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The Decision to Go to the Moon : Project Apollo and the National Interest

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John M. Logsdon's "The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest" is THE classic study of the process whereby U.S. President John F. Kennedy reached the decision to support an effort to land Americans on the Moon by the end of the 1960s. First published at the time the Apollo program was in the midst of landing six missions on the Moon in 1970, the book has now been out of print for many years. I certainly wish that it were readily available again, but Dr. Logsdon does not want it to appear again without revision since he understands that many additional documentary sources and perspectives should inform it. I cannot disagree with that assessment, as I point out in the discussion below. As it is, Dr. Logsdon is at work on a new study of the space policy of the Kennedy administration that promises to be a seminal contribution to the subject. I wish him the best with that work and look forward to its appearance.

Even though now more than 30 years old, "The Decision to Go to the Moon" may still be read with great profit, and no serious student of the history of U.S. spaceflight can ignore it. In this work Logsdon argues that Kennedy's decision in favor of Project Apollo stemmed from a series of politically inopportune incidents that included the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion and Yuri Gagarin's historic first flight into space in April 1961. In responding to what seemed to be unending humiliations in the new space frontier, Kennedy sought to formulate an ambitious but realistic response to the Soviet challenge. On May 25, 1961, after extensive consultations with his advisors, Kennedy announced the goal of sending Americans to the Moon before the end of the decade. By synthesizing the disparate threads of the events of 1961 using primary documentation, Logsdon laid the groundwork for understanding a critical event in U.S. space policy, and thus built the foundation for a new interpretive space policy history. The author touts the decision-making to press Project Apollo as the public policy process at its best. It allowed consensus building and consensus maintaining, and finally accomplishment of the goal.

Logsdon argues in this important book that Kennedy made a single, rational, pragmatic choice to undertake the U.S. sprint to the Moon as a means of competing with the Soviet Union. It was war by other means, and a way to enhance U.S. international prestige during the height of the Cold War. The president and his advisors, therefore, undertook an exceptionally deliberate, reasonable, judicious, and logical process to define the problem, analyze the situation, develop a response, and achieve a consensus for action. The timeline progressed from point to point with no cul-de-sacs and few detours from problem definition to sensible decision. It was all so neat and tidy!

This rational choice argument begins with the assertion that JFK's space policy was a relic of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it revolved around the question of international prestige. In this view, Apollo was a clear result of competition between the world's two superpowers to win the "minds of men" to a specific economic and political system. In essence, the Apollo program was nothing less than the "moral equivalent of war." It sought to weaken the Soviet Union while enhancing the United States.

There is much to recommend Logsdon's interpretation and its study as a model of outstanding policy formulation is appropriate. A year after the Apollo decision, Kennedy himself sounded this approach when he noted that he perceived only three ways that the United States could effectively compete with the Soviet Union: militarily, economically, and technologically. He eliminated the first option because no one desired nuclear war. The second option was unattractive because it would take a long time for a clear economic winner to emerge. Apollo was a logical option because the winner would be readily apparent to the entire world within a few years, and since the payoff on the decision came nearly a decade later the United States would have sufficient time to overcome any obstacles that might impede efforts. The main strength of the rational choice model, however, is its emphasis on Kennedy's Apollo decision as a politically pragmatic one that solved a number of significant problems for his administration. The American effort to land on the Moon, therefore, served as an enormously effective response to a Cold War crisis with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the most significant problem with this interpretation is its unwavering belief that individuals--and especially groups of individuals, even competing ones--logically assess situations and respond with totally reasonable consensus actions. Since virtually nothing in human existence is done solely on a rational basis this is a very difficult conclusion to accept. Charles E. Lindblom ("The Science of `Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review 19 (1959): 79-88) wrote 45 years ago that the "science of `muddling through'" is perhaps as useful an alternative approach to the study of decision-making as any, recognizing that "policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly." There may have been more "muddling through" in the Apollo decision of 1961 than suggested in "The Decision to Go to the Moon."

Perhaps so, but John Logsdon's book is still a powerful and seminal study of a defining moment in the history of the Space Age. Every student of the subject should read it. I eagerly await his new study of Kennedy's space policy, which I am certain will be just as powerful and seminal.

