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Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line

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In modern cultures, science holds undisputed tenure over the adjudication of knowledge and pseudo-knowledge. Given its epistemological authority, it would seem that the demarcation of the scientific domain from less credible areas of knowledge would follow a universally defined set of criteria. Not so, says Thomas Gieryn in "Cultural Boundaries of Science." To be sure, Gieryn investigates several "credibility contests" wherein precise boundaries of science are needed. In one particular case, for example, "scientific knowledge [was] empirical when contrasted with the metaphysics of religion, but it [was] theoretically abstract when contrasted with the commonsense, hands-on observations of mechanicians."(63) His subsequent case studies are meticulously researched and his arguments cogently made.

But Gieryn is no postmodern critic of the objectivity of knowledge, nor does he reduce its value to paradigmatic contingencies (a la Kuhn). He is a sociologist, not a philosopher, and is concerned only with the "cultural cartography" of science. And in this context, he has come to see concepts such as empirical, rational, and even science function "not as a set of rules for proper fact-construction, but as rhetorical tools deployed in the pursuit or defense of epistemic authority, or in efforts to deny legitimacy to rival claims."(362)

Gieryn's stated purpose in this book is to show how the notions of what science is like are flexible and changing, and provides several case studies where the "boundaries of science" were supposedly at issue. These case studies are developed in a meticulous and careful manner. Nevertheless the case studies are never substantially interpreted to illustrate the book's thesis. No attempt is made to compare the approach of one view at a given time with another to speak of; merely the two sides (at best) are presented. For example, his presentation of the phrenology disputes in the 19th century focus *merely* on social factors (as one might expect from a sociologist) - however, that cannot by itself explain the boundaries involved without showing other factors (epistemic, etc.) were NOT relevant to whatever degree. This said, the cases are presented quite well and clearly as far as they go.

Also, it should be noted that the epilogue where Gieryn discusses his take on the so called "Science War" is riddled with inaccuracies. For example: he accuses the philosopher Mario Bunge of saying that feminists should be excluded from science. This is complete nonsense - as anyone who reads his remarks in context will see. (Bunge was merely denouncing what could be called "radical feminists" who claim quantification is masculine, and so on: Sandra Harding, etc. The article in question makes this clear.)