Customer Reviews

Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944 (Ausa)

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This book's main theme is that the Seventh Army under Patch was the first to cross the Rhine in November, 1994, and that Eisenhower stopped the full crossing because he didn't like the 6th Army Group commander, Jake Devers. It is extremely well-researched so that the book's main point is not in contention, and one is left to digest the situation, Ike's decision, the reasons therefor, and the consequences. Also included is another missed opportunity, when Gerow's 5th Corps (of Hodges's 1st Army) broke through the West Wall in the Schnee Eifel near Wallendorf on September 14th, 1944, an event that could have taken Hodges to the Rhine but was also stopped.

General Devers is developed as the primary protaganist in this work which is focused on his 6th Army Group. This force has been largely ignored by historians since Devers courted absolutely no publicity, and left Montgomery, Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower to dominate headlines. Nonetheless, as the author clearly points out, 6th Army Group could have provided the decisive breakthrough that might have saved many tens of thousands of lives and ended the war months before it actually ended.

What happened is that Devers pushed 7th Army up on his northern flank through Strasbourg, defeating the German 19th Army in November, 1944, and suddenly found itself on the banks of the upper Rhine. Devers pushed across patrols which found the German bunkers on the east bank of the Rhine deserted. The Germans had not yet occupied their Rhine defenses, and in the event, did not do so for a number of days. Devers quickly put together a plan to put 7th Army across the Rhine, but Eisenhower, who was visiting Haislip's 15th Corps (of 7th Army) heard about the attack and halted it. Accompanied by Bradley, (interesting, since Bradley was an Army Group commander of 12th Army Group and therefore had no business in the 6th Army Group area) Eisenhower went to Devers's headquarters and called off the entire movement in a stormy session and re-directed Seventh Army to support Bradley.

So why, and what could have been? The author makes the case that Eisenhower favored those on his team, and Devers was an outsider who had been placed in Ike's theater by Marshall. Ike had already made the commitment to a "broad front" strategy, and for Montgomery to be first across the Rhine in the North. He was totally unwilling to change his strategy or allow an outsider to grab the glory due to an unexpected opportunity. That's the summary, but of course, the author provides many more details, much background, and fleshes out the entire situation. In the event, the Bridge at Remagen changed things five months later, and even Patton got across the Rhine before Montgomery who would not move until he possessed overwhelming force.

This is a valuable book in that it describes the campaign of 6th Army Group and questions the "broad front" strategy without becoming bogged down with Montgomery's insubordination and coalition-breaking actions. Eisenhower's safe strategy was one of attrition, costing a maximum of American lives, but also reducing the chances for error and possible defeat by the Germans. Montgomery had performed poorly in Normandy, depending on superior American firepower to break the Germans, then the chase across France was conducted to minimize risk, and finally Montgomery's poorly planned operation Market-Garden in Holland turned out to be a disaster. From that point forward, Eisenhower was taking no chances -- he would grind down the Germans and win in a walk. The dash of 7th Army to the Rhine, the breakthrough by Gerow, and the German attack in the Ardennes proved how faulty the "broad front" strategy was. Had Montgomery been less arrogant perhaps the strategy might have been changed, but Montgomery by his own actions doomed the strategy he favored and did the Allies a horrible disservice.

So how could/would the situation have played out had the 7th Army crossed the Rhine in November, 1944, five months before the Rhine was crossed in actuality? Devers planned to have 7th Army turn north and take the German forces facing Patton in the rear. That would have drawn the German armies massing for the Ardennes attack to turn about, re-cross the Rhine and attack 7th Army head-on. 7th Army would probably have been in dire straits unless reinforced, and although possible, it is unlikely that Eisenhower would have forced his prima donnas to the North to rush to Devers's aid. More likely the 7th would have been forced back across the Rhine, but at a minimum, there would have been no Battle of the Bulge and Montgomery and Bradley would have faced less resistance moving forward to the Rhine. It is difficult to see how the war would not have been concluded earlier than it actually was due to the collapse in German morale that could be expected (and actually did happen) by the Americans crossing the last significant natural obstacle in the West -- the Rhine.

