Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) [Paperback]

John D. Huber (Author), Charles R. Shipan (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 2, 2002 | ISBN-10: 0521520703 | ISBN-13: 978-0521520706

The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Huber and Shipan's work is an impressive theoretical and empirical undertaking of great relevance to students of American and comparative politics alike." Comparative Politics

"This remarkable book tackles a difficult question in comparative politics: why, when, and how (and how far) legislative majorities mircomanage bureaucracies. The authors' answers combine the rigor of a formal model of delegation with the sweep that comes from arguments that can be applied both to the institutions of U.S. states and many parliamentary democracies. The results' persistent theme that legislators control each other by controlling bureaucracy is rich with political insight into situations arising in coalitions and divided government, an exemplar of how systematic comparative analysis can pry important empirical implications from theoretical models." Jim Alt, Havard University

"This book, by two of the most exciting scholars in comparative politics, is a landmark text in the field of delegation and legislative-executive relations. No other book on this subject is as theoretically advanced, as methodologically sophisticated, and as empirically comprehensive." Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science

"This remarkable book tackles a difficult question in comparative politics: why, when, and how (and how far) legislative majorities mircomanage bureaucracies. The authors' answers combine the rigor of a formal model of delegation with the sweep that comes from arguments that can be applied both to the institutions of U.S. states and many parliamentary democracies. The results' persistent theme that legislators control each other by controlling bureaucracy is rich with political insight into situations arising in coalitions and divided government, an exemplar of how systematic comparative analysis can pry important empirical implications from theoretical models." Jim Alt, Harvard University

"This book makes Huber and Shipan the first to extend and contextualize principal-agent theory into a wide range of cross-national comparisons. Add to that their ingenious empirical tests of their propositions, and we have an indispensable book for anyone interested in when politicians delegate authority to bureaucrats, and with what consequences." Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University

"A debate in political theory rages on and off in political science concerning the extent to which a legislature should delegate authority to bureaucratic agencies. How detailed should statutory instructions be? Huber and Shipan offer a fresh and truly comparative approach to the topic of legislative delegation. By examining in specific policy contexts how political systems, whether American states or European nations, delegate, Deliberate Discretion? allows a systematic comparison of both how delegation is accomplished and what effect on legislative goals it has. As a conquence, the book is a major contribution to debates about the proper location of policy-making authority. It should be read by Americanists, comparativists, and public policy specialists." Bryan D. Jones, Director, Center for American Politics and Public Policy, University of Washington, Seattle

"[I]nsightful.... The study reports an impressive array of empirical data analysis and is based on research in the US (federal and state level), the UK, France, Italy, Denmark, and other countries. Highly recommended." Choice

"If you want to read just one book on bureaucratic oversight, read Deliberate Discretion. Synthesizing the most important insights of a vast literature on delegation, this book also breaks new ground, both theoretically and methodologically. Its scope is extraordinary. John Huber and Charles Shipan's meticulous efforts set new standards for research on delegation and agency policy making...a first-rate piece of scholarship...Clearly written and carefully constructed, this book is a joy to read. I suspect it will be assigned in graduate seminars for some time to come." Congress & The Presidency

Book Description

Who makes policy? Legislators sometimes write detailed laws that spell out exactly what policies should look like. At other times, however, they write vague laws that allow bureaucrats to make policy. The authors explain why, and when, legislators take these different approaches, using labor laws across countries and health policy laws across the U.S. states to provide support for our argument. Our argument and evidence provide numerous insights into the reasons for delegation and bureaucratic discretion, as well as insights into the normative consequences of incentives to limit discretion.

Product Details

• Paperback: 304 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press (September 2, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521520703
• ISBN-13: 978-0521520706
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #834,129 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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5.0 out of 5 stars Bureaucrats gone wild, November 3, 2010

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This review is from: Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (Hardcover)

Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) is a fascinating look into how and why politicians delegate authority to bureaucrats. Huber and Shipan try to move beyond the axiomatic theory that politicians defer to bureaucrats' technical expertise to provide a broader theory of bureaucracy. The consider four factors that explain the amount of discretion legislators grant bureaucrats: 1) the amount of conflict between politicians and bureaucrats; 2) legislators' capacity to write detailed statutes; 3) the bargaining environment, particularly the number of veto players and bicameral legislature; and 4) expectations regarding nonstatutory controls over the bureaucracy, such as courts. The authors try to conduct a cross-national test and compare presidential and parliamentary systems. They use the word count of statutes as a proxy for discretion, with more words indicating less discretion granted to bureaucrats. Overall, they generate interesting results and provide much for future researchers to ponder.