Most Helpful Customer Reviews
34 of 36 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Dec. 8, 1941 - Pacific Crucible, September 26, 2003
This review is from: December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor (Texas A&M University Military History Series, 87.) (Hardcover)
Napoleon is quoted as having said, "History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon." Bill Bartsch's engaging and readable book covers an historic event that has received only limited scholarly attention in the years following WWII and thus far no"agreement" exists about it. Even the attack on Pearl Harbor, which has been exhaustively examined, continues to generate controversy. In taking up this story, the reader has no settled version or consensus to which to refer. In effect, the story is being told for the first time. Bartsch has broken new ground in telling this story and presents a fascinating and dynamic history told in a well-paced narrative. He has taken on the long overdue task of presenting a compelling and sad history of bravery, incompetence and competing egos combined with a war planning system that was still evolving when America entered WWII. In its failure to fully understand the inexorable growth of hostilities in both the east and west, America was suffering from a perceptual lag during the pre-WWII period. The national mood during the 1930s, shaped by the economic traumas of the Depression and memories of WWI, adamantly opposed involvement in foreign wars. This mood was reflected in the country's foreign and fiscal policies. Military budgets were kept unreasonably low, military planning was based on defensive, not offensive, strategies and technological development was morbidly slow. Operating as an arm of the Army, the Army Air Corps was at an even greater disadvantage in both resources and status. In spite of the debacle that Bartsch describes in the Philippines, it's amazing to look back now and to appreciate the decisive role airpower played in helping to win WWII. Especially when considered in light of the events on Dec. 8, 1941.
Among the book's many strengths is the way Bartsch has constructed this story: to the extent possible, from the point of view of the participants themselves. By skillfully integrating the experiences of both American and Japanese combatants in the run-up to the Japanese attack, Bartsch is not being morally neutral, but rather providing readers the means to fully appreciate this dynamic piece of history through the insights and perceptions of everyone from high-level strategist to individual officers and enlisted men as each side prepared for war. The history revealed in this book, and the tragic event at its center, must inevitably lead to questions of responsibility. Bartsch goes back to the period just before the war to begin his story. The record of this period may still be in dispute, but there is general agreement that Washington political and military planners were hampered in their work by a profoundly inadequate appreciation for the power of the Japanese war machine and an overly optimistic perception of U.S. military superiority. Moreover, their focus was on Europe, German aggression and how to support Britain at a time when domestic political forces favored neutrality. The Pacific was an afterthought in this context, and when Washington finally understood the scope of the Japanese threat it was a case of too little too late. Air Corps and Army material in the Philippines was decidedly outdated; clearly inadequate for use against a well equipped foe. Yet, with its focus on Europe, Washington continually deflected urgent requests, until what - from this perspective - looks like the last minute. Washington planners also misunderstood the nature of the Japanese threat which had an adverse effect on their decisions in the type of aircraft they supplied. Brought out of retirement to head U.S. forces in the Far East, Douglas MacArthur no doubt brought with him old assumptions about warfare in general and airpower in particular. However, he did recognize the need to build-up and improve the Air Corps and early warning systems there which prompted MacArthur to replace the Air Corps commander, Gen Henry Clagett with Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. MacArthur felt that Brereton was the better man to lead the build-up and to manage the logistical demands that would be required. Supplies finally began to flow to the Philippines as the Japanese threat grew more palpable. Plans began in earnest to deploy resources, improve early warning systems, air bases and generally mount a defense of the Philippines against the increasing likelihood of Japanese aggression. Bartsch goes to great detail to document Washington's repeated warnings to MacArthur and Brereton that Japan was on a war footing. Indeed, Bartsch also records their response and the range of active preparations in anticipation of conflict. There was a disconnect somewhere in all of the planning. Though MacArthur and Brereton had a full day after the attack on Pearl Harbor to prepare a response to the very high probability of a Japanese attack on the Philippines, and though the outlying fighter and bomber groups were all on alert, when the attack finally occurred the Air Corps and most of the other military units there were caught off guard. Bartsch tells the dramatic story of that day from both American and Japanese viewpoints. He provides graphic details of the tragedy on the ground for those airmen and airplanes caught in the sights of Japanese attackers. He describes the heroism of those pilots who were able to take off and bravely faced the overwhelming odds. Bartsch is a good writer. He has the rare ability to establish an aura of suspense about an event in which the outcome is already known. He is also an historian, and it is important that out of this recording of events, the reader gain some insight about what happened and how it went wrong. His extensive research provides a reliable foundation for an assessment of the failures of command and control in both Washington and the Philippines that ultimately caused not only the destruction of U.S. military capacity in the Philippines but also the loss of America's prime strategic outpost in the Pacific. Without the Philippines, America's ability to resist Japanese aggression was so badly crippled that it would take another year to begin turning back Japanese advances in the Southwest Pacific and East Asia. This is a powerful story, well told and well researched. It's also an important moment in American history about which Americans know too little. Bill Bartsch has done a remarkable job in telling that story and reminding us that we have much to be proud of but there is also much to learn from our own history.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
