Customer Reviews

Dennett: Elbow Room (Cloth)

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Compared to most philosophers and given the complexity of the arguments that he makes, Dennett is relatively easy to read and clear. Be warned though, if you are not used to reading philosophy, this probably will not be the easiest book to follow. If you are used to reading philosophy, particularly analytic philosophy, this book should be very easy for you to follow.

Dennett's approach to the problem of free will reminds me of Wittgenstein's approach to traditional philosophical problems. Wittgenstein claimed that the best approach to take with many philosophical questions is to "dissolve" rather than solve them. He held that certain questions cannot be asked or at best do not make sense. The job of the philosopher is to find those questions and expunge them (This is an oversimplification but it does at least capture some aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy). I will not lay out for you how exactly Dennett arrives at a "solution" in this book, but his method does resemble-- in some ways-- Wittgenstein's method.

One can only marvel at the way Dennett presents philosophical problems. His presentation is both humorous and thorough. While reading his critique of some people who have written on the topic of free will, I often laughed out laud, given his somewhat sardonic, but at the same time, apparently accurate characterization of those writings.

One last note, if you think similar to the reviewer who gave Dennett one star, be warned; Dennett is not going to directly answer the problem of how if the statement "everything that will happen necessarily will happen" is true free will exists, i.e., free will in the sense that I could have done otherwise. If you are expecting a direct answer to this, again, you could be disappointed. But then again, you could like what you read. Dennett might change your mind about what counts as free will and what counts as a valid response to the question of whether or not free will exists.

Nothing can make the free will problem an easy one--but Dennett convinces that it is not necessary to give up too much in denying pure, idealistic free will. He effectively disarms our greatest fears of determinism by demonstrating what it is not in a fascinating array of metaphors and analogies, some of which are truly poetic.

This book expounds that by oversimplifying the concept of causality, we have unnecessarily complicated the free will 'problem'. Free will is indeed real; however, it is not the fingerprint of a supernatural deity--it is a product of material reality.

If you are bothered by the suggestion that perhaps our will is not as free as it seems, this book should set your mind at ease. If you have surrendered to the jaws of determinism, this book will set you straight. Either way, once you turn the last page, you will feel neither threatened nor constrained that something caused you to read it.

Daniel Dennett's _Elbow Room_ is a nicely written piece on the compatibility of determinism and free will. He notes that even if the world is deterministic, there is a certain amount of freedom (or elbow room) for man to operate within. The previous reviewer who stated that "you don't have to think about it very long to realize that free will can't exist in a deterministic [universe]" has apparently missed all of the philosophical work relating to "Compatibilism," which is the very idea that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Dennett presents a nice case for the plausibility of this viewpoint, pointing out why the scary thought experiments that others have created to make determinism seem so horrible cannot be reality. He also makes a clear distinction (that is sometimes blurred) between fatalism and determinism, and in questioning some underlying assumptions makes the idea of free will much more understandable. It may take some concentration to read (I am only beginning to study Philosophy and so had to read a number of sentences over before fully comprehending), but that hardly takes away from the quality of the book. Definitely recommended!

Although I do agree that Compatibalism does "save" the notion of free will by thoroughly distorting it, I think that Dennett's overall analysis of the issue is one of the most thorough and illuminating that I've encountered. In particular, he does a masterful job of debunking the "horror" of a world where one's will is contingent on external factors. As such, I find that I can accept his notion that our wills are "free enough", even while balking at his contention that this actually amounts to something that ought to be called "free will".

Readers who are more familiar with his popular works (such as _Darwin's Dangerous Idea_ and _The Minds I_) should be warned that this is an academic work. He obviously presumes that his readers have more than a passing familiarity with philosophy in general and cognitive philosophy in particular as well as presuming that his readers are competent enough to handle a scholarly work. Someone who is used to only reading science popularizations may find themselves getting in over their heads, although I do suspect that any reader who is interested in the field should be able to take something away from this. Never the less, caveat emptor.

This book reminds me of the pre-Copernican astronomers who were saddled with a commitment to keep the Earth at the center of the universe no matter what. In order to explain the movement of the planets, they were forced to invent elaborate Rube Goldberg contraptions to reconcile what they could see with what they were committed to believing.

Dennett seems embarked on a similar enterprise: he is committed to maintaining the idea of free will no matter what, and is willing to jump through any number of hoops to do it. Following his mental gymnastics can be quite a challenge.

Why is he compelled to sustain his belief in free will? "It has seemed very important to demonstrate that we are not just acting out our destinies but somehow choosing our own courses, making decisions--not just having `decisions' occur in us."(p. 1)

He says that if we are "hoodwinked" into believing that we don't have free will, the "implications... are almost too grim to contemplate," which he demonstrates with a number of grim metaphors: We would be like "a dog on a leash being pulled behind a wagon," "a mere domino in a chain," "disabled as a chooser." "Small wonder then that we should be highly motivated to look on the bright side and find the case for free will compelling if we possibly can."(p. 168)

Dennett's contention that you have to believe in free will or be "disabled as a chooser," should be empirically testable since the entry for "free will" in Wikipedia lists several major religions and scientific disciplines that consider the idea of free will untenable. There are at least several million people on this planet who don't believe in free will and seem to be living happy lives; billions of choices must "occur in" them every day without causing any major distress. Dennett's dread descriptions of life without free will seem patently false, and should at least require testing rather than being accepted as true by proclamation.

