In this book, first published in 2007, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.
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Editorial Reviews
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"Zurn is at his best and most interesting when engaged in exegetical analysis of the thought of others who have written on judicial review. Their work is treated fairly, engaged sympathetically, and analyzed perceptively." - James A. Gardner, University at Buffalo Law School, The Law and Politics Book Review
"This book is imaginatively conceived, well written and researched, and tightly argued." - Christian Barry, Australian National University, Ethics
"This book is imaginatively conceived, well written and researched, and tightly argued." - Christian Barry, Australian National University, Ethics
Book Description
Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts, but also legislative and executive self-review.
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deliberative democratic constitutionalism, constitutional elaboration, constitutional fora, mutual consociation, political consociation, judicial institutionalization, private autonomy rights, paternalist objection, bare majoritarianism, interbranch debate, pure parliamentary sovereignty, reasonable interpretive pluralism, majoritarian aggregation, deliberative troubles, democratic worth, juristic discourse, political structuration, specialized constitutional court, legitimacy criterion, informal public spheres, decisional weight, aggregative democracy, quasi guardianship, unaccountable judiciary, independent constitutional court Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
New York, Cambridge University Press, Harvard University Press, New Haven, Yale University Press, Oxford University Press, Jeremy Waldron, Princeton University Press, Fourteenth Amendment, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law, Alec Stone Sweet, Larry Alexander, The Least Dangerous Branch, Constitutional Self-Government, First Amendment, Jurgen Habermas, Learned Hand, John Ferejohn, Samuel Freeman, Theory of Constitutional Amendment, University of Chicago Press, Civil War, Designing Democracy, Hans Kelsen New!
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deliberative democratic constitutionalism, constitutional elaboration, constitutional fora, mutual consociation, political consociation, judicial institutionalization, private autonomy rights, paternalist objection, bare majoritarianism, interbranch debate, pure parliamentary sovereignty, reasonable interpretive pluralism, majoritarian aggregation, deliberative troubles, democratic worth, juristic discourse, political structuration, specialized constitutional court, legitimacy criterion, informal public spheres, decisional weight, aggregative democracy, quasi guardianship, unaccountable judiciary, independent constitutional court Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
New York, Cambridge University Press, Harvard University Press, New Haven, Yale University Press, Oxford University Press, Jeremy Waldron, Princeton University Press, Fourteenth Amendment, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law, Alec Stone Sweet, Larry Alexander, The Least Dangerous Branch, Constitutional Self-Government, First Amendment, Jurgen Habermas, Learned Hand, John Ferejohn, Samuel Freeman, Theory of Constitutional Amendment, University of Chicago Press, Civil War, Designing Democracy, Hans Kelsen New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Surprise Me!
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