Customer Reviews

Dare Call it Treason (The True Story of the French Army Mutinies of 1917) (The True Story of the French Army Mutinies of 1917)

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This book is supposed to be primarily about a short but very dangerous time during WWI (spring 1917), when the common French soldiers on the Western Front got fed up with the incompetence of their leaders and temporarily rose up against them, got good and drunk, and refused to fight.

But, in order to have us really understand why the soldiers acted (and felt) as they did, Mr. Watt sketches back quite a ways in French history (to the 1800's) and then spends several more chapters on the first years of WWI itself, so the bulk of the book is really an overview. He does a fantastic job at this -- I tried a few military histories of WWI and gave up on them, but Mr. Watt made everything clear to me, not only the movements and main battles (the Marne, the Somme, Verdun, and the Chemin generals were trying to do, why it worked or didn't work, and the effect the battles had on the total war effort and morale.

The book is invaluable reading even for just the descriptions of the trench warfare. I never understood the significance of the term - why they were so hated - until reading this book. And Mr. Watt explains how the Germans and French were mismatched because WWI took place in the window of time after the invention of artillery but before the full-scale use of the tank. He tells how the French military leadership took a shamefully long time to figure out that bayonet charges (!) were useless against machine gun and artillery barages -- also, that the generals thought that to attack and never defend was the secret of military success. So the incredibly valiant French soldiers were sent out time and time again to trot, crawl and climb across the fields of barbed wire -- and be cut down before they could get anywhere near the Germans. After thousands and thousands of men were slaughtered, the generals realized they had to change their tactics and dig in, but even then, for the next 3 years, they continued to launch useless offensives, even though the clear-headed among them realized that it had become a war of attrition.

Along with this recount of the military side of the War and how it made the French soldiers discouraged, Mr. Watt describes what was happening in France politically at the time, which also undermined the war. Certain French leaders, politicians and newspapermen, pretty much aided and abetted the Germans, because their political base was the pacifist left-wing, and also because they assumed that France would lose the War and they personally would be in a better position for having fostered anti-war factionalism.

Despite these depressing events, Mr. Watt never descends to cynicism. He puts forward two heroes -- the military general Petain, who turns things around in the nick of time (at Verdun, and later during the mutinies), and, on the political side, "The Tiger," Clemenceau, who ran France like a dictator for those final war years but managed to keep her intact. At the end of the book Mr. Watt tells us what happened post-war to these 2 and also to the traitorous Malvy and Caillaux. There are definitely surprises here - the French political mindset is hard to understand from my American point of view, and probably from others as well. As the author states, "It was as if during World War II a former President of the United States were conducting secret conversations with known traitors in the pay of Nazi Germany...and as if the Attorney General and his director of the F.B.I. were winking at the whole affair."

Another shocker was the fact that there was at the time almost no independent press, and that one of the top liberal newspapers was being literally financially subsidized by the Germans! Mr. Watt explains that, for some reason, French newspaper ads didn't generate much profit, so, to survive, periodicals had to accept money from political factions. Astonishing, indeed.

Mr. Watt is a very fine writer, dramatic, as the subject matter calls for, and almost poetic when occasion demands. He is, as the dust jacket says, scrupulously fair, though not in the least supercilious or detached. And, though there is nothing made up or exaggerated, he manages to end each chapter in such a way as to impell you to the next.

For another great book by RM Watt on WWI, search "The Kings Depart." If you need to read something on WWI, I would recommend both of these, for their clarity, passion, fairness, and just plain enjoyability.

One might or might not agree on the author's take, reasonable in any case, on politics here, but this work is a good account of France during World War I (and before) with a blunt perspective and some of the facts that don't make it into story book accounts. The description of the mutiny in the trenches by the French soldiers is especially interesting, and, while no doubt not the last word, does actually mention this quite important subject! It is significant the left often bypasses this material, perhaps because of the history of the Kronstadt mutiny. It is not coincidence the Bolshevik revolution was one wildcard in the situation.
It is also clear that this 'mutiny', like a strike, did accomplish, to some degree, its purpose, and the efforts of Petain to restore order more than yielded on many of the key issues. A host of fascinating details, such as the drunken stupor pervading trench warfare, as an ingredient of acquiescence, to say nothing of the mutiny itself, where this backfired, to say the least. The 'poilus' could see what the generals simply could not see, the obvious absurdity of the 'over the top' strategies.
Acerbic and well worth adding to a list of books in this field.

Richard M. Watt graduated from Dartmouth College and served as a gunnery officer in the US Navy in the early 1950s. He spent years investigating the French Army mutinies of 1917 through libraries, government agencies, and historians in England, France, and the United States. Little has been written about the mutinies in France (p.308). Written works have their point of view (p.309). After the war a number of troops who were illegally executed were rehabilitated (p.310). There is a Bibliography of books in English and French, and an Index. Notes for each chapter are at the end of the book. Watt has written a very readable book for his point of view. I wonder what he would say about the War in Vietnam? I recommend this book for its education about a society.

Watt begins with French society since 1865 (Chapter 1). He discusses the French Army as a symbol of the nation in Chapter 2. As in other countries, the army was the career choice for younger sons of the aristocracy (p.24). The writing of a dead Colonel was very influential (p.28); it ignored the advances in firepower. Germany's industrial growth would make it the leading world power (p.31). The Schlieffen Plan was a formula for success. The mobilization of one country meant war for all (Chapter 3). Watt tells about the political intrigue of Joseph Caillaux (p.45), the leader of the Radical Socialists who represented the middle class of France. At one time thugs guarded him (p.53). The war united the French (p.57). Trench warfare in the West was not expected (Chapter 5). The machine gun stopped infantry attacks. The hand grenade was used for assault (p.85). Watt describes an attack (pp.86-88). The French suffered the most from the war (p.91). Chapter 6 discusses the problems of military command. Page 99 tells of an incident that became part of "The Paths of Glory". Pétain got more results with fewer men killed (p.108). He rose from colonel to full general in eight months.

Chapter 7 describes the power struggle between Parliament and the Army. The battle of Verdun is explained (Chapter 8).Artillery was used on a vast scale (p.123). Thousands were killed to no avail (p.125). The German plan failed. The Battle of the Somme resulted in the greatest number of casualties in a single day for the British (p.129). There was intrigue and espionage in France (Chapter 9). General Nivelle came up with a plan to win the war in April 1917 but it turned into a catastrophe after warnings were avoided (Chapter 10). May saw the first mutinies when troops were tardy when gathered for another attack (Chapter 11). Mutinous troops refused to return to the trenches (Chapter 12). Pétain was promoted to suppress the mutinies (Chapter 13). Increasing the amount of leave and better benefits ended the unrest. Pétain personally assured the troops (p.224). The next step was to punish a few mutineers as an example (Chapter 14). Pétain's new policy was successful (pp.244-245).

The Nivelle offensive was judged to be a failure but allowed to occur (pp.250-251)! There were other problems (Chapter 15). Some French officials failed in their duty (p.261). Disasters occurred in October 1917 (p.265). Chapter 16 tells about the mutinous Russian troops in France. Clemenceau formed a government to wage war (Chapter 17). He ruled like a dictator (p.283) but was distrusted by Parliament (p.287). "War is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers." Chapter 18 tells what happened after the war ended. Watt says the records of the mutinies were destroyed (p.300). Watt suggests the mutinies probably prevented another bloody Nivelle offensive (p.303). Watt asked why Germany didn't attack when units of the French Army mutinied. They may not have known or believed it; they had their own problems with their troops; or the Germans were afraid of catching a Soviet virus. The story about the secret ownership of newspapers was revealing. Do you know who owns your newspaper?

[This is from the hardcover book.]