If we skip to the end for a peek at where Dennett is trying to lead us, we find this: "What we want when we want free will is the power to decide our courses of action, and to decide them wisely, in the light of our expectations and desires. We want to be in control of ourselves, and not under the control of others. We want to be agents, capable of initiating and taking responsibility for, projects and deeds."(p. 169)

The curious thing about this statement is that if we take the words "free will" out of it, all the things he says we want are available to us, even if we are fully determined parts of the natural world. Even we "hard determinists" have brains that make plans and carry them out, etc., so why do we need the idea of free will? What would free will give us that we don't already have in a determined world?

Dennett doesn't answer these questions in Elbow Room, but in Darwin's Dangerous Idea we find his concern clearly stated: "How could I be held accountable for my misdeeds, or honored for my triumphs, if I am not the captain of my vessel?" (Page 366) I'm confident that Dennett has been socialized well enough that his misdeeds are misdemeanors at worst, and that being held accountable for them is not his major concern. What seems most important to him is that he be honored for his triumphs. He is intent on finding a way to justify pride in his accomplishments, and without free will, pride is nonsensical.

If you read Elbow Room with Dennett's end goal in mind, you might be more alert for the kinds of restrictions he wants us to put on our thinking in order to maintain the idea of free will.

He cautions us about looking "`too closely' at our mental activities," or we might find that we have no selves! Even if we don't look too closely, science might, "...and the inner, detailed view of our brains that science provides is not likely to reveal to us any recognizable version of what Descartes call the res cogitans or thinking thing we know so well `by introspection.' But if we lose our view of our selves as we gain in scientific objectivity, what will happen to love and gratitude (and hate and resentment)?"(p. 13)

Love and gratitude seem to be built into us as part of our evolutionary heritage as social animals; they are part of the cement that holds groups together and are products of determinism rather than possible casualties. Hate and resentment have evolutionary components as well, no doubt, but belief in free will reinforces them by ascribing arbitrariness to those "enemies" who elicit them: granted free will, they are seen as deliberately choosing those actions that arouse our passions.

In his quest for justifiable pride, the idea of "skill" is a crucial element: skill gives one the right to take credit for one's accomplishments. But in order for skill to serve his purpose, it must be uncontaminated by luck: if one person is more skillful than another because of luck, then the more skillful one doesn't deserve any special credit.

Dennett uses a rhetorical device to make his point, beginning with an enumeration of several lucky breaks that might account for one person's developing a skill: born with talent; or if not with talent, then the gumption and drive to practice; or if lacking the temperament to practice, learning it from a wise teacher, etc. After naming a number of quite reasonable possibilities, he veers off into the whimsical: "...lucky not to have been born blind, and lucky not to have been struck by lightning on their way to school... lucky to have ever been born at all!"

This sets the stage for calling this a "petulant little dialogue," turning a discussion that started out quite reasonably into an object of ridicule. Put in this light, he disparages the view that would give luck such weight. "On this view nothing in principle could count as skill or the result of skill. This is a mistake."(p. 96) Perhaps it would be a mistake if this view did in fact lead to the conclusion that "nothing could count as skill or the result of skill," but skill acquired by luck is still skill, and a skillful violinist sounds much different than one who has not been lucky enough to develop to the same level. We can express appreciation and gratitude for our good fortune in hearing a virtuoso performance without granting the performer free will.

Dennett's dismissal of "luck" and his embrace of "skill" as something we can take credit for is brought in to anchor the idea of the "self-made self." If I tried to unravel that whole discussion I'd be writing another book, but if you stay alert for "`heuristic' decision procedures, in which a risky, limited amount of analysis is terminated in some arbitrary way"(p. 71) and similar devices, you will find much reason for concern. The entire section hangs on luck: "Is it `just luck' that some of us were born with enough artistic talent, in effect, to have developed `good' characters while some of us have turned out less well?" (p. 92)

We hard determinists would say, "Yes," to which Dennett would respond with his "petulant little dialogue."

Dennett takes a jab at determinists in this curious statement: "...those who have written books and articles denying the reality of free will... are left advising (pretending to advise? seeming to advise?) the reader that advising is pointless."(p. 155) Advising about anything would only be pointless if brains were incapable of making use of advice, but that is far from the case. Brains are constantly looking for ways to improve their models of the world and themselves, because evolution selected for brains that were capable of such improvement. People who write books advising their fellows of possible ways to improve their models do so because social animals that aid their fellows have better survival rates. We have evolved to be helpful, and those who understand the disadvantages of belief in free will--and there are many--are acting in a rational, determined way.

