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The Desert Generals (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

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This work is a study of military leadership under stress, not a detailed blow-by-blow campaign history. The setting is the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, between June 1940 and January 1943. The perspective is thoroughly British and the fluctuating tide of British military fortunes is depicted by a detailed examination of the five key commanders in this period. Originally written in 1960, this work was revised in 1981 to incorporate the later information on the role of Enigma. Although Barnett's main contention - that General Montgomery's accomplishments were more mythical than factual - is not addressed until the last chapters, it is the primary intent of the author to debunk this myth.

The first chapters deal with the opening of the desert war and the initial victories of Field Marshal Wavell and General O'Connor over the Italians. Beda Fomm was O'Connor's brilliant victory, but today it is overshadowed by Rommel's battles. Despite the extent of these victories, the victors were soon forgotten: O'Connor was captured in the initial attack of the German Afrika Korps and Wavell was relieved by Churchill. Although this was an interesting phase of the war for the British, these chapters lack the dynamic quality that the rest of the book has.

General Sir Alan Cunningham, a hero of the campaign in Ethiopia, was sent to replace O'Connor. He was the first British general to face Rommel on even terms, but he lasted in command for only three months. When Cunningham took command, the British were still reeling from Rommel's first offensive and desperately attempting to raise the siege of Tobruk. Cunningham presided over the premature Operation "Crusader" to relieve Tobruk, constantly goaded by Churchill to strike at once. Barnett's portrait of Cunningham is interesting in two respects. First, as a successful colonial soldier suddenly thrust into command of a large mechanized army, Cunningham fumbled Operation Crusader (although more for non-technical reasons, like failure to achieve mass at the decisive point or maintain unity of effort). Cunningham was able to recover and muddle through to a victory of sorts, but suffered a loss of confidence that was fatal to his continued command. This is Barnett's second interesting point, on the strain of battle command upon the commander. Ostensibly, Cunningham was relieved due to "battle fatigue" but the erosion of his command authority and confidence was closer to the truth.

General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mideast, then made a disastrous choice in selecting General Ritchie to temporarily command the 8th Army. Although Operation Crusader had forced Rommel to abandon the siege of Tobruk and pull back, Ritchie took over command as the Germans swept back up to the Gazala line outside Tobruk. Ritchie was well-connected politically and he possessed a soldierly image but unfortunately, his professional abilities were modest. Ritchie was unimaginative and indecisive - fatal attributes when faced by an adversary like Rommel - and his static defense and piece-meal use of armor resulted in the 8th Army's greatest defeat. After Tobruk was lost and Rommel pushed into Egypt, Auchinleck decided to relieve Ritchie and take over command of the 8th Army himself.

Barnett's portrait of Auchinleck and his chief-of-staff Dorman-Smith is intended to vindicate these men as the true saviors of Egypt and British military fortunes in Africa. The case is persuasive. Although only in command for a few months, Auchinleck stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein and began the process of re-organizing the 8th Army into a more effective force. Dorman-Smith was a military intellectual, and he accurately predicted Rommel's likely course of action and advised Auchinleck on British dispositions. Unfortunately, Churchill visited Egypt right after 1st Alamein and Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were relieved. The reasons are ambiguous, but the purge was due to political and personal reasons much more than military factors. The benefactor was General Montgomery, who became the new commander of 8th Army.

Barnett's portrait of Montgomery is even more unflattering than most American portrayals of this controversial general. I was unaware, for example, that while at Sandhurst Montgomery has set another cadet on fire as part of a hazing incident (and even recounted it in his memoirs). Montgomery took command when the British were finally receiving massive reinforcements in Egypt and Rommel's forces were at their weakest. Engima decryption also gave Montgomery valuable insight into the enemy's strength and weaknesses. Nevertheless, Montgomery's set-piece Second Battle of El Alamein was nearly a failure. The breakthrough battle was a muddle that nearly foundered on Rommel's minefields and anti-tank barriers. When German supply difficulties finally helped to turn the battle his way, Montgomery clearly fumbled the pursuit and allowed the Afrika Korps to escape. However, Barnett cites the creation of the Montgomery Myth - that his battles all went according to plan and that he was invincible - as necessary to restoring bruised British military prestige. In these pages, Montgomery is clearly labeled as a vainglorious liar of limited military capabilities, but with a keen eye for public relations.

This book is an excellent study of command. For these readers who believe that Hitler interfered with the German war effort, this book is valuable for showing how Churchill also interfered. Churchill's Greek adventure in 1941 weakened the British in North Africa at a critical moment, as well as his diversion of forces to the Far East in December 1941. Likewise, Churchill's insistence on holding indefensible Tobruk in 1942 led to a great British disaster. Furthermore, Churchill was constantly badgering his commanders to attack which reduced the amount of time they had to learn their commands and build up their forces.

There are only two areas I can fault in this book. First, the sketch maps are absolutely awful. The reader will need to find other campaign maps to support the text because these are crude in the extreme. The second area is on the strategic impact of the war in the desert. Several times, Barnett makes the assertion that the war could have been lost if the Germans had broken through at El Alamein. Of course, Barnett is British and the British would like to have everyone believe that the British Army won the Second World War (or at least prevented it from being lost). Barnett also parades "what if" fantasies about German troops reaching the Persian Gulf in a month or even going on to India. This is nonsense, even without hindsight. Rommel's logistics were stretched to the breaking point getting to El Alamein but Barnett makes it sound like going an extra 1,500 miles would be easy. The book lacks balance in placing the Desert War in its proper historical perspective: it was a sideshow for the Germans and a valuable training ground for the British, but the war was decided elsewhere. Loss of Cairo did not equate to loss of the war. Barnett might have done well to remember that Napoleon's conquest of Egypt under similar circumstances (British naval superiority) did not produce any great strategic result for him. It is hard to see how Rommel's handful of troops and tanks could have done much beyond taking Cairo and even harder to see how holding Cairo would have saved Hitler's empire.

I don't think I may have read a better account of Desert War than Barnett's Desert Generals.By all means a revisionist history ,the book traces the careers of five British Generals in North Africa: O'Connor,Cunnigham,Ritchie,Auchinleck,Montgomery.Their operations represent collective British effort in preventing Rommel's Deutsche Afrika Korps from seizing Egypt, Middle East.

The book opens with brilliant campaign of Maj Gen O'Connor which began as a raid but climaxed in the Battle of Bedda Fomm resulting in the destruction Rudolpho Graziani's Italian Tenth army.Unfortunately British political establishment in London failed to exploit this victory.O'Connor's Western Desert force could have easily taken Tripolitania thus completing the conquest of Italian North African empire.Instead forces were diverted to Greece .This was a blunder of monumental proportions for which Churchill must be held accountable.

The diversion prolonged North African campaign,for it helped Germans land troops in Tripolitania.Besides forces assigned to the Far East were sucked into the defence of egypt ;consequently British were unable to resist Japanese onslaught.Author also is highly critical of Churchill's direction of war in North African theatre.PMs continous prodding led to Battle Axe-premature offensive to defeat Rommel-which ended in a fiasco.Ultimately Gen Wavell was made the scapegoatand had to resign.

Poor British performance continued under generals who succeded O'Connor.How can we explain heavy British defeats in Desert War?
Author says this was due to poor,faulty armoured tactics.During Crusader offensive General Cunnigham split the armour across length and breadth of the battle field.Instead armour should have been massed enabling it to strike like a clenched fist.Cardinal failure of British was unlike Germans they failed to organise Combined Arms Teams with tank as the pivot.Mad onrush of tanks against fixed German defences without artillery support led to heavy losses.Barnett attributes this to comparmentalised,orthodox ,regimental tradition of British army.

British tactical conduct of battle improved considerably under Gen Auchinleck's dynamic leadership.Author calls Auk as the man who saved Egypt.Against this it must be said when Rommel started probing Egypt's defences Afrika korps had shot its bolt.Ammunition and fuel shortages -due to failure of Axis High Command to neutralise Malta-crippled the movement of German armour.Besides Rommel had lost the services of his efficent Radio Intelligence Service commanded by Alfred Seebohm.With the result he had no idea of British plans ,intentions ,capabilities and was now boxing in the dark.

