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5.0 out of 5 stars
an editors note,
By RDCO (USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence (Paperback)
This book provides a nice cross section of contemporary research by economists and political scientists who analyze the effects of democratic institutions from the rational choice perspective.
Do voting rules matter? Does bicameralism matter? Do presidential systems differ in significant ways from prime ministerial systems? Do amendment procedures affect the evolution of particular democracies? Does judicial independence matter? If so, why and to what extent? Chapters were written by well-known scholars including Dennis Mueller, Bruno Frey, Barry Weingast, Lars Feld, Thomas Stratmann, Antonio Merlo, Torsten Perrson and Guido Tabelini. The volume also includes contributions by Stefan Voigt, Randall Holcombe, and Bjorn Rasch. The first chapter provides a nice survey of the constitutional political economy literature and and overview of the chapters. The book has been used as a text book at several universities in Europe and the United States. |
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Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence by Roger D. Congleton (Paperback - May 26, 2006)
$36.00 $29.42
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