All in all, this is a significant book, and well worthy of purchase and reading. I only gave it four stars due to its rather short length (212 pages), fairly light development in some areas (Operation Northwind, for example), and discussions and analyses that I believe could have been more thorough. I was left wanting more, and felt that the book, although it hit its mark, also left a lot on the table for further reading.

Other books the reader might consider concerning 7th Army would be:
"America's Forgotten Army" by Charles Whiting (the 7th Army);
"When The Odds Were Even", by Keith Bonn;
"The Final Crisis Combat in Northern Alsace" by Eichard Engler; and
"Seven Days In January" by Wolf Zoepf (Operation Northwind).

In "Decision at Strasbourg" David Colley examines the denied opportunity for one of the allies less famous generals, Lt Gen Jacob Devers. Colley proposes that General Eisenhower directly ordered Lt Gen Devers Sixth Army Group to not cross the Rhine in November 1944, a full four months before the famed Ludendorff Bridge was captured in the small German town of Remagen. During a meeting during one of the rare General Eisenhower visits to the front lines, he realized the massive preparations the Sixth Army Group had undertaken in preparation for the first major combat incursion across the Rhine. Colley asserts that an adversarial relationship between Eisenhower and Devers strongly influenced the order to remain on the west side of the Rhine.

After landing in the French Riviera during Operation Anvil, Lt Gen Devers drove the Sixth Army Group through southern France and and up the Rhone Valley until they linked up with the Allied invasion forces who landed on the famous beaches of Normandy. Colley documents the accomplishments of the Sixth Army Group against the German 19th Army as they clashed through the Rhone river valley and the Vosges Mountains. Once clear of this final geographic barrier, elements of French General LeClerc's 2nd Armored Division liberated the symbolic city of Strasbourg fully surprising the German defenders at the proximity of Allied Forces.

Following the liberation of Strasbourg, the General Devers ordered combat patrols across the Rhine to determine the strength and composition of the forces facing them. These patrols reported back empty pillboxes on the Siegfried line. With the German 1st Army facing the Normandy invasion forces; the 19th Army in a salient around the city of Colmar; and the last defensive band in Germany undefended, the gates to Germany were wide open. A bold strike into Germany in late 1944 could have dramatically changed the course of the war in Europe. Devers, aware of this possibility, begin the planning process for the first push into Germany.

Colley postulates that it was an adversarial relationship between Eisenhower and Devers that caused Ike to issue the order prohibiting the cross river attack. In the book, he examines the interpersonal dynamics among the Allied generals. Ike and some of the others were classmates at West Point, but Colley asserts that Devers was perceived as an outsider by this select group of officers. Colley speculates Eisenhower intentionally denied this opportunity in order to keep the honor of the first across the Rhine for one of the members of this close-knit group of generals.

Colley lays out many applicable factors such as the overall strategy laid out for the liberation of Europe and he examines the possible influences this may have had on Eisenhower's decision to hold back Devers. Colley also reviews Eisenhower as more of a "Coordinator in Chief" vice "Commander in Chief" of the Allied forces. Coalitions only work if all the players agree on the rules and the objectives. Colley speculates that the international politics may also have influenced the decision.

So what would have happened if Allied forces had crossed the Rhine in September 1944? Colley examines this too. His expert analysis of the potential realignment of German forces to meet this threat.
Drawing on personal diaries of the Generals and of confidants (a.k.a. Kay Summersby) Colley was able to accurately portray the interpersonal dynamics that influenced Eisenhower's decision. With the addition of intelligence reports of both combat and Wehrmacht general officer prisoner debriefs, he credibly paints a picture of the potential impact of the decision.

This book would be a perfect for the World War II history enthusiast.

I have enjoyed this book, partly because WWII is "the war" for my generation, and partly because I have met General Devers and my mother-in-law knew him very well. SInce he's the reason for the book, I find it fascinating. It's also clearly written and holds one's interest.

