38 of 44 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent history for the most part, but with glaring flaws, April 20, 2006
All academic writers should hope for the skills of Derek Leebaert, who takes what could be a dry subject in the hands of the lesser-skilled and turns it into a page-turner of the first rank. Despite its multiple flaws, "To Dare & To Conquer" is an absorbing history of what the author classifies as the "colossal impact that the commando has had at key junctures of history." Billed as a "groundbreaking exploration of war, politics, and power," Leebaert unfortunately applies the beliefs of 21st politically correct academia to his subject with less than salutory effect.
In 16 of the 19 chapters, Leebaert provides an overview of how small groups of determined men have acheived considerable military victories, the few prevailing over the many. Leebaert's scholarship is impressive: notes and bibliography consume 49 pages. The primary theme is that small groups, whether called commandos, special operators or whatever, can have a disproportionate impact. He cites examples beginning with the siege of Troy, Alexander's conquests, the bloody triumph of Cortes, Mosby's raiders through modern times. Leebaert does wonderfully well at describing brave, often aberrant, men who apparently unconcerned with the risk to their own lives challenged opposing forces many times their number. He is at his best in this history.
Leebaert shows how these small groups, often openly composed of brigands and sociopaths, have always been marginalized or abandoned by their leadership, such groups falling out of fashion after the immediate emergency has passed. This is not news. Most nations abandon their military in every aspect after whatever conflict is at hand is brought to an end.
It is in the last three chapters that Leebaert seems to lose his way. One of Leebaert's targets is the CIA: he lambasts them as an ineffective organization, which any careful student of history and the news already knows. Those lacking such knowledge may be unpleasantly surprised by the CIA's record of failed, truly stupid, adventures. Unfortunately, in detailing this history, Leebaert drifts from the objective to the subjective, allowing his own political biases to creep in. This is unsurprising, considering that Leebaert is described as "a professor at Georgetown University." (This may be a bit of hyperbole in that he is described as an adjunct Professor as recently as January, 2006.)
Leebaert, when describing contemporary efforts to combat the Soviet Union, its allies and the current crop of terrorists, becomes predictably shrill about the United States and its various "failures," as if the United States was wrong to even make the effort. He appears undecided, if not actively opposed, to United States policies in every aspect. Straying from his focus on "special operators" in the military, he criticizes political leadership as well. This would be acceptable if the criticisms weren't so one-sided, the side one hears all too often from the Marxist recidivists so common on college campuses.
Leebaert is at his worst when he attempts to sum up his belief that special forces have become so institutionalized that they have lost their way (probably true); that political leadership is incapable of consistently using special forces productively (undoubtedly true); and that the terrorist few can topple all industrialized nations (not necessarily true). Here, Leebaert might have been well advised to quit while he was ahead. He comes off sounding like one of those Park Avenue liberals from the 1960s who always rooted for the alleged underdog, the purportedly repressed whom, as history has shown, were really after nothing more than power for themselves. In short, Leebaert strays into an area where he seems to be lionizing the very people who would happily kill him, me and you without a second thought.
Leebaert also pays homage to the political correctness gods. He is at pains to repeatedly point out perceived "racism" in various commando efforts, an easy thing to do when reviewing the past through the distorting lenses of 21st Century reality. Oddly, Leebaert demonstrates his own biases when he twice uses the word "fat" to deprecate a subject whom he obviously doesn't like. Of course, claims of an "obesity" epidemic are big among the politically-correct these days, so maybe that's just another manifestation.
It is in these last three chapters that Leebaert drifts from a stunningly good military history into political discourse. Leebaert is correct in pointing out that increasingly technological societies provide a richer target pool for terrorists of any stripe. But I gained the impression that he advocates placating by undisclosed means terrorists who wish to impose 7th Century beliefs on unwilling people. He appears to be arguing for some sort of toleration for those who would reduce women to ignorant chattels, stone homosexuals, annihilate Jews and reduce all over "infidels" to servitude. This is moral relativism at its worst. At the same time, he chastises the United States for attempting to deprive these oppressers of their sanctuaries. Leebaert also trots out some well worn urban myths, a departure from his otherwise fastidious research.
