The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged edition (History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century) [Paperback]

Charles P. Kindleberger (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review

The finest analytical account of the run-up to the Great Depression and the ensuing run-down from it into mild recovery and eventual world war. [This] brilliant book remains a carefully documented admonition to our leading spirits to look to the ends of what they are currently about. -- Times Literary Supplement --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From the Inside Flap

"The World in Depression is the best book on the subject, and the subject, in turn, is the economically decisive decade of the century so far."--John Kenneth Galbraith

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Product Details

• Paperback: 355 pages
• Publisher: University of California Press; Rev Enl edition (April 17, 1986)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0520055926
• ISBN-13: 978-0520055926
• Product Dimensions: 8 x 5.5 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #354,955 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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39 of 45 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Benchmark Study of the Causes of the Great Depression, May 22, 2004

By A Customer

This review is from: The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged edition (History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century) (Paperback)

This book is outstanding at describing the economics of the Great Depression. In his time, Kindleberger was regarded by many as the highest authority on the economics of the Great Depression. He also was a regular economist of the highest order. (Check out his other books.) This book is outstanding analysis of the Great Depression.

Kindleberger explains that the reason for the Depression was a lack of a stable international economic structure. In other words, the financial structure we enjoy today simply did not exist at the time. The flawed international system could only have led to a financial crisis eventually.

The financial world used a flawed gold standard - and this book describes why it was a disaster. Great Britain (and finance minister Winston Churchill specifically) played a leading role in implementing the flawed international system. Then when the depression hit, Great Britain quickly dumped the gold standard - hypocrosy - and recoverd the soonest. Herbert Hoover rigidly stick to the gold standard. FDR dumped it once becoming president, and it brought about a recovery. But a full recovery from the great depths of the Great Depression did not occur until the massive spending of World War II.

Why did this all happen? There simply was no financial structure in place to exact a powerful enough of a force on the global financial system. Great Britain had abdicated the leadership role and the United States was yet unwilling to assume that role. Nations turned inward (and I would add that countries that devalued quickly faired best).

Macroeconomics had not yet been developed. Keynes General Theory only came out in the mid-1930's, and then it was largely unknown. Friedman would not develop his monetary theory until well after the Great Depression had ended.

The book is not the only explanation of the Great Depression, nor pretends to be, but is a highly valid one and should be considered by anyone seriously interested in the subject. This book is a classic for the subject.

13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Very Useful; 4.5 Stars, June 20, 2009

By 

R. Albin (Ann Arbor, Michigan United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged edition (History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century) (Paperback)

Written a generation ago, this concise and well written book is still regarded as the best single monograph on the Great Depression of the 1930s. Kindleberger provides a nice description of the major economic and financial events involved in the Great Depression coupled with a generally convincing analysis of its mechanisms. While Kindleberger uses a fair amount of economics/financial terminology (par, terms of trade, etc.), the analysis is generally easy to follow and a modest amount of background knowledge of economics is all that is needed to follow his discussion.

Kindleberger sets out to answer 2 related questions; what caused the Great Depression and what made it so profound and durable? One criticism of Kindleberger is that the answer to the first question emerges implicitly while the answer to the second question is addressed explicitly. Kindleberger's narrative shows that the Great Depression was to a large extent a delayed sequel to WWI. The war generated a large number of structural and political problems that contributed significantly to the emergence of the Great Depression. These included the erosion of British dominance of the world financial system, the related problem of war debts and reparations, over-production of primary products, the considerable economic problems of Germany, and smaller problems like the deleterious economic consequences of the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Kindleberger shows the Great Depression as a massive deflationary event emerging and sustained by a series of interrelated vicious cycles. Competitive currency depreciation, competitive tariff barriers, and problems of individual national central banks to cooperate. Once the vicious cycles were initiated, they developed momentum of their own, severely affecting the economies of many nations, and leading to an enormous decline in international trade and paralysis of the international financial system.

Kindleberger argues that this downward path could have been arrested only by intelligent leadership of the international financial system. But one of the sequelae of WWI was an absence of such leadership. The British, who had de facto occupied this role for much of the 19th century were no longer able to exert such leadership. The logical successors to the British were the Americans, but American governments were not inclined to undertake such responsibility. Kindleberger points out as well, though, that there were not international financial institutions for certain key roles. For example, with private international lending withering in the Great Depression, there were nothing like the IMF or World Bank to provide capital. Kindleberger, a self-described Keynesian, clearly believes that the Great Depression could only have abrogated by aggressive American use of fiscal and monetary policy, and American led reconstruction of the world financial system.

Written a number of years, some of Kindelberger's detailed discussion is probably incorrect. I believe the consensus is that the 1937 depression was due to the relatively tight fiscal and monetary policies of the Roosevelt administration. Adam Tooze has argued well that the German economy of the late 30s was not a "blitzkrieg" economy but devoted to maximum rearmarment and limited by balance of payments problems and other economic constraints.

Finally, Kindleberger makes a fascinating counterfactual suggestion. Would American leadership and reconstruction of the world financial-economic system occurred without WWII?

10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars "The" Depression Book, March 29, 2009

By 

T. Shields (Siloam Springs, AR USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The World in Depression, 1929-1939, Revised and Enlarged edition (History of the World Economy in the Twentieth Century) (Paperback)

This book was regarded by Galbraith as the best of Depression era books. Updated not too many years before his death, Kindleberger gives a detailed account of the depression. His view differs from both Keynesian and Friedman's views. He also spells out real fact that Hoover was not as cluelss as often made to be and that inaction between the election and Roosevelt's inaguration led to the Bank Holiday crisis. Hoover had tried to get Roosevelt to work with him between November and March (before it was changed to Jan. 20) This ended with Roosevelt having to declare a bank holiday and "stress tests" applied the very day after Roosevelt took office. Hoover argued, as does Kindleberger, that the depression was worldwide and not local to the U. S. only (as Friedman claimed) He supports that with data from the globe, some added in this last edition. Kindleberger is the first time I understood that the issue of debt from WWI was a big issue for Europe and the U. S. and the failure to resolve that issue was part of the reason Hitler rose to power.