This is a book about the mutinies in the French Army after the failed Chemin Des Dames offensive. The book does a good job describing the events and personalities involved in General Nivelle's disasterous offensive. It is also effective in its discussion of the mutinies and Petain's role in solving some of the problems which led to the implosion of the French Army. However, Watt's description of the ring of subversives and traitors in high places borders on the lurid. Some of the individuals mentioned were traitors while others were merely opposed to continuation of the war. Here difference of opinion is often equated with treason. It also must be noted that consensus politics are not a part of the French tradition as they are part of ours. The book has an air of Cold War red-baiting about it. Finally, recent research suggests that the mutinies were not incited by socialist agitators. All in all, however, the book is informative and a good read. Hopefully, someday these events will be described comprehensively with the objectivity they deserve.

This is a fascinating story of how the French Army almost crumbled in 1917. General Nivelle started an offensive which almost cost the French their Army. When you have troops marching off to the front and immitating the Bah, Bah of sheep, you know you have lost the confidence of your troops. Two men rose from the ranks and helped the Army regain its balance. Philippe Petain rested the Army (no more offensives for the time being) and Clemenceau (the Tiger) helped the French stay in the war to ultimate victory. A series of trials of mutineers also stabilized the French Army and weeded out defeatists. When the French Army went back onto the offensives in late 1918, the war sealed the fate of Germany.

This is a great read about a little known event in the Great War. If the French Army had cracked, history might have been vastly different. As it was, France and Great Britain defeated Germany.

Watt's work is a classic on the French Army and French nation at war. There is precious little in English on the French experience in WW I (BUT see Doughty's new book) and this book details not just the military aspects of the struggle but also the political. The heroes of the work are Clemenceau and Petain, who rallied their nation and army (respectively) to victory when the communist and socialist pacifists, some of whom were in collusion with the Germans, would have surrendered and allowed France to be destroyed. A brilliant work and a cautionary tale of the enemy within.

The author does a very good job of presenting all the details without repeating himself. There are times where the action drags a bit, but there aren't a lot of spots like that.

The book really shows how close France came to losing the war due to these mutinies. The author lays the blame squarely on the French political and military leadership for their incompetence in waging war. The strategy of simply sending men charging into the German gun positions was a complete failure and caused many needless deaths.

This book gives a much different perspective on WWI that you normally don't see.

Well-researched and accessible, this book goes a long way toward explaining the breakdown of 1917. Great background sourcing, rich description of character, and easy to follow. An excellent research tool.

this is a well-written book which provides an excellent history of these mutinies, but it suffers from excessive francophilia. France is the great and mighty nation, the Germans simply a gray and menacing mass beyond the trenches. Also not adequately laid out are the roles of Raymond Poincare, President of France during the war and, on several occasions before and after, Prime Minister, and Georges

Clemenceau, wartime Prime Minister. Poincare has, more than any other one man, the responsibility of allowing the European mobilizations in the summer of 1914 to go on to full-scale conflict: the Russians were considering a retreat from this course, but Poincare urged and convinced them to continue. Both he and Clemenceau - in the late 1800's just another sleezy politician - imposed a draconian peace of Germany (and on the Hungarians), with crushing reparations, an attempt to annex the German province of the Saar, occupation of the Rhineland (with quartering of Senegalese troops in German homes) and a break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire which often ignored ethnics lines. Petain, on the contrary, was every bit the hero of the hour that the French made him - he suppressed the mutinies with exactly the right mix of mercy and justice, essentially putting the French Army on a mostly defensive stance until the Americans arrived.

The book dates from the 1960's. A more balanced viewpoint today is emerging and it is now often conceded that America's intervention harmed the cause of world peace - that the Great War would otherwise most likely have ended in a negotiated settlement in 1917, without the damage that led to the next war. That, unfortunately, the Anglo-Saxon ascendancy here would not permit.

The author's afterword, in which he describes his astonishment at the degree to which the French government and Fourth Estate were complicit in pacifistic or even treasonable activity, must be interpreted in light of the VENONA transcripts, which identified hundreds of Soviet agents in the US government during World War II - including a member of Congress and later New York state supreme court justice, a future editor of a nationally respected news and cultural journal, and highly placed officials in the State department and intelligence agencies. He may not have been so astonished.