On the other hand his opponent had a clear picture of Rommel's intentions thanks to Enigma decrypts.Auchinleck's calculated aggression helped British defend Egypt.Swift punches here, there unhinged Rommel throwing his battle plans into disarray.

The book contains virulent criticism of Montgomery's generalship.Firstly ,author condemns Montgomery for claiming credit for repelling Rommel at Alam Halfa.Facts show the plan for repelling German assault had been devised by Auchinleck with the help of his brilliant chief of staff Eric Dorman Smith.Montgomery while becoming Commander of desert army inherited those plans and put them into effect.With the battle progressing favorably ,Montgomery ,according to the author,botched the opportunity of annhilating Rommel's Panzer Armee.He could have done so by unleashing his armour from Alam Halfa ridge which would have descended into the Africa Korps rear- at a time when it had bitten deep into British defences-severing it from its base.There would have been no El-Alamein then.

Further author impugns the wisdom of fighting this set- piece battle.Auchinleck's successful defence of Egypt prompted the Allies to sent a expeditionary force to North Africa.Landings which were to be effected on Rommel's rear would have compelled him to abandon fixed defences and withdraw.British then could have launched their superior mechanised forces to cut off retreating Germans.Instead yearning for national prestige made them fight a battle which came close to disaster.

Author faults Montgomery's breakthrough plan .Armour was used a battering ram.Sheer weight of metal helped Eighth Army hack,crunch their way through German defences.Despite suffering tremendous losses Montgomery knew that victory would be his.Thanks to Ultra, he knew German strength was ebbing away.If he could sustain this attrition for few more days enemy would break.This happened precisely.Despite possessing superior mobility British failed to cut off retreating Germans owing to the chaotic nature of their advance.

All the above are intresting observations which have combined to demolish Montgomery myth.No doubt book raised a storm when it was first published in 1960.I feel author has displayed remarkable courage,intellectual honesty in challenging the established views which made this book military classic.

What follows is from the preface of Desert Generals, and it is THE reason to read this book:

"The theme of this book is the struggle of individual will against circumstance. The subject matter is human characer. In these five uncommon men during the Desert Campaigns (of World War II), as in the condensed action of a tragedy, were displayed nobility, frailty, resolution, loyalty, indecison, vanity, fear, simplicity, selfishness, greatness and littleness..."

"Desert Generals" delivers all of that and more..much more.

And make it six generals, not five. The Desert Fox, Erwin Rommel, must be included as well. Six generals, five British, one German, a study in character, leadership, the lack of it, and meddling politicians in a time of war.

Good read. Very good. It's about men, not war.

In this book, Barnett again demonstrates a unique ability to dissect high command. Barnett was ahead of his time with his critical analysis of Montgomery. The latest edition includes a section which details the extent to which the allies in North Africa knew in advance what Rommel's moves would be, thanks to ULTRA intercepts. With this additional information, Montgomery's cautious conduct of the campaign in North Africa comes into even greater question. Barnett also details how the British, under O'Connor, were on the verge of driving the Italians from North Africa in 1940, but instead chose to send an expeditionary force to Greece on what was basically a poltical mission masterminded by Winston Churchill. That mission, like Churchill's foray into Gallipoli during the First World War, collapsed and Axis forces were not cleared from North Africa until early 1943. This book is highly recommended for anyone who enjoyed *Hitler's Generals* or *Swordbearers*, both also by Barnett, or anyone interested in the history of the Second World War, North African theater.

Some may be inclined to call this a "revisionist" history, but Barnett presents a clear and compelling account of the British battle for North Africa from 1940-1943. He focuses on the British Generals, and aruges that much of Montgomery's success can be linked to the military proficiency of O'Connor, Auchinleck and others. (Indeed, Barnett labels Auchinleck "The Victor Of Alamein" while most accredit that title to Monty). A highly readable account of the struggle for North Africa before the U.S. joined the campaign. Armor enthusiasts might feel the tank battles are not detailed enough, but I believe it does not detract from the substance of the book. It is rewarding to see those who deserve credit get it in this book.

