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The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror

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Bernard Lewis is a master of clarity. I must say I have not read any of his works other than his "Middle East," but the quality of these two books, combined with his general reputation make it clear that he is a giant in the field of Arab and Islamic studies. His grasp of history is phenomenal, and his ability to apply history to current exigencies is astounding.

"The Crisis in Islam" very neatly, but not simplistically, lays out the history of relations between the (mainly) Christian West, and the world of Islam, beginning with the generation of the Prophet up to the current times. It is critical to understand, and the brilliant introduction lights the way, that Muslim from birth see the world in metaphors that we can barely descrobe. The former American imperative of Manifest Destiny is a pale reflection of the inevitability many, but certainly not all, Muslim feel about the spread of the "Dar al-Islam" in the world. This literally translates as "House of Peace" and implies the eventual conquering and conversion to Islam of the entire planet, without room for compromise. All other "nations" and religions are within the "Dar al-Harb," literally "House of the Sword." No permanent peace can exist between the two houses. (Again I stress that this is NOT a universal attitude.) In Lewis' thesis, attitudes toward the West have evolved through contacts with first the Eastern Empire in Constantinople, then Spain, Portugal and France, and through years of direct conflict in the Crusades and the colonial wars of the 19th and 20th centuries. Combine this with the flourishing of multiple schools and "sects" within Islam, combined with chance vagaries of history, and you wind up with the hegemony of the Wahhabi school within the Kingdom of the Su'ud family (now Sa'udi Arabia). Then add the discovery of oil. Then add the poverty of most Arab Muslim people whose only access to any education is via Wahhabi supported schools and mosques, and you have a very heady recipe. While this is grossly oversimplified, it gives the barest skeleton of the first part of the book.

To Lewis, the influence and philosophy of the Arab Wahhabis and Iranian Shi'ites make accomodation pretty much impossible. The West, especially the United States is seen as primarily a force for temptation and corruption. There are many surprise insights in the book; one big one for me was the revelation that the hostage crisis in Iran in 1979 was not due to the decline in relations between the two "Dar"s, but instead because there was a threat of 'rapprochement' which was seen as potentially corrupting. Another was the explanation of how democratic process is used by some as a tool to achieve power legitimately, then subverted in a method he calls amusingly the "One man (only men), one vote, one time" method. While popular demand may be for self-determination, the hard-liners (who are really NOT fundamentalists) have other agenda. And the West has done a pretty poor job making a case for co-existence, given its history in such places as Iraq and Syria.

I cannot recommend the book enough as a quick, but not superficial way to "catch up" with how our Muslim brothers have arrived at the current impasse, and how terrorism seems to function within a peculiar and very important social structure.

First of all, Lewis'"Crisis of Islam" is not about the Iraq War or George W. Bush. Secondly, it is NOT an anti-Islam, anti-Arab, pro-Western polemic. For example, Lewis writes that:

(1) "The expulsion of religious minorities is extremely rare in Islamic history - unlike in medievel Christendom, where expulsions of Jews and, after the Reconquest, of Muslims were normal and frequent. Compared with European expulsions, 'Umar's decree was both limited and compassionate ... And unlike the Jews and Muslims driven out of Spain and other European countries, to find what refuge they could elsewhere, the Jews and Christians of Arabia were resettled on lands assigned to them ..." [xxix-xxx].

(2) "To most Americans, bin Laden's declaration is a travesty, a gross distortion of the nature and purpose of the U.S. presence in Arabia. They should also be aware that for many, perhaps most Muslims, the declaration is an equally grotesque travesty of the nature of Islam, and even of its doctrine of jihad. THe Qur'an speaks of peace as well as of war" [xxxii].

(3) "During the centuries that in European history are called medieval, the most advanced civilization in the world was undoubtedly that of Islam" [29].

(4) "Fighters in a jihad are enjoined [by the Qur'an] not to kill women, children, and the aged unless they attack first, not to torture or mutilate prisoners, to give fair warning of the resumption of hostilities after a truce, and to honor agreements ... At no point do the basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder" [39].

(5) "There were certainly major negative consequences of imperialism and more broadly of Western European influence ..." [58].

(6) "There is some justice in one charge that is frequently leveled against the United States, and more generally against the West: Middle Easterners increasingly complain that the West judges them by different and lower standards than it does Europeans and Americans ... Sometimes, even where American interests are concerned, American governments have betrayed those whom they had promised to support and persuaded to take risks" [107].