I felt that the author went over and over some points; especially at the end, he argues his main thesis from all angles. However, it was interesting to learn about Eisenhower -- strengths and weaknesses, and the opinions of others. The responsibilities of generals, what it takes to supervise thousands of troops, what it takes to make good decisions and use your resources effectively were food for thought. Generals are indeed CEOs with more complicated demands and greater penalties for mistakes than many other CEOS.

Dear Reader:
Finally, General Eisenhower's decision at 6th Army Group Headquarters on November 24-25, 1944 to not cross the Upper Rhine River with the U.S 7th Army's VI Corps and attack towards Frankfurt and Nuremburg is exposed by author David Colley as the "biggest criminal fiasco decision of Ike's career." One of the most scandalous decisions Ike ever made after telling Army Group Commanders and Army Commanders that the Objective of the November 1944 Allied Offensive on the Western Front was to seize crossings over the Rhine River.
It's safe to say "Decision at Strasbourg" Author, David Colley, won't be wining and dining with President and General Eisenhower and General Bradley's families this Christmas for exposing General Eisenhower's biggest and final blunder on the Western Front before the German's slaughtered the Americans in their counteroffensives known as the "Battle of the Bulge." If "Ike" went with an Upper Rhine River crossing by the U.S 7th Army's VI Corps with the legendary 3rd, 36th, 45th Infantry Divisions of Italian Campaign fame and the 79th Infantry Divisions and others (American and French) nearby by early December, 1944; Stalin would have launched his 300 Division assault immediately on the Eastern Front causing the 6th(SS)Panzer Army and other German Heer (Army)Panzer Divisions to the Eastern Front by mid December 1944 so that 105,000 American soldiers would not be slaughtered in the Ardennes and Alsace in a battle that could not be launched by the German Armed Forces.
Intriguingly, David Colley was still unable to accept the "self evident" fact that the German "Operation Northwind" was not just a diversion for the Ardennes Offensive but a 15 Division German assault to destroy the U.S 7th Army's VI Corps from crossing the Rhine River after the Bulge in late January to early February 1945 during that fateful Yalta Conference when we gave Eastern Europe to Stalin-long before the Remagen crossing. Daniel P. Kneeland, Grafton, Ma.

DECISION AT STRASBOURG: IKE'S STRATEGIC MISTAKE TO HALT THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP AT THE RHINE IN 1944
DAVID P. COLLEY
NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS, 2008
HARDCOVER, $34.95, 320 PAGES, MAPS, BIBLIOGRAPHY, NOTES, INDEX


