Customer Reviews

The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rommel's Defense of Fortress Europe

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Mitcham's thoughtfully researched analysis of Rommel's final months reads a bit like hero worship, but the thorough documentation of sources (and quality thereof) makes this a definitive third-party analysis of this period of Rommel's career. Mitcham casts Rommel as strategic seer, chronicling the Field Marshal's workmanlike foretelling of so many Allied tactics that you really do wonder if the U.S. would've been pushed back into the sea at Omaha had Rommel been able to a) properly fortify the coastline and b) bring up the 15th Panzer Division, which stood idle during so much of the crucial fighting in the bocage and on the Cotentin Peninsula. In explaining Rommel's role in the Hitler assassination attempt, Mitcham distances Rommel from direct involvement, painting him as politically naive and motivated to prevent a Russian overrun of Germany by "arresting" Hitler and seeing to a political restructuring of the Reich through a negotiated, Allied truce. Whether ! ! or not this was the case is uncertain to me, but it does make me speculate about what a post-Hitler Germany would have been like had the plan worked. Rommel as its president? Mitcham thinks this could have been the case.

Author Mitcham does the American reader a service in covering Rommel's actions in Normandy and his writing is well-paced and readable.

The book's strengths are in its viewpoint -- clearly outlining the hopelessness of the German defense as constrained by Hitler's interference and decisions against which Rommel labored much like a classical tragic hero, repeatedly avoiding defeat in very near-run situations, but unable to bring about victory. The comparative strengths of the Allies and Germans is discussed at length, and with the overwhelming tactical air support enjoyed by the Allies it is difficult to see how a lesser man than Rommel would have avoided a catastrophy long before the St. Lo breakout. On the Allied side, Bradley is presented as methodical and Montgomery as somewhat inept (without explaining Montgomery's desire to avoid incurring British casualties). The mini-biographies of German personnel are welcome (in the end notes), but sometimes multiple notes must be read before the individual comes into focus (like von Stuelpnagel.)

On the negative side are the many inaccuracies -- I found myself reading with a pencil and correcting errors in the text (Bastone should be Bastogne, etc.) Curiously, the author usually refers to Wilhelm Canaris as "Canasis", even referencing Heinz Hoehne's book "Canaris" as "Canasis." In addition, books like this usually have inadequate maps, and this one is no exception. The author frequently gets his directions wrong such as where east should be west or northwest should be northeast, making the need for maps even more critical than usual.

With respect to the Introduction complained about by an earlier reviewer, I found it accurate. Mitcham's point is that leaders do make historical impacts and that accurate biographies (of DWMs or whatever) are important in understanding history. That we are currently being very poorly served by elitist leftist academicians who revise history according to their own agendas is without doubt -- but rarely expressed. On any scale, Rommel was a German hero, ready to sacrifice himself for Germany and its people. I wonder how many university professors who have never been outside the cocoon of academia would be be willing to sacrifice anything, much less their lives, for their country. Certainly, the activities of academicians in World War II and subsequent conflicts would indicate something much less than a heroic sacrifice.

Mitcham's book is refreshing, focusing on Rommel's struggles as an individual -- one who was immensely talented as a leader but frequently limited in his ability to accomplish what he saw as required in a doomed defensive conflict.

Anybody who has read a Mitcham book knows the author has high esteem for German Command and the Wehrmacht in general. One also knows that from 1944, he over stresses the poor state of the Wehrmacht and as such was fighting a big disadvantage. This book will be no exception for as the author describes how Rommel tried to exert a positive influence on his command in Normandy, he will also stress how understrength and inexperienced his divisions were. The author also goes into detail on how Rundstedt and Hitler refused Rommel's requests to redeploy his forces closer to the shore and specifically Normandy beaches.

Rommel was convinced that the only way to defeat the Allied invasion was to push them back into the sea within the first few days when the Allies would be at their weakest. To accomplish this the panzer divisions would have to be nearer the shore. A problem with this theory is that neither Rommel or the author explains how the panzers would be protected from Allied air strikes.

After the deliberate situational coverage prior to the landinggs, the author delivers a brief but decent summary of the engagements up to the end of July that will include Operation Cobra. Attempts at holding the beach, St Lo and the defense in the Caen sector are also covered in typical Mitcham fashion. The near fatal wounding of Rommel on July 17th and his subsequent recovery is discussed as well as his slight involvement in the plot to assassinate Hitler. The book ends in an attempt to save his family, Rommel commits suicide for the alleged involvment in the assassination attempt.
There are a few maps and some good photos to study as well. The author, as usual, also provides an extensive Notes section.

I take issue on three minor statements the author has made. The author states the Germans had 2000 panzers destroyed at Kursk. I believe that's an over statement. He also claims Japan was a good Ally of Germany which is false. The repeated misspelling of Adm Canaris's name was also disappointing.

For anybody not familiar with Rommel this book would be a good starter book. Its not comprehensive but it is engaging and an easy read. It provides Rommel's insight and drive as a career officier and it shows a glimpse into Rommel's personal life.
Anybody who is well read on WWII will probably not find anything new on Rommel in this book but its still worth having in your collection if your're a Rommel fan.

Mitcham has touched upon an issue of slight controversy here. He talks about Rommel's role from an admirer's point of view. Wasn't an editor from a popular magazine fired last year because he thought that Rommel and other Nazis had good tastes in fashion?

Anyway, Mitcham doesn't worship Rommel like a deity. He was probably right in describing Rommel as the German commander best-suited to preside over the defense of France in 1944. If not for Hitler's stranglehold over the Wehrmacht and Rommel's rivalry with senior commanders/Nazis, he likely would have conducted a better defense, if not driven the Allies back into the sea. Mitcham's description of Rommel as the potential leader of Germany wasn't so far-fetched either. Stephen Ambrose once commented briefly on this prospect.

Mitcham's tendency to make his endnotes miniature stories in themselves is his forte. The damper to this book is his preface, in which he goes off on a tangent by ranting against liberal historians and affirmative action, as if these things bore a direct relation to the subject of his book. Readers may wonder if Mitcham wanted to rant against civil rights, but stopped short of doing so lest it stir up controversy. Please stick to the subject, Dr. Mitcham! If it weren't for your preface, your book would have rated 3.5 stars.