Customer Reviews

David Hume's Argument Against Miracles

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

I'm afraid the previous reviewers have failed to understand what is really a clearly-written book. Beckwith's negative argument against Hume is this: Hume offers an in-fact argument and an in-principle argument against the possibility of miracles. The former claims that there isn't (in fact) enough evidence to support a miracle claim, while the latter goes further: there _couldn't_ ever be sufficient evidence for a miracle. Beckwith rightly points out that the latter version is simply question-begging, but agrees with the spirit of the in-fact objection: one needs significant evidence to take a miracle claim seriously.

Most of the rest of the book takes up this challenge. A miracle claim is much less implausible against a theistic background, so Beckwith first offers a carefully-presented argument for God's existence. Only then does he offer a developed argument for a particular miracle claim, that of the Resurrection of Jesus.

Obviously, as with any topic of interest, much more can be said on the issues Beckwith discusses; indeed, even the arguments he employs have been subject to much debate in the dozen or so years since his book came out. But I fail to see that he has made any straightforward methodological errors, contra cwyoung.

As for Deepak Gupta's terse dismissal, however, one is reminded of the dreary anti-religious chauvinism of an earlier time, highlighted by the false dilemma between philosophy and apologetics. As for the "strong" arguments Beckwith allegedly "evades", it seems that Gupta is confusing this with a textbook. Of course Beckwith should - and _does_ - deal with objections to the positive arguments he does make; to blame him for not responding to every possible objection, germane or not, is not to understand how books are written.

Finally, Gupta's remark that there is "little that would be convincing absent an a priori acceptance of theistic premises" is just a rhetorical trick. As mentioned above, Beckwith devotes significant space to arguing for the existence of God; it is by no means assumed. Gupta may not like the argument, or its conclusion, but the book provides the reader with a substantive defense of theism.

In conclusion: there are other, more recent and/or more thorough works of Christian apologetics, but this is a worthwhile effort and a nice, sympathetic treatment of Hume's argument (and that of some of its successors as well). Not a must-buy, but a good book, well-worth getting for those interested in a theistic response to Hume. (The price is rather steep for its size, though, so get it used.)

I'm afraid the previous reviewers have failed to understand what is really a clearly-written book. Beckwith's negative argument against Hume is this: Hume offers an in-fact argument and an in-principle argument against the possibility of miracles. The former claims that there isn't (in fact) enough evidence to support a miracle claim, while the latter goes further: there _couldn't_ ever be sufficient evidence for a miracle. Beckwith rightly points out that the latter version is simply question-begging, but agrees with the spirit of the in-fact objection: one needs significant evidence to take a miracle claim seriously.

Most of the rest of the book takes up this challenge. A miracle claim is much less implausible against a theistic background, so Beckwith first offers a carefully-presented argument for God's existence. Only then does he offer a developed argument for a particular miracle claim, that of the Resurrection of Jesus.

Obviously, as with any topic of interest, much more can be said on the issues Beckwith discusses; indeed, even the arguments he employs have been subject to much debate in the dozen or so years since his book came out. But I fail to see that he has made any straightforward methodological errors, contra cwyoung.

As for Deepak Gupta's terse dismissal, however, one is reminded of the dreary anti-religious chauvinism of an earlier time, highlighted by the false dilemma between philosophy and apologetics. As for the "strong" arguments Beckwith allegedly "evades", it seems that Gupta is confusing this with a textbook. Of course Beckwith should - and _does_ - deal with objections to the positive arguments he does make; to blame him for not responding to every possible objection, germane or not, is not to understand how books are written.

Finally, Gupta's remark that there is "little that would be convincing absent an a priori acceptance of theistic premises" is just a rhetorical trick. As mentioned above, Beckwith devotes significant space to arguing for the existence of God; it is by no means assumed. Gupta may not like the argument, or its conclusion, but the book provides the reader with a substantive defense of theism.

In conclusion: there are other, more recent and/or more thorough works of Christian apologetics, but this is a worthwhile effort and a nice, sympathetic treatment of Hume's argument (and that of some of its successors as well). Not a must-buy, but a good book, well-worth getting for those interested in a theistic response to Hume. (The price is rather steep for its size, though, so get it used.)

It's probably deeply unfair to criticise work that is over a decade old. However, Beckwith's profile on other issues requires some critical comment. If I understand the core argument of this doctoral thesis correctly, Beckwith argues that as there is no absolute certainty that there may have been some violation of scientific laws, then David Hume's objection to miracles as events that transgress an otherwise orderly universe is not a valid one. However, I would make a Lockean objection to this- Beckwith must conversely assert that there is independent verification of this claim that there were singular historical events that transgressed scientific laws, but he fails to do so. Moreover, why not submit any evidence about miracles to professional standards of analysis? I would also note that his section on evidence carefully avoids any discussion about the interpretation of forensic evidence. Sorry, but [in my opinion] Beckwith has not established the case for belief in miracles outside an a priori acceptance of claims that the Bible is a wholly authentic document. I do not deny that there was an historical entity named Jesus, but in the absence of any independent empirical verification that miracles and faith claims are true, why should I accept the absence of empirical evidence that is based on professional verification as satisfactory? ...

This book, a modified version of the author's philosophy doctoral thesis, is actually a text of Christian apologetics. It steadfastly evades strong empirical arguments which would successfully overcome its position and ultimately provides little that would be convincing absent an a priori acceptance of theistic premises.