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The Curve of Binding Energy: A Journey into the Awesome and Alarming World of Theodore B. Taylor

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"The Curve of Binding Energy" is the landmark work that changed the American government's collective mind about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. It is fair to say that until nuclear weapon designer Ted Taylor sat down with John McPhee, and until McPhee's articles and book were published, the U.S. government believed that building a nuclear weapon required a regiment of top scientists and an effort on the scale of the Manhattan Project, something which could only be done by major industrialized powers (despite China).

After "Curve" was published, the government accepted the idea that terrorists could build nuclear devices, given only that they had access to fissile material and shifted gears almost immediately, an occurrence as rare as its effects were crucial. Taylor demonstrated that a few competent people mining the scientific literature could do the job. Many millions of dollars, pounds, francs, euros and rubles have been spent by many governments since publication of "Curve" to ensure that no terrorist ever gets his hands on plutonium or enriched uranium, and we are all safer as a result.

The book is, of course, incredibly readable and compelling. One would not expect less from the foremost prose stylist in the United States.

I read this book in 1975 and have subsequently reread it several times. The possibilities imagined in this book haven't yet come to pass, mainly, I think, because Ted Taylor is a genius and the terrorists are actually pretty stupid. Dr. Taylor, or someone like him, could build a home-made bomb that would make the events of 9/11 look like a tea party. However, the people motivated to actually carry out events like 9/11 are fortunately not so technically inclined.

The book spells out in chilling detail how it is actually pretty simple to put together an atomic bomb that could rival a Hiroshima-class explosion, IF, and it is a big IF, you have enriched uranium or plutonium.

The book does into enough detail to prove the point that bomb construction is fairly simple, but it contains several deliberate mistakes (one in chemistry and one in physics, that I could find) that keep this book from being a "blueprint" for bomb construction.

Like "The Hot Zone" about ebolla, this book may keep you awake nights if you read it carefully and really think about the implications.

One of the best and brightest, through Mr. McPhee's able penmanship, Mr. Taylor gives a guided tour of the (then) current state-of-the-art. Chock full of facts, figures and references, all verifiable. With the current glut of so-called 'expert' writers in this field, this book is one of the better uses of a tree on this subject ;O). I guarantee that any person interested in the nuclear weapons stockpile-to-target sequence will find the book an EXCELLENT buy.

John McPhee is a writer for the New Yorker with a particular focus on science and nature. His heroes tend not to be the pure scientists but the engineers, the doers. His 1987 profile of the Old River Control Structure, the enormously complex and epic-scale engineering works that prevent the main body of the waters of the Mississippi from spilling down the Atchafalaya as they really want to, was widely linked at the time of the New Orleans floods last year and deservedly so -- search for "McPhee Old River Control" to read it, it's well worth it. He has a love for the concrete that doesn't prevent him having a good understanding of the underlying science that his engineers use and writes clearly and with energy.

The Curve of Binding Energy is about Ted Taylor, a physicist from Los Alamos, his efforts to develop the lightest fission bomb that he possibly could, and how his research pushed him in the direction of proper oversight of post-fission materials. The writing is excellent, pacey and readable, though at times tending too much to the New Yorker structure of "At facility Y I was ushered in to meet Expert X. He had shrewd eyes and an expansive, welcoming half-smile at the corners of his mouth. He said Z." The basic message is: (1) plutonium is easy to get access to; (2) with current (1974) practices and volumes the amount necessary to produce a bomb (15 kg) would be lost in the statistical noise; (3) this will only get worse as volumes produced go up, and they're projected to go up massively.

This is all from the perspective of 1974, of course. Since then, prompted in part by the concerns this book raised (and in part by independent factors such as a fall in the price of oil), the US cut back hugely on reactor starts. Nevertheless, nuclear power in the US grew from 114.0 billion MwH (out of a total of of 1867.1 billion MwH) in 1974 to 763 out of 3721 in 2004, in other words from 6% to 21%. Global annual plutonium production has gone up by a factor of 4, which granted is a lot but isn't the exponential increase predicted by the book. This is in part because the US contributes much less plutonium than you'd expect, in part because it hasn't adopted fast breeder reactors.

So the good news is that the US seems to have taken the issue relatively seriously. The bad news is that the UK and France between them hold 50% of the civilian plutonium in the world. I'm shocked by the lack of serious public awareness and serious official response in those two countries -- the protests seem to have died down a lot since the 80s but the problems have just got worse. The other bad news is that nuclear material keeps going missing in Russia, though under a 1994 agreement the US is continuing to pay some of the costs of shutting the relevant reactors down and moving to fossil fuels.

Ultimately, given that deterrence works against states, the question is how to prevent terrorists from getting the bomb? One part of the answer is simply increased vigilance, which has the advantage of protecting against all attacks: the terrorists don't necessarily need the bomb, after all. Another part is increased spending on counter-proliferation measures like the Russia program. Another part, perhaps, is engaging with countries that want to develop nuclear power to make sure that their plants are efficient and safe. And another part, unfortunately, is probably to accept that in the future there will be the occasional bomb in a major city and people will die but life will go on. All of these conclusions are reached in the book: they haven't dated, and in an important sense neither has the book itself.

