Customer Reviews

Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (S U N Y Series in Philosophy and Biology)

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Arnhart argues that certain desires are universal in human societies because they are based in human biology. He sees this as grounding an Aristotelian view in which virtues are to be pursued because they promote eudaimonia--human flourishing. Humans can only flourish when biologically-based needs are satisfied. These needs include not only the appetitive ones like food and sex, but "higher" needs of meaningful social interaction and the pursuit of understanding. These universal needs provide the needed telos for judging the rightness or wrongness of actions: How well does the proposed action promote these biologically-based teloi? This view also provides a neutral standard whereby the ethical practices of diverse cultures may be judged, so complete ethichal relativism can be avoided. However, Arnhart recognizes that there may be multifarious, culturally-relative means of achieving the universal ends.

Arnhart holds that the good is desirable, and since we are a natural species, the good can be discerned from our individual environments and our universal constitution as a species. Arnhart's contribution is Aristotelian, in that this philosopher started from the natural position of humanity (e.g., we are a zoon politican--a social animal) rather than from Plato's Ideal World. Arnhart is a Darwinian, in that our constitution as a specied derives from our evolutionary history.

This book can be read with profit by professional philosophers as well as beginners interested in understanding evolutionary ethics. It is clear and systematic, avoids jargon, and amply discusses alternative views.

I take issue with one part of Arnhart's analysis. I learned that "the good is the desirable" in my graduate student days in economics. I have always thought this quite incorrect (I wrote my Ph.D. dissertation on the topic!). For instance, I may desire potato chips (or heroin) but not consider it good, and may indeed wish that I did not desire these things. In place of Arnhart's principle, I would suggest "The good is what allows us to flourish and to use our natural capacities to the fullest." The idea of flourishing as a criterion is associated with Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen and others, and the idea of developing one's capacities to the fullest is associated with the young Karl Marx, in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

At any rate, virtually all of Arnhart's arguments go through with this minor change.

People like me, behavioral scientists, tend to ignore ethical philosophy and have contempt for its practitioners because it tries to find ethical truths independent from the natural position of human beings in the world. Arnhart is a wonderful antidote to this tendency, maintaining a high level of both philosophical and scientific reasoning.

This book looks at morality or ethics and tries to tie together an Aristotelian with what we now know is a moral system that was part of our primate past. Part evolutionary psychology and part philosophy, it is well written, cogent and easy to read. Its message is simply that humans are social and political animals that have innate desires, but need not act on them. Humans can choose to act contrary to their evolutionary past in ethical terms. But also, political systems must not IGNORE our human nature either, or they will fail.

From page 259 of the book: To justify his laws, Moses repeatedly insisted that if the Jews obeyed, his laws, they and their children would survive and prosper in their new land. He made no claims about immortality of the soul or about rewards and punishments in an afterlife. Instead, like Darwin, he argued that the purpose of morality was to secure the earthly survival and prosperity of oneself and one's progeny. The first commandment of God in the Bible is "Be fruitful and multiply" (Gen. 1:28). For Moses, promoting the survival and reproduction of the Jews required social norms that led individuals to cooperate within their group to compete with other groups (Deut. 4:40, 6:1-3, 11:8-9, 20, 23:9-14,25:11-16, 30:15-20). Moses taught that "whoever obeys the law will find life in it" (Lev. 18:5). Saint Paul cited this as the fundamental aim of the Mosaic Law (Rom. 10:5). It should not be surprising, therefore, that Darwinian theorists can explain the Mosaic law as promoting the reproductive interests of the Jews (Hartung 1995; MacDonald 1994, 35-55). As a product of natural human experience, not only Judaism but all religious beliefs and practices serve the natural desires of human beings in diverse social and physical environments, and consequently we would explain religion as an adaptation of human ecology (Burkert 1996; Reynolds and Tanner 1995).

So even one of the first moral successful systems, the Mosaic Law, recognized the purpose of morality in an evolutionary form, survival of the group. This book tries to go beyond group interests and argues (not always persuasively in my opinion) that a Darwinian morality can subsume the current value system that we all want to see.

The book covers the essence of an evolutionary morality. That is, humans evolved with social ranking, justice as reciprocity, political rule, war when group interests collide, religion to explain the fear of the unknown and eventual death, etc. Morality then became part of the pleasure of serving the tribe or belonging. Kin selection, inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity; these evolutionary processes required that humans have fear and guilt if they act against the tribe's rules. Morality included honor, fearlessness, willingness to die for the group -- that is what the communal sense was all about. Adherence to the tribes moral codes meant the group could fight of predators and other human groups when necessary. Those tribes that could not unify against a common enemy -- what we now call patriotism -- more than likely died out in favor of the more fearless tribes.

And how does this morality come about? Well contrary to what folk psychology tells us, from Dr. Laura to President Clinton, both conservatives and liberals, infants are born with a moral nature and seek the rules naturally. That is, even when playing with other children, a child will develop proper behavior by observing others and learning what works and what doesn't, similar to chimpanzees. So the moral do not have to be taught so much as just observed by children. We are naturally moral animals, but the morals change over time and are different for different cultures. However this book argues that we can now change those moral rules that should be abandoned: slavery, clitoridectomy, circumcision, cannibalism, genocide, etc. Perhaps.

Darwinian Natural Right, by Larry Arnhart, argues for a moral system in which we should seek to fulfill our natural desires, which exist due to Darwinian natural selection and evolution.

I think it's important to note that in this book Arnhart holds no distinction between statements of nature-what is-and statements of ethic-what ought to be. As such, his arguments tend to ignore this dualism. However, being a person who generally holds this dualism to be true, I found it easier to understand his argument by understanding his claims within such a distinction; the best way for me to describe his arguments is in such a way. His argument acts as a statement of nature in that it says that human beings, as part of their existence, seek to fulfill natural desires. Furthermore, these desires are, at their most basic level, determined by Darwinist evolution. What we typically see as morality, society, and moral sense is in fact the act of human beings seeking to fulfill these natural desires. Arnhart's claim also takes on tones of a statement of ethic, in that he further claims that not all desires are truly desirable; only those that lead to our flourishing are actually desires. He says that we ought to use reason to assess the best ways to fulfill our desires within environmental constraints, and then seek to fulfill them. Finally, he claims that an Aristotelian prudence is required in dealing with conflicting desires and finding the proper balance of desires that produces the greatest good.

Arnhart goes on to elaborate on these claims in ten different chapters. The first chapter deals with the origins of his ideas, a series of claims that he feels best describes his argument, and a series of seven main objections that he discusses at various points later in the book. In Chapter Two he defends the idea that the good is desirable, defends the use of reason to determine the best way to achieve the good, and sets out what he sees as the basic natural desires of human beings. In Chapter Three he defends Aristotle's interpretation that human beings are by nature political animals (political in this case is synonymous with what we now consider social to mean). In doing so, he argues against two of the seven objections: the possible gap between biological instinct and learned behavior, and the objection that biological principles are fixed, and allow for no variability. In the fourth chapter he asserts the existence of natural morality and the Darwinian support for it, arguing against the Is-Ought objection; he also argues against the objection that Darwinism fails to allow for free will. In Chapter Five and Six he asserts the existence and significance of the parent-child bond and the male-female conjugal bond; the parent-child bond acts as the evolutionary origin of morality, and serves to aid reproduction, and the male-female bond satisfies needs of social dominance and stratification. He also claims that any society that lacks both will fail because they cannot handle the emotional frustration that results. In chapter Seven and Eight Arnhart deals with what he sees as the most potentially damaging flaws in his model: slavery and psychopathy. In seven, he claims that slavery is a moral wrong-it is the denial of the desire to be free of exploitation. In eight, he argues that psychopaths must be considered moral strangers, and removed from society. In the ninth chapter he deals with two more of the seven objections: the objection on the grounds that Darwinian evolution requires change, while Aristotelian philosophy seeks stability; and the objection that Darwinism is directionless, which conflicts with the essential teleological nature of Aristotelian philosophy. And in the tenth chapter he tackles the last of the objections: that Darwinian Natural Right denies the presence or need for God.

There are a few problems with the organization and structure of the book. First, Arnhart fails to adequately explain his argument in the beginning of the book. He lists ten premises that form the basis of his argument, but some of the premises don't follow from the ones before them. Furthermore, some of them seem entirely pointless to his argument (I'm specifically thinking of 7 and 8). Later in the book, you discover the reason behind the confusing premises; in fact, they are key to Arnhart's argument. Unfortunately, he doesn't actually make that very clear until chapters 5-7.

The second major problem with the book's structure is that Arnhart habitually changes the context some of his terminology, which in turn changes their definition, and this makes understanding his arguments VERY confusing. For example, at some points he seems to use the word "moral" in a solely traditional context: morality concerns actions that are more than mundane, such as lying, cheating, stealing, etc. However, in other contexts, he uses his working definition of morality, which is defined as whatever the good is (in this case, fulfillment of desire). As such, things others and I might not consider moral, such as eating habits, suddenly are discussed in a moral context. Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with this definition. The problem comes from Arnhart's habit of changing the definition of "moral." (among other terms)

The final major problem I had with the book is that Arnhart spends quite a bit of time trying to connect his theory to the works of past philosophers. In essence, he tries to show how past philosophers would have supported his theory. There is nothing wrong with this, when the theory is adequately supported. However, Arnhart has a habit of focussing so much on connections to past philosophers that his support for his theory suffers. The section of his book in which he deals with the Is-Ought problem (the Naturalistic Fallacy) is a good example of this problem.

There are two main non-structural objections I have to the book. First is Arnhart's failure to deal with the problem of the falsifiability of natural selection. In DNR, Arnhart lists seven major objections to his book. Pretty much all of these are relevant, and he uses them to bring out evidence in favor of his theory (by the way, he does this very well). However, he never addresses the potential for natural selection to be disproven. Ideally, any scientific theory has the capacity to be shown to be in error--in essence, there is always the possibility that new evidence will show up that will render the scientific theory in question false. Furthermore, to paraphrase Karl Popper, error is manifest. Truth is not. In other words, error is something that can be instantly recognized by human beings. Truth, however, is not (this concept is the underlying premise behind falsifiability).

What does this mean for Arnhart's argument? Well, it means that he's supporting his moral theory from a non-absolute position. That is, he support for the existence of Natural RIghts--Darwinian evolution and natural selection--is not set in stone, or in any way known *for certainty*. Insomuch as Darwinism has the capacity to be falsified, Arnhart's argument has the capacity to be falsified. This seems to be a rather serious problem that I hoped Arnhart would address. He didn't.

The second "non-structural" problem is that Arnhart never really addresses the concept of human rights, and how it plays into his theory. His book, in my opinion, seems to imply that when we determine what the right thing to do is (the best way to fulfill a particular natural desire), we ought to do it. Can we force others to do it? To what extent can we force others to do it? In other words, to what extent can we use governmental and social power to promote this moral theory? Arnhart never touches on this.

Now, don't let my seemingly negative reaction to this book fool you. I did enjoy Arnhart's work. As an athiest and a humanist, I always enjoy reading works that put forth an essentially nonreligious foundation for ethics, and among those available, Arnhart's is one of the best. He provides excellent support and examples for the arguments he covers, and I found his argument against the Is-Ought dichotomy to be the best I have read. While I do hold to that dichotomy, I can't stand it's stranglehold on modern ethics, and Arnhart's willingness to argue against it--and his generally impressive argument--is refreshing. His chapter on parent child bonding is equally impressive and informative.

Overall, the book deserves four stars. I wouldn't go so far as to give it five, because there are some rather annoying issues in the book's format and the structure of Arnhart's *style* of argument. However, the book succeeds, for the most part, in defending Arnhart's theory, and it's VERY thought-provoking.

I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in nonreligious support for ethical systems, or in interactions of biology and ethics. It's not an easy read, but it's a good one.

I enjoyed reading this book but I was ultimately left deeply dissatisfied. I do not disagree with the basic idea that morality, in the sense of our motivations to be successful social animals, has evolved and is part of our nature and natural desire. Empathy, guilt, shame etc are natural emotions we experience which naturally shape our sociality. Where the argument weakens is around the premise that what we desire must be good. There is a big difference between saying 'the good is desirable' and 'the desirable is good' but Arnhart does not deal with this difference sufficiently. Sometimes he is saying that if something is desired it is desired because it is good, other times he is saying that we often are mistaken or ignorant about our true desires and make mistakes we regret so we have to think in terms of a whole life well lived and simple desire does not show us what is good after all.

Arnhart also aknowledges how there is a natural desire in us to exploit others but he believes this is simply countered by the natural desires of others not to be exploited. It all sounds as if this is the end of the problem, as if no one ends up exploited, as if there can be no need to concern ourselves any further. He takes the examples of female genital mutilation and slavery to show the workings of his argument and how it proves that these two practices are against natural right. Fair enough, but he has chosen two topics about which even ardent misogynists and racists would not bother arguing in favor. There is a noticeable lack of any attempt to show how his argument works with the moral issues over which his readers would actually argue.

We are told that war is natural so there is no need to concern ourselves with morality here either. We are naturally social with respect to our own group and naturally against and in competition with other groups. This conflict turns out to be good, according to Arnhart, because it helps humans as a species to flourish. (Perhaps the losers might disagree if they were able.) Human flourishing is good and for Arnhart that is what we all desire. Arnhart believes there can be no naturalistic fallacy where anything natural is bad and no mismatch between our ('true'?) desires and our human good. Perhaps this is where Arnhart's basic error is situated - in a belief that behavior evolves for the good of the species. This is not how evolution works. It works for the survival of genes in bodies through time and this can work through misery and pain too. And extinction - genes have no magical foresight. Even Arnhart's view that we must think about our desires over a complete life, work out what is right to do, think about consequences etc means we do not just do what our bodies push us to do - we have to recognize the pain our desires can cause to ourselves as well as others and we have to control our own natures.

It generally all sounds so simple. Each individual acts in accordance with their life-time self-interest as a social animal and is naturally bounded by the self-interested behavior of all the other social animals s/he bounces into. But surely, this is what we have always been doing anyway? Yet we've been forever arguing about morality. We've had individuals and groups unable to avoid exploitation. If it is our human good that each human not be exploited then we, as a species, are universally failing in this human end. Has reproductive success really depended on happiness and morality? On happy and moral progenitors?

On the one hand I accept Arnhart's point that what we consider moral behavior has evolved because of our evolved sociality. On the other hand, knowing this does not really change anything. I would be very much interested in the author showing how this view can actually be applied to everyday morality arguments and how it can improve the lives of those humans who are far from flourishing.

Three "Darwinian" Fallacies

The misuses of Darwin's theories are legendary. The very first and obvious mistake is to apply Darwin's theories to social processes, since Darwin acts only on natural processes. The second mistake is to assume that humans can imitate Darwinism over the long or short haul. Natural selection occurs naturally, not by human design. The third mistake is to take a natural fact and make it a human value, to take an "is," and make it an "ought." No "is" gives an "ought," and not "ought" gives an "is." The fact/value divide.

Because nature operates by natural selection does not make it a value people should do likewise. To do this is to commit the "naturalistic fallacy," which David Hume in 1740 and G. E. Moore in 1903, made plainly clear is a mistake. But let's be clear: These fallacies did not originate with Darwin, but by others who misused his theories. So, when politicians use Darwin's theories to justify their political system, their ethical or moral system, etc., they are plainly mistaken.

Uses of Darwin

Darwin explicates the evolution and origin of species. It's no longer theory, but fact. Variability in nature is the norm, but that fact does not mean variability should be prized because it is a natural fact -- at least not because of Darwin! To infer this is fallacious. That said, variability in nature opens our eyes to the beauty that variability contributes to our experience of nature, and prizing that variability many of use prize human variability. Some of us prize human variability without any regard for nature. But natural fact does not constitute a social value.

How, then, is Darwin useful to us humans? Besides answering questions about our origins, it is the theory of how human life in its immense complexity arrived to exist on planet earth. That complexity is itself valued is a transferred value from natural fact. But natural facts also create calamity, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, poison ivy, etc., and no one "values" these destructive phenomena, much less seeks to imitate them, because they happen to be "natural."

Yet, there are many values we can establish, based on our experience with nature. Prizing complexity may be one; prizing diversity may be another; applying Darwinian theory to our interpretation of texts yet another; understanding ourselves through the lens of Darwin's theory still another; etc. But, it would be better to suggest that no other theory in our other domains should not take Darwin's theories into account, not necessarily prescriptively, but factually. Most of us develop our day-to-day theories based on facts, and those theories cannot exclude Darwin without consequence. So, it would be preferable to say Darwin should not be excluded, rather than Darwin should be the model of our theory about X.

Ethics, Morality, and Nature

Thus, when James Q. Wilson wrote his book The Moral Sense, he did not make Darwinian theories the basis of his moral paradigm, rather he considered Darwin's influences on the viability of his moral theory and their compatibility. Conversely, Larry Arnhart's Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature conceives of "Darwinian natural right" based on the claim that the good is the desirable, the author argues that there are at least twenty natural desires that are universal to all human societies because they are based in human biology. Arnhart is gravely mistaken. Natural desires do not constitute human good. Nor did Darwin or his theory invoke a "natural right." Arnhart confuses is for ought.

I cite these two works because they illustrate the important difference between natural facts and social values. The Fact/Value Divide! It just so happens that I support Arnhart's promotion of Aristotle's ethics, and I also support an awareness of Darwinian biology, and I believe that Aristotle's ethical theory is compatible with Darwinian biology. But neither depends on the other for its justification or its support as evidenced by the fact that the two writers are separated by 2,300 years, and neither makes reference to the other. Nothing in Aristotle suggests Darwin, and nothing in Darwin suggests Aristotle.

Social versus Natural Fact

In fact, the moral theories of David Hume and Adam Smith, written a hundred years before Darwin, have proved themselves worthy of Darwin, but only after Trivers and Williams discovered human empathy as "biologically hardwired" in humans in the mid-20th century -- 200 years after Hume and Smith and 100 years after Darwin. Empathy, or what Hume and Smith called "sympathy," are not merely compatible, but virtually identical. But, the similarities may be necessary, yet not sufficient, which I believe to be the case. Indeed, I don't believe Aristotle is even necessary, but he is sufficient. One could simply impose the Epicurean Rule: Avoid Harm and Injustice as the moral law, which Aristotle's theory does, but goes beyond, while neither Smith nor Hume do.

Separating Facts from Values

Let's begin with separating two facts: surviving and flourishing are different facts. Darwin speaks to survival, Aristotle speaks to flourishing. Clearly, survival is presumed in flourishing, but flourishing is not presumed of survival. The two are different states of affair. Secondly, we are "biologically hardwired" with empathy, which leads to altruism and reciprocal altruism. But universal altruism (benevolence) is not entailed; merely altruism toward our family, friends, clan, in varying degrees, and our cooperation with others in exchange for mutual favor is reciprocal altruism, not universal benevolence. Thirdly, ethics, morality, politics, etc. are part of our values (axiological) systems, while Darwinian biology is part of our factual (epistemological) systems, and facts (is) and values (ought) are irreducibly divided.

Necessary and Sufficient

Philosophers love this distinction, because it is important. A trivial example to illustrate: A cup of flour is necessary to make a cake, but it is not sufficient, as other ingredients, cookware, cook, and oven are also necessary; altogether, they are sufficient. Biologically, for example, Darwin is necessary, but insufficient, as atomic theory, physiology, anatomy, biophysics, genetics, etc., are also required. Likewise, Aristotle's ethical theory is unnecessary, but sufficient, while Epicurus' principle is necessary, but insufficient, and Hume's and Smith's benevolence is necessary, but insufficient.

Conclusion

The tripartite axiological requirements of Aristotle's ethics, Smith's benevolence, and Epicurus' Harm-Injustice Avoidance as the ideal ethical and moral system are to be commended, but one concedes only Epicurus' Harm-Injustice Avoidance is socially necessary, but insufficient for flourishing. The question of benevolence may go either way, if it is presumed as necessary for the Harm-Injustice Avoidance, and is sufficient if Benevolence presumes Harm-Injustice Avoidance.

The language of "rights," such as those in the U.S. Bill of Rights, are social facts, not natural facts, and therefore to appeal to Darwinian natural rights is entirely confused. Life on the savanna, the jungle, or oceans has no "rights," only survival of the fittest. The "rights" enshrined in the Constitution are those discovered in the Age of Enlightenment as part of "social contract" theory. "Natural right" is therefore an oxymoron and contradiction.

Insofar as Darwin's five theories inform our present existence, clearly everyone benefits from the knowledge, which then can be used in making our values. These theories help us to understand how and why we have developed our social facts and values, but do not constitute them. Indeed, most of the theories and social facts we have embraced were done without knowledge of Darwin's theories. That Darwin's facts shed additional information on how we as a species came to be, interact as naturally constituted, certainly augments the understanding and appreciation of our values. But facts will never constitute values or vice versa. But values that incorporate fact (versus myth) certainly are more valuable because of it. Thus, Trivers and Hamilton and Williams' works are valuable for the light they shed on our natural constitution, but neither justify nor deny the value of a moral, much less an ethical, life.