The Devil We Know: Dealing With the New Iranian Superpower (Thorndike Press Large Print Nonfiction Series) [LARGE PRINT] (Hardcover)

by Robert Baer (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
Former CIA operative Baer (See No Evil) challenges the conventional wisdom regarding Iran in this timely and provocative analysis, arguing that Iran has already half-won its undeclared 30-year war with the United States and is rapidly becoming a superpower. In Baer's analysis, Iran has succeeded by using carefully vetted proxies such as Hezbollah and by appealing across the Muslim sectarian divide to Sunni Arabs, and is well on its way to establishing an empire in the Persian Gulf. Baer claims that since Iran's dominance in the Middle East is a fait accompli, the United States has no viable choice but to ask for a truce and enter into negotiations prepared to drop sanctions against Iran and accept a partition of Iraq, which is already, and irretrievably, lost. Baer's assumptions are often questionable—most tellingly that Iran is now trustworthy—and his conclusions premature: he states unequivocally, for example, that the Iranians have annexed the entire south [of Iraq]. But his brief adds an important perspective to a crucial international debate.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From The Washington Post
From The Washington Post's Book World/washingtonpost.com Reviewed by Shaul Bakhash Robert Baer is not given to understatement. He previously wrote a scathing indictment of the Saudi royal family's influence in Washington (Sleeping With the Devil) and a swashbuckling account of his 20 years as a CIA operative (See No Evil) that became the basis of the George Clooney film "Syriana." Now, in The Devil We Know, he sets out to chart Iran's growing dominance in the Middle East and what the United States should do about it. In his view, Iran is bent on empire and is already halfway there: It is "effectively annexing" all of southern Iraq, Lebanon and western Afghanistan. Most of Iraq's oil has fallen into Iran's sphere of influence, and the Muslim clerics in Tehran are close to establishing an oil monopoly in the Persian Gulf. They have a master plan to dominate the entire region, and the United States is virtually powerless to stop it, short of committing to 30 years of containment, "wars without end," a million troops permanently based in the Persian Gulf and the expenditure of trillions of dollars. Thus, Baer sides with those who advocate negotiation rather than confrontation with Iran. He seems to believe that a long-term deal with Iran is possible. In exchange for good behavior, he suggests, the United States should give Iran security guarantees, establish joint patrols in the Persian Gulf, grant Iran a security role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and remove the rationale for Iranian meddling by settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Somewhere beneath the layers of over-inflated language in this book, there is a core of an important story. Iran is emerging as an influential power in the Persian Gulf. Its weight in Iraq is considerable. In Lebanon, as Baer rightly notes, it has perfected an effective, low-cost strategy that it may seek to replicate in Iraq and elsewhere: the use of surrogates to advance Iranian ends. Lebanon's radical Hezbollah organization has grown in strength thanks to a combination of Shi'ite Muslim resentments and Iranian money, arms and investments in schools, clinics and mosques. Iran clearly aspires to major-power status and sees itself as the banner-bearer of an Islamic awakening that can confront and confound U.S. influence in the region. But Baer can rarely resist a super-charged, exaggerated assertion. On almost every page of his book, he bombards the reader with the verbal equivalent of shock and awe. "Iraq is lost. Iran won it," he writes. "Iran's empire is already half built; we can't stop it now short of starting World War III." Baer not only attributes to Iran ambitions of breathtaking scope but also suggests it is capable of achieving them. He argues that having "tipped" Lebanon and Iraq, Iran is on its way to "tipping" the Palestinians, and once it has done so, "what's to keep them from doing the same in Jordan and Egypt?" In addition, he contends, Iran is reaching for the oil of the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. It has fixed its sights on the energy corridors -- present and future pipelines and shipping channels -- running through Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and the Straits of Hormuz. It has its eye on other "low-hanging fruit" in Central Asia and in Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan. If the United States leaves Iraq (and the author doesn't think it can afford to stay), "Iran could simply bully the Gulf Arabs into accepting Iranian suzerainty," he claims. Yet this prospect doesn't seem to worry Baer very much. "Is it worth it for the Americans to protect the Arabs from the Iranians?" he asks rhetorically, strongly implying that the answer is no. But Iran, its regional influence notwithstanding, is not the country the author depicts. It has largely squandered its oil revenues and does not have a vibrant economy. Other than oil, its exports are insignificant. It has legions of eager, bright college graduates, but many are unemployed or underemployed, and the regime fears its own people. Compared to the United States, it is a puny military power. The Bush administration may have wasted America's moral, monetary and military capital, but Iran is not going to bring the United States to its knees. Having attributed to Iran overweening and fantastical ambitions, Baer tries to argue nonetheless that the regime in Tehran has evolved into "a classic military power," a pragmatic, rational actor that pursues "fixed, reasonable demands" -- which is why he contends that a stable U.S.-Iranian understanding is possible. Some of his proposals for a settlement appear sensible. But in his policy recommendations, too, Baer slips into verbal overkill; by the time he is done, he has handed over virtually the entire Middle East to Iran. "We cannot and should not try to stand in the way of Iran's quest to dominate Islam," he writes. As long as Iran guarantees the Saudi oil fields, he asks, "do we really care what happens to Saudi Arabia?" Baer also recommends that the United States allow Iran to take direct control of the parts of Iraq it already commands through proxies (one-third of the country, including its main oil fields and its access to the Persian Gulf!); acquiesce in Iran's future control of Islam's two holiest shrines, in Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia; and concede Iranian "dominion" in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, the Gulf and Gaza. These are among Iran's core interests, according to Baer, and he finds none of them "impractical or excessive." There is, after all, nothing to worry about.
Copyright 2008, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 445 pages
• Publisher: Thorndike Press; Lrg edition (December 10, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 141041163X
• ISBN-13: 978-1410411631
• Product Dimensions: 8.6 x 5.5 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars See all reviews (43 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #1,012,843 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

118 of 124 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars RUSH to Read this Book before November, October 2, 2008

By	Giordano Bruno (Wherever I am, I am.) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)

This review is from: The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Hardcover)

Robert Baer's take on the Middle East is deeply supportive, without electioneering, of the position of Barack Obama on negotiations with Iran and with other 'suspect' regimes. "If you can't talk with them, you can't know them," is the implicit wisdom of this position, to which I would add the necessary corollary that "if you don't know them, you can't talk with them effectively." Baer has the experience and credentials to assert that he knows Iran rather well, with twenty-some years in the CIA, mostly in the Middle East.

