in sharing this expect the emotional outcries that are found seeking their own validation.

Disclosure: My agenda is declared in my profile.

I have read husserl's the crisis and enjoyed it very much. I think that this book has lost none of it's relevance. It is a thorough analysis of what science can and cannot do. For me as a landscape architecture teacher this books delivers a good antidote against all too positivistic scientific thinking within the university. It opens our eyes to the fact that science can answer certain questions very well but at a loss of meaning and sense. It peals off the layers of history that hide the shaky foundations of science and reveals the scope of science and that much is beyond this scope. It is meticulous in it's analysis, but in that it is thorough and not shallow. I can advice all who are interested in the relation between science and the world to carefully study this book.The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting (SPEP)The World of Perception