Customer Reviews

Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to on War (Modern War Studies)

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Carl von Clausewitz is a clear and straight forward writer so it must be asked does he really need someone to `decode' him. Well the short answer is yes. As Sumdia points out in this excellent companion to "On War", Clausewitz presents some extremely complex ideas in his unfinished master work. Further although his prose style is clear, his exposition of his ideas and arguments often is not. As his discussion of the distinction between "absolute war" and "real war" demonstrates. In a related example it is no means clear that weather by "people's war" he means guerilla warfare in support of regular forces or independent guerilla operations or what today is called asymmetrical warfare. As the result Sumida notes, von Clausewitz has been routinely misinterpreted by scholars as well as ordinary readers.

In this work Sumida provides summaries of the views of some of the most distinguished critics of "On War" and attempts to show where such criticism is the due to misinterpretation of von Clausewitz. He then proceeds to a careful analysis of what he believes von Clausewitz actually meant explain about the theory and practice of war. In some ways this book is like a collection of extremely good end notes to the first four books of von Clausewitz's works.

For this reader the best way to deal with Sumida's expository book is to first read "On War" then read "Decoding Clausewitz", then reread "On War" using Sumida's book as you would use a set of footnotes. In this respect one can truly treat Sumida as a decoder of what is a difficult, but important body of work.

The bulk of this book is devoted to supporting analysis that is, I believe, ancillary to the thesis obtained in the final chapter, a thesis that I shall shortly delineate. This last chapter is to a large degree contained in a paper Sumida published in the Journal of Military History in 2001, titled

"The Relationship between History and Theory in 'On War': the Clausewitzian Ideal and its Implications,"

and reproduced online at the Clausewitz Homepage (do a search). I had read the paper, as well as another shorter and less specialized article published in the Fall 2009 issue of Army History, titled

"The Clausewitz Problem,"

which you can also obtain for free online through the NDU website (again do a search). Very pleased with these two papers, I eagerly obtained this book. Sumida's core argument rates five stars, but its further elaboration in the book is small enough that I give the latter only four.

The intellectual contribution of this book is based on the understanding that "On War" is a reasonably complete work that reasonably captures Clausewitz's thought, and revolves around the use of a very specific kind of history in officer training. Sumida argues that Clausewitz believed that while direct experience with the challenges of command (the friction and fog, the fear, the uncertainty, etc.) was the best teacher, the next best thing to be chosen for the education of officers and commanders in peacetime is close factual study of specific battles to understand the mind of the commander, his decisions, and the results. The papers and the book elucidate in considerable detail the form of such history, how to use it, and what a priori theoretical foundations are warranted for effective interpretation.

The Sumidan explication is fascinating and will especially appeal to those with any familiarity with Bayesian statistics or machine learning, as well as Pyrrhonian skepticism and decision-making under extreme uncertainty. Having some exposure to the enormous breadth of responses to Clausewitzian thought (from the very positive doctrinal manuals of the US Marine Corps, e.g., MCDP 1, to the obviously unlearned berating in Keegan's "A History of Warfare," with members of the military and academia spanning the spectrum), it is clear that Sumida's citation of Brodie is extremely valid: 'Clausewitz's work stands out among those very few older books which have presented profound and original insights that have not been adequately absorbed in later literature.' I now feel well-prepared to approach his opus, "On War," and simultaneously put this hypothesis to the test: Clausewitz himself took much time to write histories of the kind he advocated, and no doubt many other historical works exist that can satisfy his requirements. I can think of Thucydides (thanks to Robert Strassler, we have a sublime edition of this) and Keegan's "The Face of Battle" (yes, the same Keegan who later panned Clausewitz---according to Bassford, who runs the Clausewitz Homepage, when he asked Keegan if he'd ever read Clausewitz, 'he sputtered a bit and said that he'd been assigned it in school---back in the late 1960's'; but "Face of Battle" is almost entirely pure gold, and seems to exactly match the kind of history Sumida believes Clausewitz to advocate).

In the book, Sumida discusses what he believes to be a crucial discrepancy between the Clausewitzian theory and what is commonly believed: Clausewitz in no uncertain terms and repeatedly asserts that defense is the stronger form of war, and that war does not have to cease with the destruction of a nation's military, as resistance and insurgencies can easily materialize, given the will to resist. This theme is concisely developed in the second article cited above, and Sumida uses the book to expand on this one as well, contradicting the commonplace notion that Clausewitz advocated a simple-minded but bloodthirsty attack-oriented 'unlimited war.'

Perhaps I can quote from Sumida's Army History article to sum up his thesis: 'Clausewitzian theory is about learning how to do something--namely, how to exercise supreme command in war--rather than a representation of war as such.' In short, read the papers above, and treat the book as a 'director's cut.'

Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem

This is an important book with original ideas. The discussions of pedagogic uses of historic reenactments and of Clausewitz's conception of "praxis based theory" clarify ideas which are of profound importance. It should be read all concerned with Clausewitz's On War and with statecraft and rulership as a whole..
To illustrate a minor but cardinal point, Sumida recognizes the double sense of Politik in German as politics and policy, which provide rather different meanings to the famous conception of war as a continuation of Politik. This is an important corrective to common misunderstandings and misuses of Clausewitz.
However the book has a major weakness, namely the uncritical treatment of Clausewitz's key concept "genius," who is to be put in charge of the strategic direction of war. This failure is aggravated by the shallow treatment of the related idea of "intuition." Sumida emphasizes that "the crucial factor in Clausewitz's conception of practice is intuition (p. 183)." This makes a thorough examination of intuition essential. But Sumida relies on one single and rather doubtful text to support Clausewitz's very problematic propositions, ignoring the many relevant historic and cognitive studies showing serious fallacies characterizing subconscious processes, such as the tendency of early successes to corrupt the judgment of "geniuses" and the serious failures of intuition in coping with uncertainty.
Still, the book includes important and original insights and is therefore strongly recommended for close reading. I will rely on some of its reasoning in my next book Israeli Statecraft: Challenge and Response.

Professor Yehezkel Dror
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
msdrir@mscc.huji.ac.ilThe Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of RomeThe Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome