Customer Reviews

Denial and Deception: An Insider's View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11 (Nation Books)

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(5)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links.

This is a very personal story by a female case officer who served overseas, did some very hard time over the course of at least fifteen years with the Directorate of Operations, and has produced a very rare book, one that provides some useful documentation of the ups and downs of clandestine operations under five Directors of Central Intelligence (this would be even more impressive if the five had not all been appointed in the space of six years).

This is, without question, one of the best books available on the intimate subject of the clandestine culture, and it offers some lovely gems and personality assessments that intelligence professionals will appreciate more than the general public. I have taken one star off for lack of detail and context, but strongly recommend the book to anyone who has served in the clandestine service and wishes to be reminded of the dark years, and to anyone who has not served in the clandestine service, and wishes to have a small glimmering of the down side of it all.

Although the book does a good job of weaving a somewhat superficial (that is to say, the highlights, not the irrelevant) history of counter-terrorism with a history of bureaucratic mis-steps by a series of DCIs, and the book does a superb job of shredding both CIA lawyers and CIA security officers and CIA's complete lack of counterintelligence, this is primarily a book about the failure of the Directorate of Operations as a tribe, not about the failure of the US Government in the global war on terrorism.

In retrospect, 1983-1985 are the years when the USG and the IC should have gone to "General Quarters," and 1992 was the year when Congress should have risen to its role and passed the Boren-McCurdy National Security Act of 1992. No one comes out of this book looking better than Senator Dave Boren (today the President of the University of Oklahoma) and Congressman Dave McCurdy, both from Oklahoma, both in charge of the respective committees on intelligence, and both bright men with good hearts who were unable to prevail against their less enlightened colleagues.

The author does an excellent job of capturing some of the really low moments in CIA's clandestine history (such as in the 1990's when case officers were advised to take out legal liability insurance, both to protect themselves from CIA witch-hunts and to protect themselves from witch hunts mounted by others against which CIA would not be helpful to them).

The author, who got into trouble over some Palestinian relations that led to her being fired, has *not* written a bitter or a revenge book. This is an excellent and useful book, and for those who wish to study the CIA's clandestine service and its ups and downs in the 1980-2005 timeframe, this is destined to be a core reference. It captures nuances and insights that are not available to outsiders in any other source.

I do, however, want to highlight the author's brief discussion of CIA Security and the shortcomings of CIA security, the excessive reliance by CIA Security on the polygraph (which both Ames and the Cuban agents that blew two of my classmates passed), and the "room from hell" that is created by CIA Security and CIA management for those who are "suspect," more often than not without cause. I was stunned to learn that in the post-Ames environment 400 case officers (400--that is, by some accounts, at least 10% and perhaps as much as 30% of the entire case officer corps!) failed the polygraph as roughly administered by CIA Security, and were referred to the FBI for full field investigations. I cannot articulate the depth of my disdain for any CIA manager that would allow that to happen.

There is a great deal wrong at CIA, and I give the author top marks on her discussion of CIA's over-all attitude of denial and deception across two decades; and her helpful discussion of the culture of deceit and self-service that has prevented the clandestine service from adjusting to reality and being more effective in protecting America. However, as the author is careful to point out, CIA's failure take place in the context of the failures of the FBI, of the White House, and of other governments.

This is not a book I recommend for applicants to the clandestine service, mostly because I do not want to see them dissuaded from applying. The clandestine service is the last great adventure left in the U.S. government, outside of special operations, and no matter how screwed up it might yet be, there is no greater honor and no greater life-affirming engagement, than to be a case officer in the service of your country. Miles Copeland, Without Cloak or Dagger : The truth about the new espionage-- remains my single best suggested work for applicants to the clandestine service.

See also, for the good in CIA:
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander
The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB

And also the bad:
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars

One last comment: over the next ten years I want to reduce the secret intelligence budget by 80%, down to $12 billion, and redirect the savings into national education and global connectivity for the five billion poor. You can learn more by seeking out information on collective intelligence, peace intelligence, commercial intelligence, gift intelligence, cultural intelligence, and Earth Intelligence. My first book, On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World remains the standard work on why this needs to be done.

It frustrates me to read books lately that have many grammar and spelling mistakes. This book is full of misspelled words, improper grammar and sentences that have no meaning at all. I'm not sure if it is the editor's fault or the writer's fault. But, a simple proof-read would have caught most of these errors.

As far as the book goes, it's just okay. If I had to read it all over again-I wouldn't.

The book does not cover Melissa's career much, but instead focuses on the CIA and its history from Iran-Contra until the build-up of the Iraq war. It is a bit dry, but informative. If you're interested in the Clandestine Service and its actions, do NOT read this book. There are better books on that part of the CIA, including Robert Baer's "See No Evil" and Lindsay Moran's "Blowing my Cover" (although I'd wager Mr. Baer would hate to be placed in the same group as Ms. Moran except as "good officer vs. bad one.")

Mahle writes only sparsely about her own career with the CIA clandestine service in this book, most likely because her former employer wouldn't let her, as she herself says a few times. This well-written book is full of insights, especially, on the sorry state of the clandestine service of the CIA (also known as the Directorate of Operations, DO) during the last fifteen years or so. The author writes about general developments within the DO and its position within successive US administrations. Partly due to Iran-Contra, the DO from the second half of the 1980s had to work under all kinds of ethical and political restrictions that made operations very difficult if not impossible in many cases. Operations would be cancelled if there was only the slightest chance of them resulting in bad publicity. Agents could only be recruited if they would lead the life of saints and go to church and confession at least once a week. Whereby the author makes abundantly clear that saints do not usually make good agents. Support from headquarters for clandestine officers in the field was weak at the best of times, if Mahle is to be believed. This was the time I think when a CIA officer in the field, before going off on an important but risky mission inquired first if the headquarters at Langley was still in friendly hands. It could always be that the enemy had taken over by the time he came back from his mission, of course. I seriously wonder if there was ever a great power in the last century whose clandestine service had to labor under such restrictions and under such a fear of risk-taking. After 9/11, of course, the pendulum swung completely in the other direction again, witness the program of 'extraordinary rendition', for example, about which much has been written lately. Apparently, in American political culture it is very difficult to find a kind of balanced middle road for the clandestine service that is a necessary tool for every great power in this imperfect and evil-ridden world. For an intelligence service in a democracy, there have to be some restrictions, of course, in the means used, but not excessively so. I found Mahle's analysis sharp but at the same time objective and balanced. She doesn't seem to bear a grudge towards her former employer but as an American citizen and a patriot, she naturally regrets the sorry state of an important part of the CIA during the time she worked there. I should also mention that her book is well-written and a good read.

Denial and Deception is the story of the CIA from 1987 to 2004 as seen through the eyes of a former CIA spy. Although she was eventually forced out due to some admitted error on her part (now classified), she was generally supportive of the agency though often very critical of its leadership. The book is divided by the various CIA directors, Webster, Gates, Woolsey, Deutch, and Tenet, and provides a fascinating account of the unintended dismantling of our intelligence capabilities and the demoralizing of our intelligence personnel at the hands of Congress, numerous bureaucrats, various reformers and a few directors. Although reform was badly needed because the agency had gotten out of control, the endless reforms had the effect of paralyzing the agency, making CIA leaders and officers afraid of taking risks for fear of political repercussions. Rigid CIA leaders made matters worse by failing to come to grips with the new dangers of a post-Soviet Union world. Although the author acknowledges supporting Bill Clinton for president she admits that most of this took place on his watch and that between his distrust of the CIA, his preoccupation with the Lewinski scandal, and his focus on domestic issues (It's the economy stupid)--he greatly compounded the problem. Just before 911, the CIA was apparently so dysfunctional and afraid to take risks (for fear of political repercussions) that it is no wonder they were unable to predict 911 and messed up on the WMD call in Iraq. It's hard to know how accurate the author's version of this history is, but I found the book fascinating and hard to put down.

This book could use a good editor and a good re-write. While the small part of the book I actually read was OK in content, there seemed to be a lot of repetition, and a scattershot approach to the presentation. After just under a hundred pages, I gave up.

Perhaps some would call the following nitpicky. OK, that's fine. However, when I see a glaring error in the text of a book, I tend to question the entire book. Was this the only error? Or is the entire book filled with such errors? At one point the author says something to the effect of it being midnight in Washington DC, but 3 pm in the Middle East. Well, that may be, but one place or the other would have to have changed time zones for this to be so.

I'd like to read an edited version of this sometime. As a former spook, of sorts, back during the Stone Age, I greatly enjoy reading good books on this subject.

It took me nearly three weeks to make it through the short portion of the book that I did. Constantly putting it down in frustration, then picking it up again due to my great interest in the subject matter. The content of the remainder of the book might warrant a thorough reading, but I apologize: I'll have to leave that to another reader.

Unlike alot of books, this author doesn't seem to be writing to grind an ax. Well written and provides great insight on some of the most recent terrorist events.

The book gives an insight into what it was like to be a CIA agent prior to the Iran / Contra scandal, and how it changed because of the timidity introduced because of the scandal. Unfortunately this is obscured by the "not-so-sprited" writing style of the author. One is also suspicious that the author has an ax to grind as she was involentarily separated from the CIA for misconduct (in her words "risk taking") on the job. Given a knowledge of the events cited, her credibility on many of the conclusions is high, but one never knows for sure.

I finally finished reading the book after starting over 2 months ago. I was able to accomplish this while being held captive on 2 different airplane flights, if you know what I mean. In other words I found the reading very challenging or boring, you choose your own label.

What kept me motivated was the fact that I knew nothing about the CIA other than the scandals in the newspaper and wanted to get a more intelligent background. Melissa did a good job in this regard and normally I would give a higher rating but....

So I recommend the book if you are really motivated to want to know some of the details behind what makes our government tick and why we are always getting into trouble with the rest of the world.

Melissa also shares her views on a number of topics including the "War in IRAQ" which I happen to agree with totally.

I have met Melissa Boyle Mahle while researching post Cold War espionage She is a spunky lady with a great sense of humor. At that time she was battling the CIA who wanted to suppress huge chunks of her book. As a former case officer in the Middle East and work at headquarters in Langley she was in a good position to see what was going on at what once was a premier intelligence organization. Add Melissa's analytical mind and you have an interesting memoir that will give you an insight of what's wrong with Washington's intelligence community. The best recommendation for this book is that the CIA doesn't like it. As relevant today as the day it came off the press.

Kingmaker