Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor [Hardcover]

Jack Lambert (Author), Jack W. Lambert (Author), Norman Polmar (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 2003

When these two [authors] combine their considerable experience, the reader has to pay attention. Naval Aviation NewsIn 1999, by a vote of 52 to 47, the U.S. Senate cleared the names of Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter Short of blame for leaving Pearl Harbor vulnerable to attack. According to the declaration, Kimmel and Short had performed their duties "competently and professionally," and that America's losses at Pearl were "not the result of dereliction of duty." Revisionist historians have been trying for years to portray Short and Kimmel as innocent scapegoats. However, Major General Kenneth Bergquist is among the many witnesses who went to their graves crying "foul," but not before telling their stories to historians Jack Lambert and Norman Polmar.This book combines the evidence of never-before-seen photos and documents, Lambert's taped interviews with some of the last surviving witnesses, exhaustive research of all remaining evidence, Polmar's perspective as naval warfare commentator for the History Channel, and Barry Levenson's legal experience trying cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, to finally put the case of the tragic failure of command and dereliction of duty leading up to December 7, 1941, to rest.Senator Strom Thurmond called Kimmel and Short "the final two victims of Pearl Harbor." In reality, was the last victim the truth?

Product Details

• Hardcover: 258 pages
• Publisher: Zenith Press (September 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0760317399
• ISBN-13: 978-0760317396
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,371,095 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Short, But to The Point -- Turf Wars & Failures Of Kimmel & Short, September 11, 2008

By 

David M. Dougherty (Arkansas) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor (Hardcover)

This is a short, crisp book that can be read in a single sitting outlining the failures in the Hawaiian command structure of the Army and Navy immediately before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. It does not address the issues of failures in intelligence, communications, and command in Washington. For those see Clausen, "Pearl Harbor Final Judgement" and Victor, "The Pearl Harbor Myth." I do not recommend Prange, "Pearl Harbor, The Final Judgment" due to its many errors in fact and analysis.

Over time the Pearl Harbor debate has divided authors into two general camps; those seeking to blame Roosevelt and the service commanders in Washington while absolving Kimmel and Short, and those attempting to present the situation with blame passed around to everyone. The charges against Roosevelt usually center around the idea that he pushed Japan to attack the US, knew when it would occur, and failed to notify Hawaii so the effect of the attack would galvanize the American people into entering the war (against both Japan and Germany.) The corollary to this is that Kimmel and Short were sacrificed as scapegoats to keep scrutiny away from the truly guilty parties. Books such as Kimmel's "Admiral Kimmel's Story" and Theobald's "The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor" take this point of view. Leyton's postumous book "And I Was There" adds to the literature but contains inaccuracies designed to deflect blame from his intelligence and cooperation failures.

This book simply focuses on Kimmel's and Short's command failures and treats all other exogenous failures as of little consequence. There is much merit to this approach in that it shows what the Hawaiian command did and did not do to prepare for war and to defend itself without getting bogged down in other issues. A military commander is charged to do the best possible job with the resources he has, including intelligence, and this book, in a very cut and dried manner, rates Kimmel and Short (Short primarily) on this single responsibility. The conclusion is that both commanders were woefully derelict in their duties.

There was little (or none) cooperation between the Army and Navy commands even though Kimmel and Short enjoyed a very friendly relationship. The right hand did not know what the left hand was doing, and critical functions fell through the crack as both thought the other was taking responsibility for those functions. Yes, the lack of an overall commander was a deficiency that can be attributed to inter-service rivalry and a command failure in Washington, but the two commanders on the ground could have done much more to alleviate the problems. Unfortunately they didn't. Turf wars also raised their ugly heads among subordinates as discussed in this book, and were not addressed by the commanders.

This book shows that the Hawaiian command was given a healthy number of first line aircraft for defense and reconnaissance, but failed to put them into service and use them effectively. In addition, the radar system and the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) were operable but Short failed to integrate then into an effective defense system. In both cases, blame must rest with the Hawaiian commanders and their subordinates, most of whom enjoyed subsequent promotion and rewarding careers.

The Navy spotted and sunk a hostile submarine an hour before the attack, but the communications procedures were so poor that no action of any kind was taken by Kimmel's staff on this incident before the Japanese air attack. Nor was the radar warning heeded by the Army staff, apparently in part because fighter aircraft and their pilots were not on alert and in most part the aircraft were parked without combat ammunition loads. There was no system in place to identify the incoming planes due to a lack of Army-Navy liasion, and no system of communication to operational commanders or their staffs. Truly, the Hawaiian commanders were taking their responsibilities at a glacial, peacetime pace and not attending to details and the resources they possessed.

An item of note is that the authors accurately mentioned that Short lowered the alert level from 2 to 1 prior to the attack, but failed to state that Short communicated this to General Marshall in accordance with his instructions. Unfortunately, this only lulled Marshall into believing the Short had placed his command on the highest possible alert status. The problem, unstated in this book, was that Short had reversed the alert status numbers from 1-highest to 3-lowest to 1-lowest to 3-highest without notifying Marshall. This was another communications failure that must be attributed to Short.

The authors dismiss the charges against Roosevelt and Marshall saying they "... would never have risked the loss of the Pacific Fleet and Pearl Harbor's naval facilities for the mere pretext of America's entry into World War II." Maybe not, but Marshall thought the Hawaiian command was on the highest possible alert status, possessed sufficient air power through both the Army Air Corps aircraft and Naval Aviation to repel any possible attack, possessed early warning systems including a state-of-the-art radar system, the AWS, a fleet of submarines that could be used as pickets, and sufficient long range reconnaissance aircraft to patrol the likely avenues of attack to prevent any surprise attack. The commands had been given a "war warning" and told that the most likely time of attack would be at dawn on a weekend, most likely Sunday, but Short and Kimmel continued with their peacetime activities and pace.