It doesn't matter what McPhee writes about- he's simply the best non-fiction writer of the post-war era. All the best non-fiction writers today- Richard Rhodes comes to mind- owe a debt to the writings of McPhee. He makes literally any subject come alive, and when he has a compelling one like Ted Taylor and nuclear weapons technology and proliferation, the result is compelling, page turning narrative. Buy this book. Buy any John McPhee. You won't be disappointed

Way ahead of it's time, I couldn't put it down when I first read it in 1997. Engaging, well-written and with McPhee's classic ability to generate a fantastic world in which to explore. This book started a years-long passion in trying to understand about and learn as much as possible of the current state of nulear testing, power, and all nuclear power deployment, really. I HIGHLY reccommend picking it up.

Theodore B. Taylor, the physicist who was the subject of this book died in 2004, but not before he had completed his spiritual journey from nuclear bomb maker to nuclear protester. Even though the text of this book originally appeared in "The New Yorker" in 1973, Taylor was still driven to publish his own works on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. McPhee has a very understated style ("just the facts, ma'am"), but this book is still the most frightening I've ever read. I can't decide whether I would want him to write a sequel, because the threat of a nuclear bomb explosion is even greater today than it was in 1973. Just ask yourself the following questions:

Is there more plutonium available to terrorists in 2006 than there was in 1973? Yes.

Do more nations have nuclear capability? Yes.

Can a nuclear bomb be built that is even smaller and more efficient than its 1973 counterpart? Yes.

Are the instructions for building a nuclear device more readily available than they were in 1973? Yes.

Do some people hate America even more than they did in 1973? Decide this one for yourself.

John McPhee, staff writer for the "New Yorker" and Pulitzer-Prize-winning author of twenty-seven books on subjects as various as oranges and the merchant marine, has written a nuclear explosion of a book in "The Curve of Binding Energy." It's one of those books that is even more relevant now than when it was written. Essentially, it's a blueprint of how to build a nuclear device using materials at hand, along with a chunk of rather easily stolen U-235 or plutonium. Theodore B. Taylor, himself the creator of smaller, more efficient nuclear bombs, tells us where to steal the plutonium, how to assemble a bomb, even gives hints on where to plant it--one of the eeriest parts of this book has Taylor and McPhee exploring the now-vanished towers of the World Trade Center, trying to pick the spot where a nuclear device could do the most damage.

"The Curve of Binding Energy" is a must read for every man, jack, and paper-pusher in the Department of Homeland Security, not to mention both houses of Congress. I imagine the first reaction of many Congresspersons would be to ban this book, but it's way too late for that, my friend.

Despite being written 30 years ago this is still an amazing and pertinent book about all things nuclear.

First off it is another McPhee homerun. His style of just following tangents, paying attention to all the interesting details that paint the full picture and which most authors would ignore, until the tangents all coalesce into a bigger story works incredibly well. So well that I'm surprised he seems to be one of the only authors to use it, but he does it masterfully.

This book is about the life of Theodore Taylor, a brilliant nuclear engineer and weapons designer. And about mining nuclear material, and processing it into fuel (not only how, but WHERE, what the plants look like, how big they are, how many people work there, what comes in one end and what comes out the other end and where does the stuff go after that), and transporting nuclear materials, and the Manhattan project, and nuclear weapon testing, and nuclear reactor design, and nuclear safety, and the Orion spaceship design, and building coast to coast underground tunnels with specially designed nuclear bombs, and a thousand other incredibly interesting topics.

The writing style is immensely absorbing, and perhaps the biggest theme is safeguarding commercial nuclear material so that terrorists cannot get a hold of it and build a bomb that could topple the World Trade Center. Considering this book was written in the early seventies its foresight is unbelievable, and in a post 9-11 world where nuclear power is again receiving attention as an oil alternative the information in this book is still relevant.

Highly recommended!

The book is written by a respected author who appears to have become enamored with Theodore Taylor, an nuclear weapons designer. The two traveled to many places together, and the author plied Taylor with questions. The setting was the early 1970s, and nuclear weapons information was still secret, and the nuclear industry still appeared to be viable. Taylor did his best to answer questions and explain nuclear physics without violating classification. Since then, much has changed, and today Taylor could be more specific. When I wrote my first novel, a story based upon gun-type atomic weapons, I would Goggle an item to see what was in the public domain before using the material in my book. Frankly, I was amazed and frightened by the amount of nuclear weapons data available on the internet.

THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY must be viewed in this context. Also, the author, John McPhee, had to record and then present in a understandable manner, the technical information provided by a remarkable man. The author does not have a degree in physics or nuclear physics, and thus can be excused for not understanding some of what Taylor told him.

The book contains a wide ranging view, from Dr. Taylor's perspective, of the early nuclear industry and weapons program. Most of the errors I found are unimportant, since only people in the nuclear weapons program would recognize them. These I attribute to the author not understanding Taylor's remarks. I do take exception to Dr. Taylor's obsession with plutonium as a source of nuclear weapons materials for terrorists. Plutonium is the wrong choice for complex technical reasons. Should a terrorist obtain weapons grade plutonium (Pu-239), he would most likely accidentally assemble a critical mass, a self sustaining nuclear fission reaction--the equivalent of a nuclear reactor melt down. In other words, a small Chernobyl.

Dr. Taylor grossly oversimplifies explosive implosions spheres. He talks about fabricating one from TNT or C-4, using bowls as a mold. Pure fantasy. He also describes casting plutonium components, half spheres for the "pit" of an implosion device. Yes, in general terms that is how it is done, but he left out a large amount of details. Anyone attempting to follow his crude outline will meet with an untimely end, and so would the neighbors. Perhaps that was his intention.

Taylor styles himself as the inventor of several innovative small, high yield nuclear warheads. He looks at nuclear weapons from an inventors perspective, while I look at the weapons from an engineer's and users' perspective. I do not recall coming across his name, but since most of my dealing were with Sandia Corporation and the AEC, this in not surprising. I am, however, familiar with the weapons he mentions. I will only point out one minor mistake: the Mk-41 was similar in physical size to the Mk-17, and had a yield of 25 MT. It was the highest yield nuclear weapon in the U.S. inventory.

Taylor's major concern centered on the isotope he worked with--Pu-239. As stated in the book, Pu-239 is superior to U-235 for small, high yield nuclear weapons. Pu is a very toxic, hazardous metal to work with. For example, plutonium has five phases, while most elements have three: solid, liquid, and gas. Recovering Pu-239 from power reactor spent fuel rods is extremely difficult and expensive. Plutonium used in nuclear weapons is produced in a special type of nuclear reactor, a breeder reactor. Iran has one breeder reactor operating and another under construction. Dr. Taylor's warning about nuclear weapons proliferation is right on target.

Much of the book is devoted to the danger of theft of nuclear materials from poorly guarded storage facilities. If Taylor were discussing these issues with McPhee today, I believe he would place emphases on two different issues: poorly guarded spent nuclear fuel rods stored in cement pigs at nuclear reactors, the ideal source of radioactive materials for a dirty bomb; and, nuclear programs in North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.

Today's terrorist nuclear threat is uranium nuclear weapons--gun-type U-235 devices that a terrorist can make if provided with a sufficient amount of highly enriched uranium (90% U-235). Dr. Taylor mentions the Little Boy (page 220), the simple gun-type nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and gun-type nuclear bombs several times. He, Dr. Taylor, finally gets to the real danger on pages 189-191. In 1973, Dr. Taylor, nor I, could envision a world where a rouge nations (North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan) would obtain the ability to produce weapons grade U-235 and Pu-239. Our concern was the Soviet Union and China. Weapon design information did not exist on the internet--there was no internet--and the thought of a nation purposefully providing U-235 and plans for a simple gun-type nuclear device to terrorists was beyond comprehension. Today this situation exists.

Today, it is possible to take the Little Boy design, and by incorporating commercially available components, build a nuclear device with a yield several times the Little Boy. A device that can be disassembled and imported as parts into the U.S. or any other nation.

The CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY is a thought provoking, enlightening, if out of date, book. Reading it will be time well spent.

The Curve of Binding Energy by John McPhee is just a terrific read for anyone interested in the twin topics of nuclear energy and the nuclear bomb. We've all read stories about the negative environmental effects of storing used nuclear fuel, but you rarely are made aware of the other negative externality of used nuclear fuel; the threat to national security.

In this quickly-read, reportorial book written at the end of the seventies, McPhee follows the thoughts of Ted Taylor, a nuclear physicist and bomb designer. Taylor provides accounts of his work at Los Alamos and how the development of the nuclear bomb evolved from Fat Man and Little Boy to Super Oralloy and Mike. This is very interesting stuff with descriptions of bomb material, explosive yields, fission and fusion. Taylor was clearly conflicted with his work around the bomb and subsequent to leaving Los Alamos has devoted his expertise to developing safeguards and to raising awareness of the threat of a rogue bomb. This is where the connections are made between nuclear energy and nuclear weaponry. Much of the spent nuclear fuel stored in various physical states can be used to develop a workable nuclear bomb. Taylor focuses on the weaknesses in protective measures and the vulnerability of these supplies. An interesting point that is brought up near the end of the book is the comparative figures invested in fission research and coal power versus the amount of investment in fusion research (a much cleaner, less dangerous alternative). It leaves you seeing no reason why the government would resist funding a Manhattan Project around fusion technology. While no one can debate the usefulness of nuclear energy, especially given current conditions, it is important to remember the negative externalities associated with this power platform.

As with any McPhee book, I'm amazed at the level of detail he is able to provide which leads you to a much better understanding of a topic you may have known very little about before. The book also seems very topical as economic pressures will now encourage further development of nuclear power resources.