Baer's central arguments depend on our willingness to consider Iran a rational, self-interested country with a structure of leadership beyond the theatrical postures that Americans take for hopeless enmity. Yes, Iran is different, and indifferent to America's self-image of exceptionalism. Yes, Iran does aspire to a leadership in the Middle East, and even to a moderate super-power role in the world at large, which the USA has been and will still be very loath to recognize. However, according to Baer, Iran's aspirations will best be realized by establishing a mode of co-existence and shared influence with the USA, and important people among the Iranians well understand that need.

Once again, according to Baer, the Shia-Sunni antagonism is far more serious and determinant of conflict than Americans yet comprehend, even after the strife in Iraq. Thus the natural rival - even enemy - of Iran is not Israel but rather Saudi Arabia, and one of the reasons for the anger of Iranians toward the USA is the bed-fellow ties the USA has maintained with the Saudi autocracy. As for Israel, Iran is well aware that it can't achieve any of its true goals by provoking Israel to a full-scale attack, and there are major segments of the Iranian leadership who suppose that a negotiated settlement with Israel and the Palestinians would be in reach of a diplomatic entente between the USA and Iran. According to Baer, Iranian influence has already risen to new heights, in Lebanon especially, through Hezbollah, especially since the USA did them the favor of reducing their front-line enemies - Iraq and the Taliban - to chaos.

As for a US invasion of Iran, Baer maintains that it would be an unprecedented, disastrous mistake. Iran, he says, could and would "ignite" the Gulf, utterly disrupt oil production and shipping, and very likely take the opportunity to strike against the Saudis. The effect on the world economy would be catastrophic. Thus the whole Middle East is painfully locked in a "Texas draw", a stand-off of destruction that doesn't even offer a potential victor any kind of proportionate reward.

This book is sure to be controversial in the USA. I can already imagine the barrage of angry comments I'll receive on this review merely for suggesting that the book is thoughtful and deserves to be read. There's a flaw in the title, however, that I need to point out. If "the Devil we know" is Iran, then part of the problem is that we don't know this Devil well enough. Ignorance and preconception of the history and reality of the Middle East have been responsible for huge errors in American activity there - from the odious coup against Mossadegh, to Carter's policies of maximum blundering, to Reagan's impeachable secret dealings, and on through successive unsuccessful administrations from both parties.

39 of 41 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Absolutely Alternative Look at the Realty of Us vs. Iran, October 6, 2008

By	Anthony Ian "anthony_ian" (Chicago, IL United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Hardcover)

Once again, Baer comes flying in with the sorry-but-it's-true reality of the Middle East. I've read all his books and couldn't wait to read this one. The first two dealt with exposing what Saudi Arabia is really up to and their involvement in terror and, most importantly, why it is beyond insane to call them an "ally."

Now he takes on Iran and details in very convincing manner (having dealt with Iran for decades) how Iran is much more powerful in the region than we currently believe, and how all this talk of them being the third prong of the "Axis of Evil" that is going to nuke Israel is completely 9/10 thinking.

He correctly summarizes how they, via Hezbollah, were able to beat Israel in the 2006 war and galvanized public support for them. He also points out, which is pretty obvious, how they have immense sway over Iraq and its Shia majority.

What's eye-opening is his pointing out that Hezbollah/Iran hasn't launched a terror campaign (meaning, bombings, kidnappings) since the 80s because there's a "pragmatism" to their thinking and they realized this kind of thing wasn't helping their cause. And what is that cause? To be, and be realized, as the superpower in the region.

NOT to wipe out Israel, not to do anything that the fool Ahmadinejad keeps talking about, not to eventually bring Islam to our doorstep and force it down our throats.

The epiphany of the book is that Baer positions Iran not as an enemy to be attacked or feared, but rather a historic opportunity to form an alliance in the region. Time is ticking, he asserts, and do we really want to cast our lot with the zealot Sunni Muslim "takfiris" who have wreaked destruction for decades (including 9/11) and have no other goal except destruction and using the Koran as their Constitution? Because that's who we're partnered with now.

Or, do we form an alliance with a country that doesn't share that ideology at all, and who can provide dividends in settling Iraq and, yes, Israel/Palestine?

He makes a good case. Read and judge for yourself. I can't recommend it enough; too bad our leaders aren't reading it also.

BTW: easy read. Blew through it in three days.

16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An exiled Iranian, December 10, 2008

By	R. Bassam "Iranian in exile" (Washington, DC USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Hardcover)

As an Iranian in exile whom left Iran in my middle teens, I found this book both insightfull, and very easy to read. The author has clearly done his homework, and given an unbiased, thoughtfull and logical plan of action for U.S. and the western world to follow. I must admit being an Iranian I felt a bit proud of what Iran has done, even though I don't agree with process they had to go to achieve their goals thus far. U.S. must stop listening to AIPAC and other special interest groups and clearly define its purpose and a path to its prosperity. This book begins that process for a better future for all Americans and perhaps Iranians as well.