"Delegation and Agency in International Organization develops a sophisticated Principal-Agent approach to elucidate the sources, limits and consequences of IO autonomy. The volume is unified by thoughtful application of the theory to a range of important cases and also includes more critical perspectives questioning whether PA theory provides an adequate analysis. There is no better statement of how PA models help us understand the importance and operation of international institutions and organizations. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations."
Duncan Snidal, University of Chicago
"This volume represents a timely ans stimulating contribution to the newly invigorated study of international organizations...the quality of the contributions to the volume is high...In sum, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations represents a substantial and stimulating organization...the volume stands as a much needed effort to examine critically the utility of the approach as applied to the design and functioning of international organizations."
Thomas J. Doleys, Journal of Politics
Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.