23 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Mary Heimann`s Czechoslovakia - A Book Full of Excellent New Insights But With Even More Weaknesses, February 28, 2010
This review is from: Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed (Hardcover)
If one thing is definite about Heimann's book on Czechoslovakia it is that it is not the definitive history of that country its publishers claim it to be. That is a pity, as it does contain some very valuable and thought-provoking insights that make it a worthy read in spite of its many obvious weaknesses.
What are these insights? The book attacks right on a central part of Czech national self- perception, viz., the notion that the Czech nation, while always dedicated to such high ideals as liberty and democracy has - no less regularly - been prevented from living these ideals out either by the illegitimate intervention by its various powerful neighbours or by the - just as illegitimate (as the Czechs have it) - lack of such intervention. In this, the intervention bit is primarily reserved for the Germans (first, as the Habsburgs, later, the Nazis) and, subsequently, for the Soviets resp. the Russians. The lack of such intervention, on the other hand, is blamed on the "Western powers", in particular during the Munich crisis and the Prague spring on both of which occasions the Czechs felt "betrayed" by their erstwhile Western "friends". This tragedy is alleged to have started with the so-called "battle of the white mountain" in 1620, with regard to which the Czechs, for reasons obvious only to themselves, have chosen to identify with the losing party. Since then, so public Czech consensus has it, the - high-minded - Czechs have always been the victims of history - morally superior to everybody else, to be sure, in particular in comparison with their much detested German neighbours. Simultaneously, they never were the evil perpetrators of anything!
Not so, Heimann`s book clearly shows! She very ably and convincingly proves from the original sources that this self-perception is what it is: a lie or, to put it more politely, a national myth. In reality, so her conclusion, the Czechs were no better (and, sometimes, indeed, even far worse!) than their counterparts elsewhere. Surprisingly, this holds true, in particular, even vis-à-vis the Germans. To this add a sometimes almost incredible Czech opportunism coupled with an almost non-existing readiness to admit any of these faults for good mixture.
All of these points are highly interesting, well researched and - at least from a German point of view - highly welcome new appraisals. In theory, at least, they might eventually lead to a more realistic view, on the part of the Czechs, of their own history and the evil parts they themselves have - among others, no doubt - played in that history. It might thus constitute a welcome first step on the long road to a sincere (re-?) conciliation between them and their neighbours (especially, but not only, with the Germans).
However, unfortunately, the value of these welcome insights is greatly compromised by several massive weaknesses of the book:
First, the author, almost throughout her entire book, employs a sloppy and derisive tone towards everything Czech that is simply misplaced. A good example is the passage on Dvorak on p. 16, but it runs throughout the book.
Second, although such heavy-weight critics as "The Economist" in its review (Nov. 21st, 2009) have certified the author an "exemplary" attention to detail, it contains a surprising abundance of factual mistakes that concern the general background of her story. One example for this is where she talks about Hitler who she says "had served in the Habsburg army in the First World War" (p. 119)(false, Hitler never did, but, even though he was then indeed an Austrian, served as a volunteer in the German army instead), another one is her description of Poland in 1939 being divided - like ancient Gaul - into three parts, one "German controlled Western part", one "Soviet controlled Eastern part" and in the middle the so-called "General Government" (p. 123). While it is left unexplained who was in control of this "third part", this wording implies that at least it was not under the exclusive control of either Germany or the Soviet Union (as such exclusivity is pointed out as a distinct and defining feature of the other two zones). So, maybe this area, at least, enjoyed some kind of autonomy? Or was it administered jointly by the two occupying powers? This is at least suggested by the explanation of the function of this zone as a "dumping ground for Jews, intellectuals and other enemies of the two ... totalitarian regimes". However, both these possibilities are clearly wrong. Instead, the "General Government" was that subdivision of the part of Poland that had, by the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939, been attributed to exclusive German control which was not outright annexed by Germany but whose ultimate destiny, instead, remained reserved for some later decision (the part assigned by that pact to the Soviet Union, in contrast, was annexed by that country in toto immediately upon its occupation). Thus, not only was this area clearly and exclusively under German control (until its ultimate liberation by the Red Army in 1944) it accordingly was never destined as a dumping ground for the enemies of both totalitarian regimes, but, at best, for those of the German regime alone.
No less mistaken is the statement immediately following, viz., that this "General Government" became "the site of "the" largest and most infamous ... concentration camps". First, not all large concentration camps were situated there. Second, this applies, in particular, to Auschwitz, the most prominent of all such camps which the author - obviously for this prominence - wrongly cites as an example - indeed her only example - for her claim to the contrary. Rather, Auschwitz was safely located in such part of Poland as had been outright annexed to Germany. Third, Auschwitz could for various more reasons not have been destined as a "dumping ground" for enemies of the Soviet regime, but, if anything, as a "dumping ground" for its supporters, viz., for soldiers of the Red Army, having been built originally as a camp for Soviet POWs, and operating as an extermination camp only when the war against the Soviet Union was already in full swing and Germany no longer had any interest in propping up the regime of its erstwhile ally by persecuting its enemies.
This kind of inaccuracy, however, is by no means relegated to facts concerning the general historical background of the book's story but also continues with regard to the gist of its subject: This applies, e.g., to the author's statement that Masaryk's mother was "a German cook" (p. 21). According to Wikipedia, at least, she was a Moravian Slav, even though it is true that her mother tongue - as it so often happened in those times - was indeed German!
While none of these mistakes has an immediate bearing upon the validity or non-validity of her main theses, they strongly convey the feeling that the author simply isn't sufficiently familiar with the complexities of European history of the time to claim the authority to be the first one to write "the definitive" history about Czechoslovakia (or anything else European, for that matter).
This impression is further corroborated by the discovery that nowhere does the book take recourse to even a single source written in either the German or the Russian languages. This is amazing, to say the least. After all, this part of central Europe had for centuries been dominated by German culture, language and administration and was inhabited by a one third-minority of German speakers during the first half of the period covered by this book (i.e., until after WW II) - among them such world-renowned personalities as the car-engineer Ferdinand Porsche, the logician Kurt Goedel and the writers Franz Kafka, Franz Werfel and Rainer Maria Rilke! A country, furthermore, that, during what was probably its most formative period, was occupied by Nazi Germany, i.e., by German speakers once again! A definitive - or rather: - "the" - definitive history of this area without the use of even one original German-language source? Sorry! Similar qualms exist with regard to Russian language sources or, rather, the complete lack of them, concerning the developments after 1945! Surely the events constituting the communist take-over in 1948 as well as those surrounding the "Prague spring" and the "velvet revolution" of 1989 cannot with any authority be fully appreciated without taking recourse to Russian-language sources?
Very likely the same reason - a certain narrowness of outlook - that manifests itself here, must also be blamed for another surprising feature of the book: its often undue readiness to explain certain supranational phenomena of the time that also occurred in Czechoslovakia out of their international context in purely domestic terms. (This aspect was brought to my attention by the very able commentary of David Vaughan in Prague TV of Jan. 13th, 2010). This sometimes runs counter-intuitive, to say the least. Take Czech anti-semitism during the - short-lived - second republic (i.e., between the fall of 1938 and the spring of 1939). Can it - with any claim to plausibility - really be maintained (see p. 87 ff.) that this phenomenon developed entirely independently of the massive anti-semitic policies of much more powerful neighbouring Germany during the same period? To be sure: maybe it can! After all, why shouldn't the same reasons that were responsible for a certain phenomenon in one country simultaneously have been at work in another country without there being a relationship of causation between them? However, in order to prove this alleged independence, surely much more discussion and corroboration by factual evidence would be required than the author is prepared to devote to it respectively to provide. Virtually the same applies, e.g., to her contention that Czechoslovakia's decision, after WW II, to become a Soviet...
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9 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
1.0 out of 5 stars
A shameful excuse for a scholarly book, January 3, 2011
This review is from: Czechoslovakia: The State That Failed (Hardcover)
As a dual citizen of the United States and the Czech Republic -- one who lived in Czechoslovakia during the Second World War and escaped from the Communists soon after their take-over -- I was anxious to read Mary Heimann's book. However, I must admit that I stopped reading after she reached the end of the war; I simply could not continue. The author, who claims to have lived in the Czech Republic for two years and to have learned the language, shows a contempt for the Czech nation and its people that is difficult to fathom.
She begins with the premise that Czechoslovakia's -- and, in fact, many of Europe's -- problems were caused by the nationalism and chauvinism of the Czech people. Then, she devotes the majority of four hundred pages bending many facts and inventing others to prove her point. Other reviewers (most notably distinguished historians, Peter Hruby and Ivo Feierabend) have pointed out the multitude of errors in this book which her publisher presents as "the definitive political history of Czechoslovakia." I will not repeat this very long list here.
What is worse than Heimann's lack of scholarship is her obvious hatred for my native country and some of her most distinguished citizens. Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, the nation's founder, a world-reknown democratic humanist and philosopher, and the most beloved figure in Czech history, is dismissed by Heimann as a "brilliant propagandist" who invented an artificial state. She ascribes evil intent to everything TGM, as well as his successor as president -- Eduard Benes -- accomplished. When Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Deladier conspired to destroy Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938, Heimann concludes that this act was precipated by the Czechs. Those of us who suffered under the Germans during World War II might conclude that Heimann is a "closet Nazi," when she defends the Germans and Sudeten Germans and blames the majority of their actions on the Czechs.
I am amazed that Yale University Press, a respected publisher, could foist such a piece of trash, disguised as a scholarly study of history, on the reading public. Shame on Yale and shame on Mary Heimann!
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