Near the end, Dennett offers some advice to his colleagues: "You say you cannot imagine that p, and therefore declare that p is impossible? Mightn't that be hubris? One of my tactics has been to respond to traditional philosophical claims about what is imaginable by urging: try harder."(p. 170)

Dennett seems unable to imagine a happy life without free will, and though I doubt he is capable, I would hope he might take his own advice: try harder.

Dennett combines clarity of thought with clarity of expression to re-introduce the question of "free will." It's an age-old topic, but Dennett's knowledge of nature gives him fresh insight in grappling with the issue. He concedes at the outset that "free will" is usually considered a topic for academics to wrangle over. One of his special talents, however, is bringing such subjects out of the scholastic arena and into everyday life. He recognizes that all of us are plagued by outworn traditions and mind-blinding prejudices. He wants us to free our minds of these restraints. From there, he hopes we will enter a future based on more rational concepts. It's an ambitious programme, but one Dennett presents with outstanding conceptual ability and skillful prose.

Dennett's use of the "intuition pump" to expose the "bogeymen" that plague our reason makes him unique among philosophers. It's an analysis tool that more should emulate. More significantly it's a method we should all learn. Rigid thinking leads us down wrong paths and this work is a guidebook for avoiding that. One of the wrong paths is the idea that "free will" and "determinism" are absolutely separate - there is no way to reconcile the two concepts. Dennett shows that there are many forms of "determinism" in nature, and we are part of nature. Humans, however, have a decision-making capability the rest of nature lacks. We have "elbow room," based on our consciousness, which gives us the ability to make choices. The dividing line between what nature imposes and our mentality allows, is vague and indistinct, sometimes contradictory, but it's there. Dennett wants us to recognize, so far as we can, which is which.

Dennett concedes that there's an apparent paradox in this view. If we are the product of evolutionary forces, why isn't our behaviour preset in our genes? It is, according to Dennett, but exercises only limited influence. Our complex intellect allows us to modify those natural roots and give us what we see as unlimited choices. We call this condition "free will". Dennett reminds us, however, that free will is no more an absolute than determinism. Dennett's rejection of absolutes in any guise have led to many critical assaults on his work. Yet, as almost the sole philosopher to adopt natural selection as part of his thinking, he has shown his work to be the most rationally based of all. Far from "dodging" issues, he shows how this open approach can actually lead to a firmer grasp of issues. As he points out, the issue is not a "choice" of absolute options, but "control" over the conditions. It's not just choosing which path, but perhaps the building of a new one.

For Dennett, a topic such as "free will" is far from limited to academic discussion. A clear concept of what free will entails has ramifications in law, education and many social policies. He addresses many aspects of applying his definition of free will in the final chapter "Why Do We Want Free Will?". With a strong sense of the pragmatic, Dennett shows why our understanding of the concept has meaning for us all. With his witty style and practical approach to what otherwise might be an obscure topic, Dennett has given us a highly readable and realistic overview. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]

Dennet's approach to free will seems to have two main thrusts. First, Dennet explains, and I think very convincingly, that even in a deterministc world our deliberations matter for the issues we expect and want them to matter to. They are part of the causal fabric and they affect the outcome.

He also starts down an interesting road with regard to what determinism really means and why it might not be so bad. He points out, I think rightly, that the future is unkowable in principle for anyone (except an opmipotent being) because of chaotic effects. This means that in principle (not just in practice) even if we had all the information and knew all the laws of physics we could not predict what will happen, not be able to predict the future. So even though we will tread only one path through life (some day we wand others will be able to look back and see that path) we don't know what it will be. This is a good idea, but as Dennit admits it needs more filling in. The idea is interesting but the implications are still quite unclear to me.

So we have two major threads. First, our deliberations matter (at least for some things and more likely for the things that we expect or want them to matter to) and second, the future is an unknown and therefore contains genuine opportunities. Together these ideas can actually support the seeming contradiction that even in a determined world, we have free will.

I don't agree with everything in the book and there is clearly more filling ut to be done on some of the more inetersting issues, especially the implications of those issues. However, the book is entertaining, thought provoking, and sheds significant light on the issue by cleaing up some bad conceptual muddles. Also, it will be just plain good for your brain. I would recommend it to anyone interested in this question.

Outstanding book - Dennett is a great writer. He tackles one of the most important philosophical issues with this little volume, are we free or not? Does free-will exist or is it just a fanciful dream? Dennett does a good job of putting these questions in their right historical, philosophical, and scientific context. I read this for the first time in Grad School and have kept it in my library since. If you want to understand the issue of free-will, correctly, then you need to purchase this book and give it a read.

I mean "dissolve", not "solve", since the original question of what free will is and whether we have it is too muddled for any solution. Instead, he questions the questions and wipes away years of misguided philosophy.

Dennett sticks to plain English and presents a clear picture of what free will is.

Read it. (And consider, also, _Darwin's Dangerous Idea_ and _Consciousness Explained_)

Dennett has written a very thought provoking analysis of how free will is compatible with determinism, clearing away the bug bears and myths, by analysins just what we mean by 'choice' 'can' and 'inevitable'.

Definitely the leading book on the subject.