(7) "Most Muslims are not fundamentalists, and most fundamentalists are not terrorists ..." [137].

(8) "All these different extremist groups sanctify their action through pious references to Islamic texts ... They are, however, highly selective in their choice and interpretation of sacred texts" [138].

(9) "Islamic jurisprudence is a system of law and justice, not of lynching and terror" [141].

(10) "Can [the attacks of 9/11 and other similar actions] in any sense be justified in terms of Islam? The answer must be a clear no ... [such attacks] have no justification in Islamic doctrine or law and no precedent in Islamic history ... These are ... acts - from a Muslim point of view - or blashphemy" [154].

The whole thrust of the book, in fact, is that the extremism of today is a result of a particular sect of Islam, Wahhabism, which arose in the past two hundred years. He even concludes the book by arguing: "There is enough in the traditional culture of Islam on the one hand and the modern experience of the Muslim peoples on the other to provide the basis for an advance toward fredom in the true sense of that word" [169]. These are hardly the words of a religious or racial bigot, so enough of that nonesense.

Some of the most fascinating and illuminating parts of the book deal with:

(1) The major difference between Christianity (and Judaism) and Islam regarding politics. While Christ told his followers to "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's" and grew and developed for centuries as the "religion of the downtrodden", Muhammad founded a state and empire; therefore, he did not need to establish a separate church. For the formative first period of Islam, there was no experience of state persecution. Islam was the state and "God's approval of their cause was made clear to them in the form of victory and empire in THIS world." While Christ was crucified, and Moses died before entering the Promised Land, Muhammad died a sovereign and conqueror. The past centuries of Judeo-Christian superiority and victories is thus not just a humiliation for Muslims: It is a direct challenge to the truth of Islam itself. While Christians have been in dominant political positions throughout history, during their formative years they were not, and basically got used to being kicked around. While they have enjoyed holding power, they don't believe God entitles Christians to hold it.

(2) From the 7th Century the successors of Muhammad declared and fought an imperialistic jihad against the rest of the world. Muslim armies overthrew the ancient empire of Persia and absorped all its territories, thus threatening Central Asia and India. Much territory of the Byzantine Empire was conquered and the then CHRISTIAN provinces of Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and North Africa were absorbed "and in due course Islamized and Arabized, and they served as bases for the further invasion of Europe and the conquest of Spain and Portugal and much of southern Italy. By the early 8th century the conquering Arab armies were even advancing beyond the Pyrenees into France" [34]. After several centuries, Christendom began to turn the Muslim invaders back from Europe. The Crusades, NOT an imperialistic enterprise, but a brief and delayed response to centuries of jihad failed utterly. Subsequently a new phase of the jihad was inaugurated by the Muslim Turks who also pushed into Europe.

(3) The US-Israeli relationship is examined and Lewis debunks the thesis that Palestine is the root cause of Muslim rage by pointing out a number of interesting facts:

(a) In the 1930s, Nazi Germany was the main cause of Jewish migration to Palestine. The Nazis facilitated this migration "while the British, in the forlorn hope of winning Arab goodwill, imposed and enforced restrictions" [94]. Nonetheless, the Arabs openly sided with the Nazis who were encouraging Jewish migration to Palestine, and against the British who were trying to keep them out.

(b) The Soviets played a major role in securing the UN vote to establish Israel in Palestine and they then gave Israel immediate de jure recognition. The US was more hesitant and gave only de facto recognition. The Soviets immediately sent the Israelis weapons through Czechoslovakia after the war (to hurt the British) while the US maintained a partial weapons embargo. Nonetheless, the Arab (though not the Turks and Persians) embraced the Soviet alliance without bitterness!

(c) Throughout the 1950s, US dealings with Israel were limited and cautious. The US decisively intervened in 1956 to denounce the Israeli invasion of Egypt and demanded their immediate withdrawal. As late as the Six-Day War (1967), Israel relied for its weapons mainly on France. It was not until the return to the Arab world of Russian imperialism in the form of the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal (nonetheless hailed across the Islamic world) did the US-Israeli alliance begin. Thus, "the strategic relationship between the US and Israel was a consequence, not a cause, of Soviet penetration" [97].

