Daydream Believers: How a Few Grand Ideas Wrecked American Power (Hardcover)

~ Fred Kaplan (Author)
Key Phrases: wayne white, United States, North Korea, Middle East (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

America's leaders have gone from hubris to waking fantasy, according to this caustic critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy. Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon) argues that the Cold War's end and 9/11 persuaded President Bush and his advisers to unilaterally impose America's political will on the world, while remaining blind to the military and diplomatic fiascoes that followed. Rumsfeld's Revolution in Military Affairs, a doctrine touting supposedly omnipotent mobile forces and high-tech smart weapons, convinced Pentagon officials that Iraq could be pacified without a large force or a reconstruction plan. Bush abandoned Clinton's diplomatic rapprochement with North Korea, then stood by as Kim Jong-Il built nuclear weapons. And imbued with a mix of neo-conservatism and evangelism that was peddled most flamboyantly by Israeli ideologue Natan Sharansky, Bush backed clumsy pro democracy initiatives that backfired by bringing anti-American and sectarian groups to power in the Middle East. Eschewing Kaplan's favored approach of fostering international security through alliances and consensus building, Bush assumed that by virtue of American power, saying something was tantamount to making it so. The particulars of Kaplan's indictment aren't new, but his detailed, illuminating (if occasionally disjointed) accounts of the evolution of the Bush administration's strategic doctrines add up to a cogent brief for soft realism over truculent idealism. (Feb.)
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Review

Regular Swampland readers know how much I respect the Pentagon analysis filed by Fred Kaplan of Slate. Kaplan's new book Daydream Believers is excellent and devastating, not just on the Iraq war, but also on the Bush Administration's fantastic devotion to anti-missile defense and its first term refusal to negotiate with the North Koreans. Kaplan is also terrific on the depredations of former Rumsfeld assistant Douglas Feith, who also has a new, rather obese book out trying to justify his lethal foolishness. I'd love to see Kaplan review it somewhere--a Cliff's Notes version of Feith's greatest whoppers would be a small, but essential, public service. But go, please, and buy Kaplan's book. His great work deserves attention and reward.
Patrick Cockburn's Iraq obsession puts my tiny 5-year jones to shame. He's been out there for two decades and really knows the place and the players, which makes his new biography of Muqtada Sadr essential reading, especially now. I haven't finished it yet--last few chapters to go--but it seems eminently fair and very well-informed so far and I decided to include here and now because of the events on the ground in Mesopotamia.
Speaking of which, I agree with Kevin Drum's assessment of today's New York Times piece about the mysterious Mr. Sadr...especially the part where Kevin confesses that he's not quite sure what's going on. My suspicion is that Sadr sees more hope in the October elections than in a military confrontation with the U.S. and Badr Corps right now. Also fascinating that the Iran seems, for the moment, to be taking sides with its more tradition partner--the Hakim Shi'ite faction--and against the militias that Crocker and Petraeus, Bush and McCain were so convinced were Iran's cat's paw in Iraq. It's always good to remember that while the Sadr family stayed in Iraq during Saddam's reign, the Hakims lived in Iran and their militia--the Badr Corps, now melted into the Iraqi Army, were organized and served as part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
It's a classic policy conundrum: Sadr is more anti-American, but Hakim is more pro-Iranian. Short-term Sadr is a real problem--especially those Sadrist elements that are lobbing mortars into the Green Zone and setting bombs to kill American troops. Long term, though, the Hakim faction may be crucial in the further empowerment of Iran in the region. (Time.com, April 20, 2008)

"Author Fred Kaplan offers an insightful analysis of what he sees as the unrealistic hopes at the root of President George W. Bush's problematic foreign policy in the Mideast" [and calls his arguments] "strong." (Boston Globe, April 12, 2008)

"[Kaplan] sheds new light on the important part played by certain advisers within the Bush White House, while explicating several pivotal and perplexing matters concerning the administration’s decision-making process.... illuminating... incisive." (The New York Times, March 18, 2008)

"A lively and entertaining -- if occasionally horrifying -- read, it offers a cautionary tale for any administration and for the men and women who hope to serve in one...master archaeologist who can see through the shards and stones of a dig to reconstruct the culture of the city below." (Washington Post, March 16, 2008)

America’s leaders have gone from hubris to waking fantasy, according to this caustic critique of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon) argues that the Cold War’s end and 9/11 persuaded President Bush and his advisers to unilaterally impose America’s political will on the world, while remaining blind to the military and diplomatic fiascoes that followed. Rumsfeld’s "Revolution in Military Affairs," a doctrine touting supposedly omnipotent mobile forces and high-tech smart weapons, convinced Pentagon officials that Iraq could be pacified without a large force or a reconstruction plan. Bush abandoned Clinton’s diplomatic rapprochement with North Korea, then stood by as Kim Jong-Il built nuclear weapons. And imbued with a "mix of neo-conservatism and evangelism" that was peddled most flamboyantly by Israeli ideologue Natan Sharansky, Bush backed clumsy pro democracy initiatives that backfired by bringing anti-American and sectarian groups to power in the Middle East. Eschewing Kaplan’s favored approach of fostering international security through alliances and consensus building, Bush assumed that "by virtue of American power, saying something was tantamount to making it so." The particulars of Kaplan’s indictment aren’t new, but his detailed, illuminating (if occasionally disjointed) accounts of the evolution of the Bush administration’s strategic doctrines add up to a cogent brief for soft realism over truculent idealism. (Feb.) (Publishers Weekly, November 12, 2007)

