Customer Reviews

D-Day to Berlin: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-45 (Stackpole Military History)

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Alan J. Levine's `From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea: The Northwest Europe Campaign, 1944-1945' is an solid synopsis of the year the Western Allies spent in NW Europe at the end of the Second World War. Levine provides not only historically correct information but also insightful commentary where controversy or question still lingers. This is a fine piece of historiography worthy of a read not only by `academic types' but also those who want a good primmer to this period of WWII. `From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea' is not flowery or `popular' style writing; while Levine is clearly a solid writer. If you want your history a la Ryan or Ambrose style, this is probably not for you. If you're looking for first-person accounts; this is not the book for you. If you want small unit history; this is not the book for you. However, if you want a good top-down (to mid level command) look at the progress of the war in NW Europe (with connected political events and Soviet coordination of events on the eastern front) this is probably a book worth tracking down. Praeger Press is an academic press that really targets libraries rather than mass populace, thus purchasing a copy of `From the Normandy Beaches to the Baltic Sea' is probably not an option for most. However, this is a book worth tracking down a copy of at your local library or via an interlibrary loan. At just over 200 pp. of formal text, Levine's book is a 4.5 star effort, great for the serious, and good for the casual reader.

[This review is based on the original Praeger Press printing of this Stackpole production]

This is a very strange book indeed. It could have been a decent account of the 1944/1945 campaigns in Western Europe, but because of the lack of maps, of vicious characterizations, and of some questionable comments, it simply is not an acceptable history work.

The most obvious drawback is that, although the book covers the battles in Western Europe (and some developments on the Eastern Front) from June 1944 till May 1945, it does not offer a single map, which, I would think, makes the book nearly unreadable for the average reader.

Another drawback, and certainly one that puts the book's historical worth in question, is that it contains some strange characterizations made without proof, justifications, citations, notes or references (!), such as:
"Eisenhower concluded that Montgomery was a psychopath..." (p10);
"Eisenhower had to admit... that his old friend [Patton] was no longer just eccentric but mentally unbalanced." (p11);
"Leigh-Mallory...-his judgment seems to have been consistently bad..." (p12);
"By 1944 von Runstedt was elderly, lethargic, and alcoholic" (p14), and by the way the name of this Feldmarschall is misspelled (correct is "von Rundstedt");
"The degenerate Austrian beatnik Adolf Hitler" (p23);
"Model, a foul mouthed bully,...a man without any redeeming features.."(p82);
"General Bayerlein was busy most of the day trying to seduce a beautiful nurse instead of devoting his full attention to...Panzer Lehr" (p162).
The point here is not whether those characterizations may or may not be correct, but that they should not be made without argumentation or backing by trustworthy references. Also, they do not really serve any function as the author does not establish a strong link between one of his characterizations and one development in strategies or tactics.

There are some factual problems, such as:
"The Tigers and Panthers...their frontal armor, thick and cleverly sloped" (p19): the Tiger (in this case the Tiger I, not the Tiger II nicknamed King Tiger), unlike the Panther, did not have a sloped armor.
"The Sherman..., gasoline powered, was prone to catch fire when hit" (p19): this is correct but, since all German armored vehicles were gas powered too, that cannot be considered a relevant inadequacy of US vs. German tank design.
"Marseilles" (p85) instead of the correct "Marseille" (see p149 of US Army Atlas U.S. Army Atlas of the European Theater in World War II);
"Maziere-les-Metz" (p135) instead of the correct "Maizieres-les-Metz" (see p94 and 101 of US Army Atlas U.S. Army Atlas of the European Theater in World War II).
"Gniesenau" (p192) instead of the correct "Gneisenau".

Finally, there are also some questionable statements/opinions (again not substantiated by references):
"Up to May 1944, the strategic bombing offensive...had not reduced German war production in general" (p34): the author should consider what the German production could have achieved without being harassed by the strategic bombing.
"Bradley...thought that taking Berlin might cost 100,000 casualties (almost certainly a wild overestimate)" (p187): considering that the Russians lost many times 100k casualties, that statement required a justification, like for example that the German defenders would have `easily" surrendered to the Americans instead of fiercely defending their capital against the Russians bent on revenge for the destruction of their homeland, but the author does not list any such justification for his contradictory comment on Bradley's casualties estimate.
"...Dachau; with some help of the prisoners, the Americans [7th Army] massacred all 500 SS guards" (p196): that number (500) seems exaggerated and requires confirmation by a reference (I read that "an investigation conducted between May 3 and May 8, 1945 by Lt. Col. Joseph M. Whitaker, known as the I.G. Report, concluded that the total number of SS men killed on April 29, 1945 at Dachau was somewhere between 50 and 60" ([...])).

Considering all the above, this book is not a serious work on WWII history.

Having read perhaps 100 or more books on the European Theater of WW2, there is no doubt that this was one of the worst. The author uses every opportunity to use slanderous adjectives when referring to most of the German field commanders. His penchant for derrogatory and inflammatory statments while providing no reason for same, was in very poor taste. This bias on his part, calls into question pretty much everything else he had to say. For instance, he says that when the Sixth Panzer Army was pulled out of the line after the battle of the Bulge, "the German commanders in the west were glad to see it go"!!! This is shear nonsense, and no other historian has ever made such a ridiculous claim, since it was not true. The West Front commanders tried to get and hang on to as many troops as possible. He also makes the claim that the only German forces who put up a "fanatical resistance" were "well indoctrinated Nazi's". This is to say that in his opinion, the regular armed forces never put up this kind of resistance. Again, his bias is obvious. He also claims that all officers in the area of the Remagen bridge were executed. This too is false. There was one and only one officer that was court-martialed and then executed for dissobeying specific orders, thus allowing the bridge to fall into enemy hands. Also, this book is very confusing, since there were absolutely no maps of any kind, and his rather dry listing of which units went where and when was hard to follow as a result. All in all very dissappointing, and not in the least bit objective.

I was very impressed with this overview for its completeness and its engaging style. It covered everything from the planning of Overlord to the landings, to the breakout of Normandy, Falaise, Caen, Lorraine, Ardennes, crossing the Rhine, the Ruhr pocket, the southern advance of Devers, the northern advance of Montgomery to keep the Soviets honest, to the surrender and everthing in between. Besides covering all of these key military engagements, the author would also throw in little nuggets of intrigue about the Allied commanders and other useful bits of trivia to enhance the narrative. Be forewarned, the book is Allied biased and its told on a tactical level. There won't be personal or anecdotal experiences to share.
There are no maps or photos but there is an excellent section of further reading candidates.
If you are looking for an Allied tactical overview of 1944-45 in the west, you should seriously consider this book.