John M. Logsdon's "The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo and the National Interest" is THE classic study of the process whereby U.S. President John F. Kennedy reached the decision to support an effort to land Americans on the Moon by the end of the 1960s. First published at the time the Apollo program was in the midst of landing six missions on the Moon in 1970, the book has now been out of print for many years. I certainly wish that it were readily available again, but Dr. Logsdon does not want it to appear again without revision since he understands that many additional documentary sources and perspectives should inform it. I cannot disagree with that assessment, as I point out in the discussion below. As it is, Dr. Logsdon is at work on a new study of the space policy of the Kennedy administration that promises to be a seminal contribution to the subject. I wish him the best with that work and look forward to its appearance.

Even though now more than 30 years old, "The Decision to Go to the Moon" may still be read with great profit, and no serious student of the history of U.S. spaceflight can ignore it. In this work Logsdon argues that Kennedy's decision in favor of Project Apollo stemmed from a series of politically inopportune incidents that included the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion and Yuri Gagarin's historic first flight into space in April 1961. In responding to what seemed to be unending humiliations in the new space frontier, Kennedy sought to formulate an ambitious but realistic response to the Soviet challenge. On May 25, 1961, after extensive consultations with his advisors, Kennedy announced the goal of sending Americans to the Moon before the end of the decade. By synthesizing the disparate threads of the events of 1961 using primary documentation, Logsdon laid the groundwork for understanding a critical event in U.S. space policy, and thus built the foundation for a new interpretive space policy history. The author touts the decision-making to press Project Apollo as the public policy process at its best. It allowed consensus building and consensus maintaining, and finally accomplishment of the goal.

Logsdon argues in this important book that Kennedy made a single, rational, pragmatic choice to undertake the U.S. sprint to the Moon as a means of competing with the Soviet Union. It was war by other means, and a way to enhance U.S. international prestige during the height of the Cold War. The president and his advisors, therefore, undertook an exceptionally deliberate, reasonable, judicious, and logical process to define the problem, analyze the situation, develop a response, and achieve a consensus for action. The timeline progressed from point to point with no cul-de-sacs and few detours from problem definition to sensible decision. It was all so neat and tidy!

This rational choice argument begins with the assertion that JFK's space policy was a relic of the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it revolved around the question of international prestige. In this view, Apollo was a clear result of competition between the world's two superpowers to win the "minds of men" to a specific economic and political system. In essence, the Apollo program was nothing less than the "moral equivalent of war." It sought to weaken the Soviet Union while enhancing the United States.

There is much to recommend Logsdon's interpretation and its study as a model of outstanding policy formulation is appropriate. A year after the Apollo decision, Kennedy himself sounded this approach when he noted that he perceived only three ways that the United States could effectively compete with the Soviet Union: militarily, economically, and technologically. He eliminated the first option because no one desired nuclear war. The second option was unattractive because it would take a long time for a clear economic winner to emerge. Apollo was a logical option because the winner would be readily apparent to the entire world within a few years, and since the payoff on the decision came nearly a decade later the United States would have sufficient time to overcome any obstacles that might impede efforts. The main strength of the rational choice model, however, is its emphasis on Kennedy's Apollo decision as a politically pragmatic one that solved a number of significant problems for his administration. The American effort to land on the Moon, therefore, served as an enormously effective response to a Cold War crisis with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the most significant problem with this interpretation is its unwavering belief that individuals--and especially groups of individuals, even competing ones--logically assess situations and respond with totally reasonable consensus actions. Since virtually nothing in human existence is done solely on a rational basis this is a very difficult conclusion to accept. Charles E. Lindblom ("The Science of `Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review 19 (1959): 79-88) wrote 45 years ago that the "science of `muddling through'" is perhaps as useful an alternative approach to the study of decision-making as any, recognizing that "policy is not made once and for all; it is made and re-made endlessly." There may have been more "muddling through" in the Apollo decision of 1961 than suggested in "The Decision to Go to the Moon."

Perhaps so, but John Logsdon's book is still a powerful and seminal study of a defining moment in the history of the Space Age. Every student of the subject should read it. I eagerly await his new study of Kennedy's space policy, which I am certain will be just as powerful and seminal.

An exhaustive look at the history of the NASA program wonderfully complied by the author Logsdon. A must read!!!