Decent Interval [Hardcover]

Frank Snepp (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 590 pages
• Publisher: Random House; 1 edition (November 12, 1977)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0394407431
• ISBN-13: 978-0394407432
• Product Dimensions: 9.4 x 6.3 x 1.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #133,581 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

31 of 32 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Superb Insider's View Of The Fall Of Vietnam!, September 20, 2002

By 

Barron Laycock "Labradorman" (Temple, New Hampshire United States) - See all my reviews
(HALL OF FAME REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Decent Interval (Hardcover)

When this book was originally published in the late 1970s, it caused a firestorm of controversy due to its savage critique of the conduct of both the CIA and military advisory units within Vietnam. Written by a career CIA officer who resigned in disgust over the ways in which American policy both undermined and betrayed the very purposes we were supposed to be in Vietnam to promote, the book quickly became an international best-seller. Frank Snepp was the chief strategy analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon, and from his unique vantage point was able to discern most of policy discussions regarding the American approach to the ongoing conduct of the war assistance being provided to the South Vietnamese. What he discovered alarmed and surprised him, for the authorities were making plans to allow the fall of the Saigon regime even while reassuring their Vietnamese clients they would support them to the very end.

As the title of the book indicates, the most salient characteristic of the American policy was to withdraw our forces in such a way as to allow a sufficient amount of time to go by before the North Vietnamese forces made a final fatal thrust into the south to take over, so that America would save face by not directly involved in the action resulting in the losing of the decade-long war. Instead, according to this strategy, there was to be a so-called "decent interval" of time separating the associated events of American withdrawal on the one hand, and the final campaign by the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) forces, on the other. Snepp was outraged by the treachery involved in such a strategy, and argued strenuously against thus, which would leave hundreds if not thousand of ardent and loyal South Vietnamese operatives at extreme risk, for they would be caught unaware when the final critical days came that the American forces would not come to their rescue.

Snepp was even more surprised when he discovered that this strategy was not either the result of a local CIA operative such as the station chief, nor that of the CIA itself at the Langley, Virginia headquarters, but rather that it appeared to emanate from the highest levels of the executive branch of the government, from the office of Henry Kissinger and the office of the National Security Advisor to the President. This meant, of course, that it was a deliberate betrayal of the South Vietnamese by the American Government with full knowledge of the savage consequences this action would have for most of those who had worked so closely with the Americans for so long. For Snepp, this was treachery of the lowest and most unforgivable sort, a policy that served to punish our friends and reward our enemies, all done in the name of political expediency.

Of course, in order to be effective, this strategy must remain secret, for having such information made public would expose both the Executive branch and the CIA for the craven treachery they were conspiring to commit. Thus, the press releases associated with the rapidly accomplished American withdrawal of troop, material and advisors were spun to give the public the impression that all of this was part of the so-called successful "Vietnamization" of the war, under which the ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was increasingly shouldering the exclusive burden for conduct of the war against the NVA. What both the CIA and the U.S. Army command authority hoped for was a campaign in which the ARVN performed well enough to make the eventual NVA victory appear to be more gradual than it was feared it might be.

Of course, after the hasty American withdrawal, the NVA rapidly pressed their advantage and the ARVN collapsed so rapidly that no such "decent interval" was realized. Instead, the campaign took a disastrous turn, and the final result was a panic for the American loyalists now trapped in Saigon with little hope of rescue. The rest, as they say, is the stuff of history. Yet the facts laid out by Snepp in this book show just how treacherous, cynical, and self-concerned the actions of the American authorities were toward their South Vietnamese clients. In the end, we failed the loyal citizens of South Vietnam by largely abandoning them in the time of their greatest need. Left to choose between doing the honorable thing and doing what was expedient, we chose to beat feet. This is a wonderful book and a mind-boggling reading experience

28 of 29 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A Compelling Tale of How We Finished the Sellout of the RVN, June 9, 2000

By 

Rod D. Martin (Grace Hall, Destin, Florida) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Decent Interval (Hardcover)

As the CIA's chief strategy analyst in South Vietnam, Snepp is in a unique position to speak to the issues involved, and to chronical the final fall of the Republic of Vietnam. That the fault for that fall lies with us really goes without saying, even though without question he shows in great detail the ineptitude and corruption of many in the Saigon regime along with similar in our own ranks.

Snepp shows all too clearly how the CIA (and the US generally) failed to honor its commitments in a thousand different ways, and undermined the RVN time and time again. In this, of course, Kissinger would agree; and yet Snepp painfully shows that it was Kissinger's own failures at the table in Paris that lead to much of what transpired in 1973-75.

The account of the final days is riveting, just as it is tragic.

You do not have a complete picture of what happened in Vietnam without this vital conclusion.

18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Ambassador Greene causes a disaster as the Vietnam War Ends, June 30, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Decent Interval: An Insider's Account Of Saigon's Indecent End (Paperback)

Frank Snepps book has had a lasting impression upon me. The US Ambassador Greene caused misery for a vast number of US employeed South Vietnamese by refusing to allow plans to be made for the US withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Frank Snepp's book explains some of the unofficial activities of some good and some bad government officials during the winding down of the war. Some of the activities included dirty tricks such as creating fictitious spy lists and planting them into CIA field office safes just prior to their being overrun and the lists discovered. Others showed the weakness/cowardess of Vietnam's "best" army divisions and the heroic activities of their "worst" division. The book talks about the testing of a 10,000 pound cluster bomb that had to be pushed out the back of a C130 in its original crate because it was so big and of the devastating results from the explosion.

Frank Snepp has written a gripping story about the end of the Vietnam war and how many people disobeyed orders and managed to help as many people escape as possible.

It is unfortunate that the CIA had the book pulled from publication. It is a wonder someone in China is not reprinting the book.

Randy Roscoe, Former Ssgt, USAF