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 256 pages
• Publisher: Wiley (January 29, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0470121181
• ISBN-13: 978-0470121184
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 13.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (79 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #108,577 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

55 of 56 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Well written critique of current American policy, February 9, 2008

By	Steven A. Peterson (Hershey, PA (Born in Kewanee, IL)) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

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The point of this book is illustrated by a handful of quotations at the outset. From T. E. Lawrence (Of Arabia): "All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find that it was vanity. But the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act their dreams with open eyes, to make it possible." And a couple quotations from author Fred Kaplan. Page 1: "Nearly all of America's blunders in war and peace these past few years stem from a single grand misconception: that the world changed after September 11, when in fact it didn't." And (Pages 1-2): "But in fact, the end of the Cold War made America weaker, less capable of exerting its will on others. And its leaders' failure to recognize this, their inclination to devise policies based on the premise of omnipotence, made America weaker still."

This is a pretty well-written book. Its impact is diminished to some extent because others have raised many of the same points. The blindness to what would happen after the Iraqi invasion by American troops and their allies by Rumsfeld and others has been dissected many times and in many other books.

The discussion of the history of trying to develop an anti-ballistic missile system, quite fairly, traces the idea back to its early beginnings under President Eisenhower (I must confess that I am getting numbed by many books that focus just on the Bush II Administration, whether positively or negatively, without considering historical context). The theme raised by the author is that experts from start to now have noted that the system is not likely to work; there are too many ways that an aggressor can confound the system. The author also notes that military officials tend to "cook" results by structuring tests so as to increase odds of success. Kaplan laments the national treasure that has gone into the research and deployment of experiments/systems.

While Kaplan does not want a return to the cold-blooded (in his eyes) Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, he also decries the idealist vision of foreign policy of President Bush and the neocons. He wants a return to a more modest realism (small r as opposed to large R realism of Kissinger).

He ends by intentionally ironically quoting George W. Bush in a televised debate with Al Gore back in 2000. Bush said (Page 200): "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. . .If we're a humble nation but strong, they'll welcome us." With that ironic twist from the author's pen, the book closes.

For those who have read a lot about these issues, the book won't illuminate much in addition to what one already knows. Opponents of Bush are apt to seize on the book as further ammunition; proponents of the President are likely to take the opposite tack.

From my reading, this is another piece that adds to the discussion of the events of the past several years. It is well written and one can read it quickly. Not much that hasn't been said before, in terms of events. The conclusion advocating a return to "sensible realism" makes a certain sense, but the argument has been made with much greater depth and sophistication by a number of analysts (e.g., see Charles Kupchan's "The End of the American Era" or Joseph Nye's "The Paradox of American Power"). So, a book that will get you thinking about the issues one way or another if you haven't already made up your mind.

37 of 42 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A plea for reality in foreign policy , November 23, 2007

By	Smallchief - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)

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Kaplan has written a dispassionate, persuasive book about the complete, total, absolute, across the board and without exception failure of George Bush's foreign policy. Moreover the learning curve of this Administration has been nearly flat on the axis of zero.

Kaplan explains that Bush came to power at the head of a group of transformation theorists who set out to remedy the failings of past Presidents with a policy of confronting America's enemies with military muscle. Kaplan takes up back to the 1950s to explain the currents of military philosphy leading up to Bush. Drawing on the development of neo-conservative philosophy, Bush and the neo-cons wanted to throw out the dirty bath water of co-existence with obnoxious regimes such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.

Unfortunately, it didn't work and Kaplan details the reasons. The principal one is that the United States did not get stronger as a result of the end of the Cold War, but rather weaker -- more dependent on other countries in a multi-polar world and less able to go it alone with a policy that most countries found obnoxious or downright evil. The end of the Cold War, Kaplan states, didn't leave America in control of the world, it left most of the world out of control of anyone.

We seem some glimmerings of hope in Kaplan's book. Condaleeza Rice occasionally shows cognizance of reality. And after six years of Bush we seem to have worked our way back to where the Clinton Administration had progressed in eliminating the nuclear threat of North Korea. Kaplan's conclusion is that you have to deal with the world as it is -- not as how you want it to be. The U.S. has influence, but it can't abandon "statecraft" and diplomacy in favor of bullying and preaching.

Smallchief

24 of 27 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Together with a Few Other Books, All You Need to Know, March 21, 2008

By	Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)

The author is kinder to the protagonists than they merit.

I give the author high marks for making the case early on in the book that the world did NOT change after 9-11, and that what really happened was that the coincidence of neo-conservative back-stabbing and Bush's well-intentioned evangelical village idiot view of freedom and democracy.