Nonetheless, the authors' statement is fatuous since MacArthur was specifically ordered not to make any aggressive moves or fire the first shot. Clearly, Roosevelt wanted the Japanese to open the war with an attack on American facilities, but he expected his commanders to have done sufficient due diligence to avoid heavy casualties and a crushing defeat. Unfortunately, that was exactly what they hadn't done. Among the higher commanders, Stark was kicked upstairs and relieved by King, but Marshall was deemed by Roosevelt to be too valuable for removal. One wonders.

It is perhaps important to note that it is extremely difficult for a military commander to take appropriate and unpopular action when faced with the possibility of hostilities commencing. In 1965 a radio transmission from an US agent in Soviet Russia was received by an US intelligence unit indicating that hostilities were imminent but this information was not acted upon or even passed up the chain of command for action by higher headquarters. The operations officer handling the information feared the information might be a miscalculation by a relatively new agent and was unwilling to risk his career by passing it upwards. Subsequent debriefing determined the agent had sent the message as a test of his communications capability, but no amount of second-guessing can absolve the operations officer of his dereliction of duty. Unfortunately, such officers abound in peacetime, and many were in evidence at Pearl Harbor. I mention this incident only to explain the dynamics of peacetime operations and that another Pearl Harbor can happen without due diligence on the part of the peacetime military and intelligence establishments. Unfortunately, turf wars and career advancement are usually more important than readiness to defend the country in peacetime. And God forbid that anyone should die in training.

Another point to make in passing is that Short neither sought nor wanted the Hawaii assignment. This tour of duty was to be his last before retirement, and it should have been apparent that his performance would be more of a caretaker than an aggressive commander. Marshall chose poorly, even when considering that Short had a good reputation in training commands. So did Fredendall, the General picked by Marshall to be II Corps commander and who performed so poorly at Kasserine Pass. With war being almost certain, young, aggressive commanders should have been placed in those operational commands likely to be on or near the front lines.

In short, this is an important book that adds to the Pearl Harbor literature inspite of its limited scope. I recommend that individuals interested in Pearl Harbor add this book to their library. The lists of available aircraft, before and after the attack, are particularly illuminating. There is an obvious dependence on a few participant accounts such as those by Bergquist, Taylor and Tetley. These may be accurate, but such accounts must be subjected to the same rigors of examination and confirmation as those by Kimmel and the higher commanders. It is not evident that the authors did this.

15 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A Very Basic Book About The Failures of Short & Kimmel, July 21, 2004

By 

Jeffrey T. Munson (Dixon, IL) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor (Hardcover)

This book attempts to provide some insight into the subject of Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short and their roles in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although the information presented in the book is good, it is very basic and does not go into much detail. The information included in the book really only amounts to a thumbnail sketch, and the author seems to concentrate his discussion more on the shortcomings of General Short than Admiral Kimmel.

The author bases his arguments from information obtained from the several Pearl Harbor inquiries, mainly the Army and Navy board inquiries. For example, in the chapter entitled "Accountability", each charge against Short is listed, along with an analysis of the response of Short. What perplexed me is why a similar approach was not taken in regards to Admiral Kimmel? I felt that by reading this book, much of Admiral Kimmel's story was omitted.

There are some interesting parts of the book, however. The author presents compelling evidence about the inter-service rivalries that existed between the Army and Navy, and how these rivalries directly lead to the disaster on December 7. Also, the failure to coordinate training and liasion activities between the two branches is effectively discussed.

Overall, I found this book to be interesting, but very basic. The information presented is good, but only the surface is scratched and the author doesn't go into great detail on any subject. I would recommend this as an introductory book, but there are other books about Pearl Harbor that discuss these same topics in much greater detail than this one does.

12 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fills an important niche about Pearl Harbor, October 19, 2007

By 

W. D ONEIL "Will O'Neil" (Falls Church, VA USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor (Hardcover)

There are countless books about Pearl Harbor, and even a few good ones. Whether this counts as one of the good ones really depends on what you are looking for.

If you are looking for tales of dauntless daring, look elsewhere. If you are looking for dark conspiracies, look elsewhere. Above all, if you are looking to absolve General Short and Admiral Kimmel of responsibility for having failed to defend their commands, certainly look elsewhere.

"Defenseless" really has only one strength, but it's a very important one. The key to effective defense of Pearl Harbor would have been a modern air defense system (modern by 1940-41 standards, that is). Lambert and Polmar show clearly that Short was given the materials and personnel to build a good system, and adequate time, but failed to get it in operation by 7 December, basically because he didn't place much emphasis on it. In this he was abetted by Kimmel, who didn't hold up his relatively minor responsiblities for the system.

The book also lays out lesser but still crucial failings regarding reconnaissance, fighter readiness, and AAA readiness. By the letter of existing regulations both officers should have been court-marshalled for all this, rather than being given the slap on the wrist that they got. (Of course MacArthur in the Philippines should have been given a good old fashioned American tarring and feathering rather than a Medal of Honor, but that's another story.)

Whether Kimmel and Short were given adequate and specific warning really has nothing to do with it. They failed to properly prepare their commands for defense and put them in a defense posture appropriate to what they fully knew the general situation to be. This book does a good job of showing that.