Barnett's "warts and all" bios of so many of the British officers involved in the African campaign stirred up the Montgomery worshippers, despite the length of the rest of the work when compared with the section on Montgomery's command. The author succeeded with the original edition because of his reliance on facts already of record; the later editions beginning in the 1980s included the revelations from the declassified Ultra program. At the end of each section Barnett has new commentary based on the new information available, but apart from one or perhaps two instances, finds even more support for his conclusions, and often enough, more reason to criticize the Montgomery deification. The original edition remains intact within the new edition, which is an excellent approach.

Winston Churchill is criticized for his incoherent meddling. A great war leader like Churchill is bound to have made really monumental blunders, and did. By forcing one of his African commanders to launch an unwinnable and (at best) ill-advised to save Greece, he prolonged the war in Africa by two years. Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith produced the plan which defeated Rommel, beat Rommel, and were then relieved by Churchill. Montgomery's victory at Second el Alamein cost him more than half of his tanks and ended with Monty's failure to chase and catch Rommel before he could slip back to Europe. And the "victory" was entirely due to Hitler's failure to resupply Rommel; its timing was determined by the landing of US troops far behind Rommel, which was the cause of Rommel's retreat.

Barnett's use of sources is splendid. He relies on British sources, but also uses German and Italian sources thoroughly and appropriately to illuminate the back and forth struggle in North Africa.

Regarding "What If" scenarios -- Despite some claims to the contrary, the threat to Allied war efforts posed by the loss of the Middle East was real and serious. Loss of the Middle Eastern oilfields would have crippled, even eliminated, the British fleet, opening the road to a German invasion of Britain, thereby ending any possibility of a western, second front such as the one opened on D-Day. At best, it would have required even more US convoys; the few dozen miles of English Channel was a terrible logistical obstacle to the use of Allied armed forces after D-Day (although that can in large part be attributed to Montgomery).

Loss of the Suez Canal would have cut the British Empire in two, leaving the Far East the exclusive domain of the Japanese. Luckily, Germany was led by a military bungler and meddler worse than any other produced in the 20th century.

Omar Bradley's "A Soldier's Story" has some more truthfully negative remarks about Montgomery, and is also worth reading to find those.

This book examines the role played by some of the lesser known yet great commanders of the North African campaign. The arrival of Field Marshall Montgomery in North Africa and his subsequent victory at El Alamein in 1942 made him a overnight hero. Unfortunately, the commanders who had come before him were not given their dues, even though they had done a great job managing the situation in the North African theater during the intial difficult times. Undoubtedly, Montgomery had done a great job in winning the war in the North African theater, yet one must not forget that other great commanders such as O'Connor, Auchinleck, Ritchie, Wavell, Cunningham had set up the stage for him. In order to have a balanced view of the commanders in the North African campaign, this book is a must read.

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery was once asked who were the three greatest generals in history. He replied, "The other two were Alexander the Great and Napoleon." It would almost seem that Correlli Barnett's main purpose in writing The Desert Generals was to deflate Montgomery's ego, to the point of calling him an "emotional cripple".

On the plus side the author has rescued the reputations of Montgomery's predecessors in the North Africa desert war from 1940- 1943, notably Richard O'Connor and Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck both of whom may have been less cautious and more daring than Montgomery. While the popular British military historian John Keegan has called this book the best account of the North Africa desert war, one should consider a later book published in 1986, Dilemmas of the Desert War by Field Marshal Michael Carver who was at one time the head of the British Armed Forces. He had access to declassified documents and apportioned praise and blame differently and calls Correlli Barnett naive. Both books are eye openers, Correlli's book makes bold accusations, and Carver's book decades later responds with a powerful, detailed argument and different conclusions. There are two books and two views to consider and enjoy.

This is a truly enjoyable read from an author who I had previously enjoyed. The British alone against the Axis in North Africa is often overlooked in favor of the Torch landings later on. The heroism of the British and the truth about their good, and bad, Generals is here for anyone interested. Highly recomended.

The book is 300 hundred pages long with 22 pages of commentary on the chapters and about 30 pages of listed references and reprints of actual documents. There are 29 photos of the generals discussed in the book which are actually a very nice touch as you read about these individuals. There are 25 hand drawn maps that show the action being written about. I don't know who drew them (Maybe Barnett himself) - they are clear but almost quickly scribbled out. At first it is a curiosity, but then you accept them 2nd ratedness since the book is so well written.
John Keegan used this book as a reference when he wrote that fantastic book "The Second World War". He said about this book "The fighting in the Western Desert, for the Germans an appendix to their advance to the Mediterranean, has been much written of, but nowhere better than in Cornell Barnett's 'The desert Generals."

The book covers the British general in great, fascinating detail from Major-general R.N. O'Connors first campaigns against the Italians, to Montgomeries pushing Rommel back to Tripoli.
I have never heard of Major General O'Connor, but he must be the greatest British General of WWII. He is in the league of Rommel.
This book illustrates clearly how O'Connor understood and used mobile forces (mechanized) to out manouvre an enemy the OUTNUMBERED HIM BY 10 TO 1.
The book also covers the meddling Churchill undertook, and how his overall strategy stopped O'Connor from completely eliminating the Italians before the Germans even had a chance to get to N Africa to save their allies.
After O'Connor is sent off to another area by Churchill, the new British commnaders are not trained in the concepts of mechanized warfare etc. The author very clearly explains the British shortcomings as far as how they organize their units, what are the overall strategies that ignore using mobile forces. (O'Connor was a revolutionary commander in the British way of conducting warfare)
The commander in Chief of the middle East during this time was General Sir Claude Auchinleck. Never heard of him, but another man brought to life by the author, and a very able general. His one fault was not relieving a couple commanders soon enough, after poor performance.
The only German general covered in this book is Rommel. The author does an excellent job in describing Rommels actions and how they compared to the British actions/reactions. Typically Rommel would be able to plan, organize and execute a counter attack in less than one day. The British (because of their outdated views, and unit organization) would take several days at minimum.

This book however covers almost NOTHING concerning the condition of the troops. Other than constant fuel shortage for the Germans. Nothing about the heat, food, casualties etc. Just about the General (as the book title indicates)

Some quotes from the book:
"...most regular officers of the British Army were amateurs as well as gentlemen. Born into the gentry or the aristocracy, spending their lives in the last sanctuary of privilege in Europe,..." "...Cleverness, push , ruthlessness, self-interest and ambition were considerably less prized than modesty, good manners, courage, a sense of duty, chivalry and a certain affectation of easy-going non-professionalism"

".... And also that British soldiers preferred to be commanded by `gentlemen' than by able men of their own class."

"In November 1941 there were in North Africa more 3.7 inch (guns) than 88's. But the British never used them in an anti-tank role, either in Crusader or in later desert battles. ......The 3.7" was an anti-aircraft gun. It was to be used therefore to shoot at aircraft. The two-pounder was supplied to shoot tanks. And that was that."

General Messervy commenting on Ritchie who was the commander of the Eighth Army - Ritchie was "confident and decisive in speech, but one did not always feel he was quite so confident and decisive in his mind"

"Tobruk was commanded, in the current British manner, by a debating society. The troops were in every stage of disorganization. Maps were hopeless......"

"Ritchie with his stolid British virtues was as baffled as a two-dimensional being in a three-dimensional world."

Dorman-smith advised Auchinleck to receive the Prime Minister in Cairo, in full panoply of C-C. "But Auchinleck, with his complete disdain for intrigue, stayed with his army until asked for." When Churchill did visit with Auchinleck ".....Auchinleck was too honest or too simple a man for press-agenting: the Prime Minister's breakfast that morning was just ordianary Eighth Army mess issue."
(Gotta like Auchinleck !)

The second phase of the 2nd battle of Alamein was the Montgomery planned to destroy the enemies armour and army. ".....Rommel and his two panzer divisions, 90 tanks against 700. At Tel el Aqqaqir was now fought the last great tank battle of the desert war, in which the odds were too grossly uneven to leave the issue in doubt. But Rommel fought one of the best actions of his career in order to gain time for the organization of the retreat that must soon begin." His army was able to slip away - Rommel observed that ".....the enemy was operating with such astonishing hesitancy and caution."

"....the Panzerarmee's shield during that epic retreat was its commander's reputation."

The way the author described Rommels actions, I really got the sense that Montgomery was extremely cautious with his enormous well supplied army, out of fear of being outmaneuvered to defeat by the small force led by Rommel..

I will reread this book some day.