In the fall of 1944, the Allied 6th Army Group under the command of General Jacob L. Devers, was directed to continue the Allied push toward the Rhine River. Devers was ordered to attack the German forces in the Vosges Mountains of eastern France and then push into eastern Alsace. With the U.S. Seventh Army under General Alexander Patch and the French First Army under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. Devers began the attack on 14 November 1944. He ordered the Seventh Army to push north through the Saverne Gap, while the French First Army was to push south toward the Belfort Gap. Together they would try to surround the Vosges region and enter the Alsatian Plain to the east. On 19 November 1944, the southern wing of the attack broke through the Belfort Gap, reaching the outskirts of Mulhouse and the area of the upper Rhine. DeLattre's 3rd Combat Command was the first Allied unit to reach the Rhine River. After the capture of Belfort on 22 November 1944, the French First Army swung north toward Colmar. The U.S. Seventh Army pushed its way north and on 21 November 1944 forced its way through the Saverne Gap. Helped by the French success to the south, the Seventh Army pushed on toward Strasbourg. On 23 November 1944, General Philipe Leclerc's French 2nd Armored Division-which had been transfered from the 12th Army Group to the 6th Army Group as part of the U.S. XV Corps in late September, 1944-entered Strasbourg. The success of the U.S. Seventh Army split the German front in half, leaving the German First Army to the north and the German Nineteenth Army to the south. Devers then ordered the U.S. XV Corps to clear out northern Alsace and to link up with General George S. Patton's Third Army in front of the Saar region. At the same time, General Devers handed Eisenhower an historic opportunity-an open door into Germany by way of Strasbourg and the intact Kehl Bridge. Devers along with his lieutenants Generals Patch and French General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny received Ike and Bradley at his headquarters at Vittel in the Vosges Mountains. Instead of giving his congragulations, Ike intended to transfer several of the U.S. Army Seventh Army divisions to Patton's stalled bloody offensive just to the north. Devers countered with his plan: strike boldly beyond the Rhine and bypass the German forces on the west bank. This meant the abandonment of Patton's failed Third Army offensive around Metz and the transfer of Patton's Third Army to Alsace under Devers' command. From this point, Devers plan including moving the U.S. Seventh Army across the Rhine for a northward push on the far side of the river inside Germany. At the same time, Patton's Third Army would drive in parallel northward on the near side, the western bank of the Rhine. The objective: Roll up the enemy's entire rear and cause Germany to abandon the Rhine's west bank all the way up to Holland. This bold plan held a real chance to end the ETO conflict in late 1944 or early 1945. This daring new decisive war winning plan upset Ike and Bradley. Bradley fought against the transfer of the Third Army and Ike wanted nothing to do with Dever's plan. Ike didn't even approve the Seventh Army forces to exploit the success and cross the Rhine into Germany-with or without Patton. To Devers and his staff, Ike's disapproval smacked of dishonesty, betrayal, and favoritism. In so doing, Ike directly contradicted the formal orders under which the Sixth Army Group had brilliantly succeeded. Ike made no apologies nor explanations regarding 'the why' behind his change to the Sixth Army Group mission. Ike simply commanded Devers to abandon any plan to cross the Rhine. His new edict: Support Patton's right flank in his failed offensive against the Saar. Author David P. Colley's DECISION AT STRASBOURG: IKE'S STRATEGIC MISTAKE TO HALT THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP AT THE RHINE IN 1944 is a factual and objective military history of one of the lesser known aspects of the war in Europe-Ike's wasted brilliant historic drive through the Vosges and with it, the genuine prospect to end the war in the ETO in late 1944 or early 1945.


Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard
Orlando, Florida

An interesting account of the ground war in Europe after the Normandy invasion by which time Germany was clearly en route to losing the war. Discusses the "second invasion" from the southern coast of France not only from the military perspective but regarding the apparently somewhat difficult personalities of the Allied generals who were involved. Paints Eisenhower in an unusual light. A good read although perhaps a little longer than it has to be.

Decision at Strasbourg is not a typical military history. It does not reinforce the populist notions of other authors that US military action in WW2 consisted of (a) landing at Normandy in '44, (b) beating back the Ardennes offensive in December, and (c) storming into Berlin too late to keep the Ruskies out. It is not a discussion of military tactics and rarely mentions Divisions, much less individual conflicts in detail.

But it will give the reader a fuller understanding of why Eisenhower conducted the war as he did. You will understand how Ike used his close personal friend, Omar Bradley, to conduct a war of attrition and stale strategies to achieve political ends demanded by Churchill and Roosevelt. And the reader will gain an appreciation for General Jake Devers and our 7th Army, whose relentless pursuit of the Germany armies across France could have ended the war in '44 and saved 100's of thousand of American lives.

History is written by the winners and Ike certainly came out on top in the Big One... but if you wish to understand what happened in December 1944, this is a good start. Now we need someone to take a solid look at the 7th Army's tactics, battles, and heroes.

I found this to be an excellent "big picture" account of the little-known invasion of Southern France through the French Rivera. I believe the author gives an accurate outline of the battles and draws logical conclusions to the political and personal events. The only criticism I have is the almost total lack of maps that would allow the reader to identify the geography of the course and order of battles, and the political implications of the author's basic thesis.

Colley's book doesn't re-write history but certainly adds a new chapter. Most interesting look into the strategies involved with crossing the Rhein in 1944-45. He shines the light on an unknown Gen. Jake Devers who could have crossed in November 1944, which most likely would have precluded Hitler's winter offensive (Bulge). Ike, warts and all. Good read.