24 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
"One of the Blackest Days in American Military History", May 4, 2004
This review is from: December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor (Texas A&M University Military History Series, 87.) (Hardcover)
On December 8, 1941, a scant ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, a large force of Japanese bombers and fighters crippled the largest force of four-engine B-17 bombers outside of the United States, as well as many of their P-40 support fighters. This sudden blow allowed the Japanese to rule the sky over the Philippines, removing the only effective fighting force that might have opposed them in Southeast Asia. How was this attack allowed to happen? Why didn't General Douglas MacArthur, commander of all military forces in the Philippines, have his planes in the air, or even better, why wasn't he launching an attack against the Japanese bases on Formosa? These questions have been asked almost as much as who was responsible for the Pearl Harbor attack, but what makes the Philippine disaster much worse is that MacArthur had ten hours' warning that the Japanese were probably going to strike but he failed to act! General Brereton, MacArthur's air chief tried repeatedly to get clearance from MacArthur to launch an attack against Formosa, but each time he was told by MacArthur's chief of staff General Sutherland to stand by and not to use the B-17s offensively or even for reconnaissence without first obtaining Sutherland's permission. By the time Brereton was finally allowed to mount a reconnaissence mission against Formosa, it was too late, the Japanese were already winging their way toward Clark Field. The B-17 attack against Formosa never occurred. What happened on December 8, 1941 can only be described as a huge derelection of duty by Sutherland and MacArthur. MacArthur should have sought out Brereton himself and devised a plan to attack Formoosa as soon as news of the Pearl Harbor attack was known, or, at the very least, Brereton should have been allowed to speak to MacArthur instead of receiving the run-around he got from Sutherland. The results of the Japanese attack were devastating. Almost half of the B-17 force in the Philippines was destroyed on the ground as well as many of the P-40 pursuit planes. The Japanese, as at Pearl Harbor, suffered only minor losses. I found this book to be a fascinating read. Mr. Bartsch describes American involvement in the Philippines from the build-up (and Washington's fatal decision to put their faith in a long-range bomber force as a deterrant to Japan) right through to the attack on Clark Field. Japanese and American viewpoints are presented, and the Epilogue solidifys Bartsch's case against MacArthur and Sutherland. I highly recommend this fine book. This subject has never really received the coverage it deserves, but this book describes in great detail one of the most destructive attacks against the United States. The ironic part is that it all could have been prevented if MacArthur and his staff had reacted differently.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor, August 9, 2006
This review is from: December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor (Texas A&M University Military History Series, 87.) (Hardcover)
This is a follow up book to "Doomed From the Start" written by William Bartsch. This book takes the extra notes from his earlier work with interviews from both sides and numerous extracts from "Doomed" and Walter Edmonds book "They Fought With What They Had" and forms a very comprenhensive look at the events leading up to and immediately through the attacks on Clark and Iba Air Fields on 8 Dec 1941. The book starts in 1940 when the Air Corps begins modernizing the forces in the Philippines and looks at all the attempts by subordinate personnel to provide adequate forces, defense, and doctrine for the air forces of the far east. The book looks at the development of the Japanese operation plan and shows how junior officers and NCO's proved that the attack on Clark didn't require aircraft carrier support for escorts. This book illuminates enough blame for everyone above the rank of major in the chain up to and including FDR. The book points out a study conducted by Maj Hoyt Vandenburg (later AF Chief of Staff) after listening to briefings by Sir Hugh "Stuffy" Dowding on lessons learned by the RAF from the Battle of Britain which recommended action which if implemented might have delayed the final fall of the PI to a point that would have crippled the Japanese timetable most likely in a fatal manner. IMO a delay in taking Luzon by 6 months would have been fatal to Japanese intentions, a relatively secure Subic and Manila Bay would have provided a staging area for American submarines which would have made southern Japanese expansion untenable.
The largest points to come out of the book may have been obvious before reading but are still worth noting:
1. American fighter aircraft and pilots were not up to the task of intercepting the Japanese even if suffecient numbers had been available for the intercept, most of the Americans never got above 18,000 feet, the Japanese bombed from 21,000.
2. MacAurthor or his chief of staff Sutherland was criminally negelent in releasing the Air Force to conduct offensive operations against Formosa...these may not have prevented the strikes against Clark but would have severely restricted future Japanese operations from there after repairs to the bases. Additionally it would have preserved the B-17's lost on the 8th.
Overall this is an excellent book for those interested in delving into the formulation of a disaster that was 8 December1941. It left me screaming inside "IDIOTS, do un to others BEFORE they do un to you!"
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
|