Bernard Lewis continues his lifetime devotion to teaching about the Middle East and Islamic culture in this all too thin volume. As in his last book, What Went Wrong, here again Lewis focuses on raising the average readers understanding of this crucial region and its history. Unlike many so called academics, who argue from polarized positions on CNN and FOX News, Lewis takes a complex and nuance approach to this most complex of regions. Indeed, while everyone else seems to either want to condemn all Islam and its culture or apologize for the terrorists it currently inspires, this author writes from a position of respect and appreciation for this civilization all the while refusing to be blinded by base sentimentalism.

Looking through Islamic history, Lewis explains how a preoccupation with a loss of status and power, a world view looking to blame outsiders rather than looking inward for critical self-examination, and a lack of democratic tradition, continues to radicalize the Middle East. The author further seeks to explain how Islamic culture holds a different world view from those in the west and that we need to understand this world view if we are to confront the threat of terrorism.

Readers should be aware that this text is not an introduction. Lewis does not write for laymen. Assuming a certain baseline of knowledge, he tends to gloss over arguments or offer evidence in a sort of short hand, expecting the educated reader to understand references and names. In a world where most non-fiction is over written, Lewis is a throw back to an earlier age, writing thin volumes that are light on detail and heavy on argument. This does not detract from the quality of his work, but it does limit what a reader without a firm grasp of the fundamentals can learn from reading it. Still, there is much to be learned from this work, in particular his examination of the Wahabbi sect being exported by Saudi Arabia and the traditional self understanding of Islam as an ascendant religion that would spread over the whole world.

Readers should also look to Lewiss earlier work, in particular the Middle East: A Brief History and Islam and the West, both essential reading for someone whishing to understand the modern Middle East.

I have always recognized that despite what I consider to be my wide readings in History, I had a significant knowledge deficiency with regard to the Middle East, and so I belatedly starting looking around for a relatively brief work which would provide at least some useful background in which to evaluate current world events. Having just read this small but incredibly informative book, I conclude I found the right one. The other reader reviews have detailed the contents sufficiently that I just wish to add that this wonderfully concise and well-written work could not have been produced by someone lacking the profound knowledge of the subject and erudition of Professor Lewis, and that it would be as much of a pleasure to read purely as literature than for more prosaic purposes. If the motivations and objectives of Islamic terrorists are a little foggy in your mind, as they were in mine, do yourself a favor and buy this book ASAP. The only downside is that the story likely has no happy ending.

This is the second book the distinguished Bernard Lewis has put out since 9-11. In the first -- "What Went Wrong" -- he sought to explain the failure of Middle Eastern societies to modernize and, as a result, how those societies responded towards the West, which had successfully modernized. While there is some overlap with the themes in the first book, in "The Crisis of Islam" Lewis focuses his attention on the dominant religion of the Middle East, and seeks to explain how history influences relevant modern themes in Islam.

After defining the religion, and showing how much of the West's current problems with terrorism in the Middle East is a result of an ongoing war among competing visions in Islam, Lewis then gives a brief history of the term "jihad" and how the Islamic world has perceived the West (America, in particular). He also describes the roots of so-called Islamic "fundamentalism", explaining the success of Saudi Arabia's promotion of the Wahhabi sect, and its unfortunate consequences for Islam as a whole.

Lewis also writes a wonderful essay on the double standards in the West - particularly in the U.S. government -- towards Muslim countries, arguing that it feeds into Arab and Muslim resentment towards the United States. That the champion of freedom and liberty has allied itself with many of the region's dictators and autocrats who persecute them strikes some in the Middle East as the deepest and most unforgivable hypocrisy.

This is a short book, and can be read in an evening, but it has a surprising comprehensiveness in its 164 pages. Lewis's scholarship has been condensed down to a fine sharp point. He has a talent for focusing on what's important and ignoring the rest. The only caveat I give for my recommendation is that little in this book is new for those who have read much of Lewis' work.

"The Crisis of Islam" is a sequel of sorts to Bernard Lewis's best selling What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. In that book, Lewis dealt with the question of Islam's backwardness: why has the Islamic world lagged so much behind the West? In this book, Lewis tackles the related but separate question of Islam's belligerency: why do so many Muslims hate America and the West? Why were the 9-11 bombers Egyptians and Saudis rather then Korean, Vietnamese or Latin Americans?

There are essentially two schools of thoughts about the war with Arab and Muslim Fundamentalism. On the one hand, there are those who think that the Anti-Western feeling in the Muslim world is a consequence of specific Western actions. It is not always clear what those offences are, but top contenders are US support of tyrannical client states like Saudi Arabia, its support of Israel's occupation (or Apartheid if you prefer) of the Palestinians, the Colonial and post Colonial economic exploitation of the Arab world, and so on.

Supporters of this school of thought tend to see every area of Muslim/Western clash as a separate and mostly unrelated conflict: Palestinian carry our suicide bombing because of Israel's occupation of Palestine. The Iranians captured American hostages because of America's support of the Shah. The Arab Street vandalized Scandinavian Embassies because of the Muhammad cartoons; al-Qaeda attacked in New York because of America's "occupation" of Saudi Arabia and in London because of the Iraqi war.

The Other school of thought sees the root of the War with extreme Arab and Muslim states as rooted in some sort of Fundamental, ideological divide. The confrontation with al-Qaeda and other Islamic and Arab Fundamentalists is a battle between Ideologies. Like WWII and the Cold War, the West's fight against Muslim extremes is a battle between ways of life. According to this view, al-Qaeda and its cronies are not so much fighting because of any specific grievance - they are against the influence of Western Ideas in Muslim world. They fear Western materialism, immorality and secularity and its effect on Muslims.

According to that view of the world, what the first school's adherents see as a series of local clashes are actually different theaters in a worldwide struggle: al-Qaeda has branches in every Muslim and many Western nations. British born Muslims were behind attacks allegedly motivated by Israeli occupation of the Palestinians and British co-occupation of Iraq. Iran's Fatwa calling for the execution of Salaman Rushdie, and its support of the Palestinian suicide bombers, the wide spread anti-Israel sentiments in remote parts of the world, Muslim murder of Dutch film maker are all manifestation of the same phenomena: in Huntington's phrase "The Clash of Civilizations".

All this is of course a vast oversimplification. Few commentators on the Middle East hold one set of these views exclusively. The causes, characteristics, and alleged consequences of the confrontations are analyzed in vastly different ways, and the Policy recommendation of people within these two schools differ vastly (in the second school, there is a major difference between the Neo-Conservative and the traditionalist balance-of-power outlook; more on that later). But broadly speaking, this classification holds.

Bernard Lewis is a strong supporter of the second, "Clash of Civilizations" school (Full disclosure: I lean that way myself), and his book is a strong statement of that thesis. Thus the main shortfall of "The Crisis of Islam": Lewis asserts, rather then argues, his case. Lewis's "What Went Wrong" was richly grounded in Islamic history and development, including all kinds of historical evidence. In "The Crisis of Islam" Lewis routinely "reads the mind" of Arabs and Muslims: he will often quote a thinker or a manifesto as characterizing a broad segment of Arabs or Muslims; But the relevance of specific thinkers or arguments has to be argued, and here Lewis fails, sometimes spectacularly so.

The most egregious example is when Lewis spends the better part of four pages dissecting a "Letter to America", allegedly from Usama bin Laden (pp. 157-160). However, in the footnotes, Lewis writes: "the full text of the letter... [was] distributed via the internet... the personal authorship of Usama bin Laden is unlikely". Then why give so much attention for a letter that, for all we know, has been published by a fourteen years old blogger from the United Arab Emirates?

Another major issue that Lewis does not address is the relations between Arabs and Islam? Can Muslims in India, South East Asia and China really be classified along with Middle Eastern Arabs? How do non Muslim Arabs fit into the "Crisis of Islam"?

Even if we credit Lewis and the "Clash" school, there is still the question of what the policy consequences of Lewis's assessment. A major advantage of the "Western offenses" school is the clarity of its policy implications: If the West only stopped its aggression against the East, the conflict between East and West would cease.

"The Clash of Civilizations" school leads to two possible Western policies: the traditionalist, balance-of-power advocates tend to think that the US and Europe should "contain" the Middle East. Strong, pro-Western dictators like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak should be maintained and supported, as the main line of the West's defense against Islamic extremism. The Mubarak's of the world are much better then the alternative: the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Ayatollah regime in Iran, and their supporters and imitators throughout the Muslim world.

The "Neo-Conservative" critics of this approach argue that it does not, in fact, ensure the safety of the West. In a U.S. client state like Saudi-Arabia, religious schools preached an extreme version of anti-Western Islam, effectively enough for most of the 9/11 Terrorists to be Saudis. America has trained and supported the Mujahadeens, the precursors of today's al-Qaeda. It has armed Sadam Hussein, only to see it turn against US allies Kuwait and Israel.

Furthermore, the Neo-Conservatives argue that it is immoral to allow dictators to exploit and oppress their own people. How can the US deal with regimes which discourage Free Speech, which routinely torture and oppress their citizens? How can the West support the violations of Human Rights? Thus, the West should promote democracy in the Middle East.

Lewis seems to vacillate between these positions. On the one hand he writes that "If one compares... American policy in the Middle East with that of other regions. One is struck... by its success" (p.99). On the other hand, in the book's conclusion, he clearly calls for US support to Democratic movements, and actually endorses the Iraq War (pp. 163-169). So which is it?

I think Lewis, like me, is torn between the cold, heartless logic of the traditionalist school and the moral suasion of the Neo-Conservative agenda. Recent developments have not been kind to the Neo-Cons. The conflict in Iraq is gearing up towards a Civil War, if it is not there already. In every election held in the Muslim world, voters seem to elect extreme Muslim regimes. The fall of Mid East dictators seemingly leads to Lebanons and to Irans, not to any Muslim version of the Velvet Revolution. And yet, is there no way to merge together the Idealism of the Neo-Conservatives and the realism of the traditionalists? Is the Middle East so lost, that the only choices are between pro and anti-Western bullies? That is a grim vision to contemplate, for Islam and for the World.

Bernard Lewis is the author of dozens of books on Islamic history, spanning some five decades. This volume examines the various undercurrents in the Muslim world today, and how a divided Islam is seeking to interact with the rest of the world. Arab unity, Lewis demonstrates, is now an oxymoron. Today no single Muslim polity exists, and this is part of the problem, or identity crisis, which the Islamic world faces.

For many centuries there was one Islamic community united by one ruler. Even when that community splintered into various states, there was still a discernable unified polity. No longer however. It is this divided and amorphous body, with the loss of a coherent center, that is now seeking to find its way in the modern world. Resentment, disorientation and despair have been part of the reaction.

Of course Islam is more than just a religion, it is a culture and civilization as well. As part of his historical examination, Lewis compares the Islamic and Christian civilizations. In many ways they are sister civilizations, he argues

They certainly have much more in common with each other than with the major eastern religious traditions. And of course both share common ancestry with Judaism. And both appeal to divine revelation and a divine law-giver.

But there are major differences as well. This is especially apparent in the relationship between religion, society and the state. They are clearly separate - or at least should be - in Christianity. But no such distinction exists in Islam. Church and state relations, so much of an issue of debate in Western Christian nations is not even an issue in Islam. The Muslim world is at once both a religious and a political sphere. One can choose between God and Caesar in Christianity. Both are one and the same in Islam.

And of course Islam responded to modernity in a much different manner than did Christianity. In fact, it can be said that it was Christian civilization that gave birth to modernism, and it has in many ways accepted its offspring. Islam on the other hand did not - perhaps could not - give rise to such a development, and even if it did, [...]

With the differing reactions to modernism in mind, Lewis examines the various responses to the crisis in Islam that has followed, with extensive discussion of one of the more frightening options, that of terrorism.

The rise of Islamic extremism is examined in detail, with helpful comparisons made of other forms of militancy, including the Christian Crusades. While some may seek to argue that the major monotheistic religions are the same in terms of the use of force, Lewis demonstrates some obvious differences.

He makes clear that while there has always been a history of armed conquest in Islam, Christian use of arms is both tangential and unjustified in terms of its own faith and its propagation. Indeed, while there are some similarities between the histories of Christian and Islamic civilization, this is an area of major difference. Jihad is a religious obligation in Islam, while the Crusades were a late, limited and [...]

While the concept of jihad can also be understood in a more general sense as a religious striving, from its inception it also had a military connotation. And throughout Islamic history, jihad has mainly been understood to mean armed struggle.

True, both Islam and Christianity have a concept of just war theory, but differences nonetheless exist. For example, much of Islam's wars were fought against the followers of other faiths. Christian battles tended to be in-house, against those seen as heretical and schismatic.

And to the modern Muslim terrorists at least, there is no such thing as collateral damage. Uninvolved civilians are a prime target. This is a major means of inspiring fear and winning psychological victory, along with gaining publicity. Christianity eschews such practices in principle, although Islam is not alone in resorting to such means. European terrorist organizations also spring to mind.

Moreover, there is in Islam no instruction to turn the other cheek, nor an expectation of swords being beaten into plowshares. In addition, there is the theory and [...] which is foreign to Christianity. It arose at an early period in Islam's history, and of course we get the term from a Muslim sect dating from the eleventh century.

Lewis makes it clear however that the bulk of Muslims are neither fundamentalists nor terrorists, and have little sympathy for their cause. And he leaves open the question as to which way the majority of Muslims will go. If they follow the path of groups like Al Qaida, then the future looks grim indeed. But if the majority pursue a better, more peaceful option, then there are hopeful prospects ahead.

But Lewis is realistic on this. He reminds us that of the 57 member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, only one, Turkey, has had any history of length of democratic institutions. The only other two at the moment who might move in this direction are Iran and Iraq.

And he rightly notes that the war against terror and the struggle for freedom are closely related. Fostering pro-democracy reforms in the Middle East will be difficult and painstakingly slow. But they are possible and must be pursued with the same rigor that we use in combating terrorism.

In sum, this book is both realistic in its appraisal of recent Muslim history, but sensitive to distinctions, and hopeful of a better future than what we have recently been through.

Let's get it out of the way quick. How could a book on a subject like the origins of Islam be written in such a thoroughly ENGROSSING manner to an American reader with little knowledge of the subject? Only scholar Bernard Lewis could pull it off. If I could sit down, and force President Bush and his staff to read one book on the subject that is the central core of his Presidency, you guessed it. This would be the book.

It is 164 pages of fabulous reading. Make no mistake about it. What this author has done is amazing. Bernard Lewis is Professor Emeritus at Princeton University. He has devoted his life to this topic and it shows. What is unique is that this massive mind is not full of himself. His language is plain spoken, and to the point. He says in a sentence what most authors need a paragraph, or a page to say.

Do you know how you know when you are in the presence of a MASTER THINKER? It's when he tells you something, and you say to yourself, that if I had a month to think about it, I couldn't have said it any better. That's what you get on every page of this book. There are some thoughts in this book that are absolutely original.

One of them is the concept of taxation without representation as it applies to Islamic countries. As you know, a major underlying premise of the American Revolution in the 1700's is that our citizens who were then British subjects for the most part were BITTER about paying taxes to England without representation. They were so bitter in fact, that they caused a war, a REVOLUTION in fact.

In the case of many Arab countries, these nations have abundant oil reserves, which finance the needs of the leadership on a daily basis. This means that the government is not reliant upon taxation with all the accompanying grievances that the population set feels towards the oppressive government. The oil reserves allow the government to escape the underlying dissatisfaction that our own forefathers felt towards Mother England.

Some of the things you will learn in this book are:

· In the Muslim perception, conversion to Islam is a benefit to the converts and a merit in those who convert him. In Islamic law, conversion from Islam is apostasy - a capital offense for both the one who is misled, and the one who mislead him - the law is unequivocal...the penalty is DEATH. P55

· Law in Saudi Arabia did not abolish slavery until 1962, and the subjugation of women remains in full effect. P58

· Osama bin Laden interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union in a different way. It was their (Arab) struggle in Afghanistan that had defeated the mighty Red Army and driven the Soviets to defeat and collapse. Having disposed of the more ferocious and more dangerous of the two infidel superpowers, their next task was to deal with the other, the United States, and in this war the compromisers were tools and agents of the infidel enemy. P63

· The purpose of Iran taking the American hostages in November of 1979 was because the radicals in Iran believed that the moderates in Iran were trying to reach an accommodation with the United States. The taking of the American hostages would drive a wedge into that strategy which it did successfully.

· With the Soviet Union's implosion in the early 1990's, American foreign policy shifted from one of preventing Soviet penetration in the Mid East, to one of preventing any one Arab country from creating regional hegemony. This is why the United States waged the first Gulf War - OIL. P100

· In 1982, the Syrian dictator Assad leveled the city of Hama in his own country. They used tanks, artillery, and bomber aircraft. When they were finished they brought in bulldozers, and paved over the entire city like it was never there. In the process killing between 10,000 and 25,000 residents without regard to whether they were men, women, or children, or for that matter guilty of anything. P108

· What is even more interesting is that the United States said, and did nothing about Hama. In the years after Hama's destruction, Assad was visited by Secretaries of State James Baker 11 times, Warren Christopher 15 times, and Madeline Albright 4 times, and even President Clinton visited him in Syria. P109


The book is remarkable, and Professor Lewis has no axe to grind. He is not politically motivated. It is a pleasure to read such clarity of thought from anyone who is an expert on any topic.

Would you believe that the entire Arab world translates about 330 books per year into their language? This is 20 percent of the number that Greece alone translates. The entire Gross Domestic Product of all Arab countries is a little over $500 billion. This is less than every European country by itself. The smallest economy in Europe is Spain with close to $600 billion in GDP.

You need to know these things. We have a war going on. We gave the President our approval, and then found out that the war was not as it was made out to be. Whether you come from the Right or the Left on these topics, as a responsible American citizen, we need to have as much real, truthful information on this topic as we can get.

We need less information from reporters who want to spend 3 days studying the topic, and more from people like Lewis who have spent their lifetimes studying these topics. What does it mean that "No Arab leader has been willing to submit his claim to power to a free vote," or that under the Wahhabi teachings that dominate Saudi Arabia, "The burning of books was often accompanied by the summary execution of those who wrote, copied, or taught them," if those books were deemed contrary to Wahhabi doctrine.

In summary, read this SHORT, HIGHLY READABLE book, and you will have an infinitely better understanding of the Arab world. An understanding so extensive, that you will probably be more informed than most of the people in our government who are charged with the constitutional responsibility for this matter. We owe it to each other as Americans to be informed. Order it today.

Richard Stoyeck

Bernard Lewis, a Professor Emeritus in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University, has created yet another incredibly useful and timely book from articles he wrote for the New Yorker, Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic Monthly, and other publications.

THE CRISIS OF ISLAM -- even more than its excellent predecessor WHAT WENT WRONG? -- is both cohesive and spot-on. All nine chapters as well as the introduction are informed by the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath. The final chapter, for instance, deals directly with the subject of suicide bombers, discussing the Qur'an's ban on both suicide and murder of innocent civilians, and going on to discuss the "martyrs" of Hammas and the Al-Aqsa Brigades as a form of death cult that goes against the teachings of Islam.

I was particularly intrigued by Lewis's reference to some remarks made by Osama bin Laden regarding the "humiliation and disgrace" Islam has suffered for over eighty years. He refers specifically to the abolition of the Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk and his followers in 1924. For the first time since the days of Muhammad, Islam was without a leader. Lewis suggests that Osama would not be averse to the role himself -- which would be roughly equivalent to making Jeffrey Dahmer the headmaster of a boys' school.

The chapter entitled "A Failure of Modernity" gives striking evidence of the backwardness of most Islamic nations. A 2002 United Nations report states that "the Arab World translates about 330 books annually, one-fifth of the number that Greece translates. The accumulative total of translated books since [the ninth century] is about 100,000, almost the average that Spain translates in one year." If we in the West have been accused of the oddest things at times, it is because ignorance of the West is endemic. And, I might add, dangerous.

In order to avoid falling into the same trap ourselves -- such as by getting all our information from "The O'Reilly Report" -- we owe it to ourselves to know why over a billion Muslims have decided that we are the Great Satan. Knowledge is more powerful than an arsenal of MOABs.

I noted reading the reviews a very much polarized set of opinions - the "you wouldn't understand it unless you were as intelligent as me " types, and with great amusement, the ranting feminist who clearly hasnt read the book demanding the reader to read a pro-islamic alternative !

The book is loaded with facts well told and not at all lecturing. It is true a basic knowledge of the facts is required, and as for bias one way or the other, I personally didnt notice any. You'll read, and whatever way your mind is angled on the subject, this book isnt going to change it much. I personally find the islamic religion regressive to a ludicrous degree, hugely intolerant of any other religion, and aggressive in a similar manner, and this book didnt change that. But an interesting well written view regardless.