The author does a fine job of reviewing how after 9-11 we were faced with two choices, the first, going for empire ("we make our own reality") or revitalizing alliances. The neocons in their ignorance called for regime changes, but the author fails us here by not understanding that both political parties love 42 of the 44 dictators, those that "our" dictators.

The author has many gifted turns of phrase. One talks about how their "vision" turned into a "dream" that then met "reality" and was instantly converted into a "nightmare."

The author adds to our knowledge of how Rumsfeld empowered Andy Marshall, and how the inner circle quickly grew enamored of the delusion that they could achieve total situational awareness with total accuracy in a system of systems no intelligent person would ever believe in.

The author highlights two major intelligence failures that contributed to the policy bubble:

1. Soviet Union was way behind the US during the Cold War, not ahead.
2. Soviet economy was vastly worse and more vulnerable that CIA ever understood.

The author helps us understand that the 1989 collapse of the Berlin War created a furor over the "peace dividend" and the "end of history" that were mistaken, but sufficient to bury with noise any concerns about Bin Laden and Saudi Arabian spread of virulent anti-Shi'ite Wahabibism from 1988 onwards.

By 1997 Marshall and Andy Krepinevich were staking everything on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), high speed communications and computing (still not real today), and precision munitions.

The author provides a super discussion of Col John Warden's "five rings" in priority order: 1) leadership and C4I; 2) infrastructure; 3) transportation; 4) population (again, war crimes); and finally, 5) the enemy. The author is brutal in scoring the campaign designed by Col Warden a complete failure. It...did...not...work (in Gulf I).

I cannot summarize everything, so a few highlights:

+ Taliban quickly learned how to defeat US overhead (satellite) surveillance--remember, we do not do "no-notice" air breather imagery any more, except for easily detected UAVs, with mud as well as cover and concealment. .

+ Excellent account of the influence on Rumsfeld of George Tenet's failure to satisfy him during a missile defense review. It became obvious to all that the U.S. Intelligence Community a) no longer had a very high level of technical mastery on the topic; and b) was so fragmented as to make the varied analytic elements deaf, dumb, and blind--not sharing with each other, using contradictory data sets, the list goes on.

Page 187 is the page to read if you are just browsing in the bookstore:

Summarizing 2007: "Not so much a return to realism as a retreat to randomness." Also: "Grand vision was shattered by reality. Policies were devised piecemeal; actions were scattershot, aimless." And: "put forth ideas without strategies; policies without process; wishes without means." Devastating.

So many other notes. Here are a tiny handful:

+ Speechwriter Michael Gersen connected with Bush on an evangelical level, wrote major speeches, in the case of a foreign policy speech, without actually consulting any adult practitioners.

+ Joseph Korbel was both Madeline Albright's father and Condi Rice's educational mentor--talk about a non-partisan losing streak!

+ American Enterprise Institute and Richard Perl used Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky to impress Cheney and subvert Bush by reframing the Israeli genocide against the Palestinians as the first 21st Century war between terrorism (the hapless Palestinians) and democracy (the Israeli's).

+ He credits Eliot Abrams with devising the unique linkage between American Jews whose numbers and influence have been declining, and the Evangelical Christians whose influence peaked with Bush-Cheney.

+ He slams General Tommy Franks for providing assurances and making promises he could not keep with respect to settling and stabilizing the towns by-passed or over-run by the US Army.

+ The author is misleading in his account of the Saudi-Powell discussions on how an election would lead to radical Islamics in charge (as opposed to despotic, perverted spendthrifts).

+ Rumsfeld Lite going into Iraq meant that a quarter million tons of ordnance was looted by insurgents, which is what cost us four years time. General Shinseki is vindicated.

+ For the first time I learn of a planned Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

+ The author introduces Ahmed Chalabi but does not fully understand this man's crimes as well as his special relationship with Iran. Iran used him to get the USA to depose the Taliban and Sadaam Hussein, , and to lure the entire US military into a quagmire.

+ Department of State, Mr. White in particular, got it right every time.

+ Legitimacy and stability must come before elections.

+ Hezbollah win in Lebanon dealt a crushing blow to the Bush delusions.

+ Bush refused to deal with Syria and Iran throughout. I am reminded of how Civil Affairs was told in the first five years of the war to blow off the tribal leaders and imams, and only now are they being allowed to get it right.

+ Useful account of three failed Public Diplomacy tenures (Charlotte Beers, Margaret Tutwiler, Karen Hughes (who waited six months so her son could leave for college--so much for the importance of that job....)

+ USA sent $230 million in aid to Lebanon, while Iran poured in $1 billion via Hezbollah (meanwhile, the Chinese do the same everywhere else).

Page 191 is glorious: Bush's strategies were "based on fantasies, faith, and a willful indifference toward those affected by their consequences."

Page 192: the real divide is "between the realists and the fantasists."

The author quite properly slams the Democrats for not having an original idea, plan, program, bill, budget, or moral thought.

He ends by suggesting that multinational consensus is still the true litmus test for the sensibility and sustainability of any endeavor.

On this note, I conclude that five stars are right where this book should be. Incomplete, but original and provocative. Bravo.

Other recommendations:
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
DVD Why We Fight
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency
The Price of Loyalty : George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy