Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence [Paperback]

Roger D. Congleton (Editor), Birgitta Swedenborg (Editor)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 26, 2006

The variety of constitutional designs found in democratic governments has important effects on policy choices and outcomes. That is the conclusion reached in Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy, in which the constitutional procedures and constraints through which laws and public policies are adopted--election laws, the general architecture of government, the legal system, and methods for amendment and reform--are evaluated for their political and economic effects. Leading scholars, many of them pioneers in the new field of constitutional political economy, survey and extend recent empirical evidence on the policy effects of different constitutional procedures and restraints. Their findings are relevant not only to such dramatic changes as democratic transition throughout the world and the development of a European constitution but also to the continuing process of constitutional reform in established democracies.Using the tools of rational choice analysis, the contributors approach the question of constitutional design from public choice, new institutionalist, and new political economy perspectives. Drawing on empirical evidence largely from the OECD countries, the book analyzes such issues as the policy effects of direct (as opposed to representative) democracy, democratic accountability in presidential as compared to parliamentary government, bicameralism and its relation to stable policies, the relative effectiveness of centralized and decentralized governments, the civil and legal regulatory system as a nation's "economic constitution," and the link between constitutional stability and the amendment process.Contributors:John C. Bradbury, Roger D. Congleton, W. Mark Crain, Daniel Diermeier, Lars Feld, Bruno Frey, James D. Gwartney, Randall Holcombe, Hülya Eraslan, Brian Knight, Robert A. Lawson Antonio Merlo, Dennis Mueller, Torsten Persson, Bjørn Erik Rasch, Thomas Stratmann, Alois Stutzer, Birgitta Swedenborg, Guido Tabellini, Stefan Voigt, Barry Weingast

Editorial Reviews

Review

"This book brings together some of the most exciting recent work on what makes constitutions work and what causes them to fail. In territory that was until recently the exclusive province of lawyers, an eminent group of economists and political scientists gambol freely, with fascinating results. It will be essential for scholars and students of constitutional theory."--Iain McLean, Professor of Politics, University of Oxford

About the Author

Roger D. Congleton is Professor of Economics and Senior Research Associate at the Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University and Senior Research Associate at the Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) in Stockholm.

Product Details

• Paperback: 408 pages
• Publisher: The MIT Press (May 26, 2006)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0262532808
• ISBN-13: 978-0262532808
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,381,047 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Roger Congleton is currently the BB&T professor of economics at West Virginia University. He had previously been professor of economics at George Mason University and a senior research associate of the Center for Study of Public Choice. Prof Congleton has written and lectured widely on the effects of constitutions and on the politics of public policy in contemporary democracies.

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5.0 out of 5 stars an editors note, December 1, 2010

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This review is from: Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (Paperback)

This book provides a nice cross section of contemporary research by economists and political scientists who analyze the effects of democratic institutions from the rational choice perspective.

Do voting rules matter? Does bicameralism matter? Do presidential systems differ in significant ways from prime ministerial systems? Do amendment procedures affect the evolution of particular democracies? Does judicial independence matter? If so, why and to what extent?

Chapters were written by well-known scholars including Dennis Mueller, Bruno Frey, Barry Weingast, Lars Feld, Thomas Stratmann, Antonio Merlo, Torsten Perrson and Guido Tabelini. The volume also includes contributions by Stefan Voigt, Randall Holcombe, and Bjorn Rasch.

The first chapter provides a nice survey of the constitutional political economy literature and and overview of the chapters.

The book has been used as a text book at several universities in Europe and the United States.