Overall, Leebaert is an excellent writer, though he could use a refresher course in sentence construction. Some of his sentences are so complex that they require repeated reading because Leebaert doesn't recognize where a period is more appropriate than a comma.
It's difficult to tell whether Leebaert sometimes lost his way or his editor failed, but the book has far too many clear lapses in this regard.
On the whole, "To Dare & To Conquer," is for sixteen chapters a wonderfully enriching military history. The last three chapters, however, should be approached with caution and a critical attitude.
Jerry
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9 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A good read!, March 29, 2006
Through the mists of time comes a compendium of special operations that will take you through the most dramatic and vividly described "special operations" in the last three thousand years.
Derek Leebaert has done his research. In To Dare and To Conquer he re-paints for us the infamous and not so famous stories from our world's history of daring operations, by small forces of highly motivated combatants.
Few people realize how dramatically our world is shaped by the daring and extremely dangerous gambles that have been attempted and against all hope succeeded, by those very few courageous personalities from our world's history. Many are outwardly normal people, placed in unique positions, which have with their actions forced what may have seemed inconsequential events at the time, into the stuff of legends.
This history would not be complete without the story of Odysseus and the Trojan horse, the unbelievable feats of Alexander, and French Knights playing havoc behind Saladin's lines during the first crusade. What we get as a bonus is a timeline, describing the thoughts and politics and policies at play during the last three millennia that clarify what people were thinking and what external influences drive them to attempt the forlorn hope.
To Dare and To Conquer shows that at times in history, there are those that will stand up and take the bold chance, and hit where they are least expected and most likely to fail. Certainly history has not changed as a result of such bold moves that faltered, but for the ones that succeeded, the world became a different place.
I was tantalized by the desperate operations of Cortez and Pizarro, enraptured by the efforts put forth during our own revolutionary heroes: Rogers, Arnold, Jones.
Leebaert also detailed the very special operations of other heroic souls that I was previously unaware from our own Civil and Spanish American Wars. Here, I say shame on my history professors, these people contributed significantly to the path our nation has taken, and should be commended, for without their bravery, ingenuity, and fearless hearts, our nation and our lives would be significantly different.
This work should be required reading for any first-year college history class, and mandatory reading at West Point, Annapolis, and the Army War College.
Armchair Interviews says: If you appreciate research and military history, this book is for you.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Bit Over-dramatic but Still Quite Good, December 16, 2006
Derek Leebaert has given us a very well-written history of Special Operations and their impact on the culture in which they form. It is a chicken-or-egg debate perhaps whether such military units affect their culture or if the culture shapes the kind of special operations that develop within it. I tend to agree with the latter view more but Mr. Leebaert makes his point well that special operations have changed the way a people views the outside world.
Mr. Leebaert organizes his work into four sections or parts: Part I covers ancient history from the Trojan war to the fall of the western Roman empire. It is my favorite part of the book but does seem to overlook a great deal of Byzantine history giving it a bit of that western-bias in my view - but western bias that overlooks Byzantine history is not new. Part II covers the period of the 14th-late 18th centuries in a broad look at special operations around the globe at the time. A very well-done portion filling in a lot of gaps for this period. Part II begins with the American revolution through the first world war; it is rather American-centric though it does touch a bit on the French revolution. Part IV attemps to cover the post-first world war period to the present/future. In it Mr. Leebaert attempts to gleen lessons learned in the cold war. One reviewer thought the author focused too much on the failures while I would say he spent too little time on them.
In the conclusions Mr. Leebaert seems overly sensitive to making recommendations and chooses instead to identify the problems of who will select, train, and manager special operations forces. Special operations are not easily boxed into a particular category and are intended to be mavericks of sorts who think outside the box while beauracracies tend to favor keeping their charges inside boxes. It makes for difficult planning and control when the people one hopes to control tend to be the kind of people who chafe at micromanagement so prevalent in the American military leadership (military and civilian alike). Overall, the conclusions, or rather problems identified, are a sound assessment.
For a good introduction to a history of special operations/unconventional warfare, this is a solid start. I especially liked the ancient history portions that fill a void too long ignored. Very highly recommended.
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