Customer Reviews

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Thorndike Nonfiction)

5 star:		(32)
4 star:		(15)
3 star:		(6)
2 star:		(7)
1 star:		(5)

 

 

Robert Baer's take on the Middle East is deeply supportive, without electioneering, of the position of Barack Obama on negotiations with Iran and with other 'suspect' regimes. "If you can't talk with them, you can't know them," is the implicit wisdom of this position, to which I would add the necessary corollary that "if you don't know them, you can't talk with them effectively." Baer has the experience and credentials to assert that he knows Iran rather well, with twenty-some years in the CIA, mostly in the Middle East.

Baer's central arguments depend on our willingness to consider Iran a rational, self-interested country with a structure of leadership beyond the theatrical postures that Americans take for hopeless enmity. Yes, Iran is different, and indifferent to America's self-image of exceptionalism. Yes, Iran does aspire to a leadership in the Middle East, and even to a moderate super-power role in the world at large, which the USA has been and will still be very loath to recognize. However, according to Baer, Iran's aspirations will best be realized by establishing a mode of co-existence and shared influence with the USA, and important people among the Iranians well understand that need.

Once again, according to Baer, the Shia-Sunni antagonism is far more serious and determinant of conflict than Americans yet comprehend, even after the strife in Iraq. Thus the natural rival - even enemy - of Iran is not Israel but rather Saudi Arabia, and one of the reasons for the anger of Iranians toward the USA is the bed-fellow ties the USA has maintained with the Saudi autocracy. As for Israel, Iran is well aware that it can't achieve any of its true goals by provoking Israel to a full-scale attack, and there are major segments of the Iranian leadership who suppose that a negotiated settlement with Israel and the Palestinians would be in reach of a diplomatic entente between the USA and Iran. According to Baer, Iranian influence has already risen to new heights, in Lebanon especially, through Hezbollah, especially since the USA did them the favor of reducing their front-line enemies - Iraq and the Taliban - to chaos.

As for a US invasion of Iran, Baer maintains that it would be an unprecedented, disastrous mistake. Iran, he says, could and would "ignite" the Gulf, utterly disrupt oil production and shipping, and very likely take the opportunity to strike against the Saudis. The effect on the world economy would be catastrophic. Thus the whole Middle East is painfully locked in a "Texas draw", a stand-off of destruction that doesn't even offer a potential victor any kind of proportionate reward.

This book is sure to be controversial in the USA. I can already imagine the barrage of angry comments I'll receive on this review merely for suggesting that the book is thoughtful and deserves to be read. There's a flaw in the title, however, that I need to point out. If "the Devil we know" is Iran, then part of the problem is that we don't know this Devil well enough. Ignorance and preconception of the history and reality of the Middle East have been responsible for huge errors in American activity there - from the odious coup against Mossadegh, to Carter's policies of maximum blundering, to Reagan's impeachable secret dealings, and on through successive unsuccessful administrations from both parties.

Once again, Baer comes flying in with the sorry-but-it's-true reality of the Middle East. I've read all his books and couldn't wait to read this one. The first two dealt with exposing what Saudi Arabia is really up to and their involvement in terror and, most importantly, why it is beyond insane to call them an "ally."

Now he takes on Iran and details in very convincing manner (having dealt with Iran for decades) how Iran is much more powerful in the region than we currently believe, and how all this talk of them being the third prong of the "Axis of Evil" that is going to nuke Israel is completely 9/10 thinking.

He correctly summarizes how they, via Hezbollah, were able to beat Israel in the 2006 war and galvanized public support for them. He also points out, which is pretty obvious, how they have immense sway over Iraq and its Shia majority.

What's eye-opening is his pointing out that Hezbollah/Iran hasn't launched a terror campaign (meaning, bombings, kidnappings) since the 80s because there's a "pragmatism" to their thinking and they realized this kind of thing wasn't helping their cause. And what is that cause? To be, and be realized, as the superpower in the region.

NOT to wipe out Israel, not to do anything that the fool Ahmadinejad keeps talking about, not to eventually bring Islam to our doorstep and force it down our throats.

The epiphany of the book is that Baer positions Iran not as an enemy to be attacked or feared, but rather a historic opportunity to form an alliance in the region. Time is ticking, he asserts, and do we really want to cast our lot with the zealot Sunni Muslim "takfiris" who have wreaked destruction for decades (including 9/11) and have no other goal except destruction and using the Koran as their Constitution? Because that's who we're partnered with now.

Or, do we form an alliance with a country that doesn't share that ideology at all, and who can provide dividends in settling Iraq and, yes, Israel/Palestine?

He makes a good case. Read and judge for yourself. I can't recommend it enough; too bad our leaders aren't reading it also.

BTW: easy read. Blew through it in three days.

Bob Baer's The Devil We Know is well worth the time. He essentially takes the Neo-con premise that Iran is a threat in the region and turns it around. He argues that Iran is a real regional power with a centuries-long cultural history and a far more rational player in the region than near-failed states like Pakistan. Instead of trying to confront Iran, the US, with two very expensive wars they cannot sustain, needs to find a new policy direction in the region in order to more effectively further their national interests. Iran, is not near the problem that many seem to think it is, and this is Baer's essential position.

The complete lack of footnotes in the book is a problem, but one cannot entirely dismiss Baer's arguments because of it. He clearly has substantial knowledge and experience in the region, but he is not infallible.

As an Iranian in exile whom left Iran in my middle teens, I found this book both insightfull, and very easy to read. The author has clearly done his homework, and given an unbiased, thoughtfull and logical plan of action for U.S. and the western world to follow. I must admit being an Iranian I felt a bit proud of what Iran has done, even though I don't agree with process they had to go to achieve their goals thus far. U.S. must stop listening to AIPAC and other special interest groups and clearly define its purpose and a path to its prosperity. This book begins that process for a better future for all Americans and perhaps Iranians as well.

Baer's book starts out by making a number of seemingly wild and unfounded claims; unfortunately, (for the U.S., not readers) he then proceeds to document them quite well.

Baer sees Iran as engaged in a soft takeover of the Middle East - it now controls a significant portion of Iraq, is extending influence over Jordan and Egypt, and has the ability to wreak havoc over the entire Middle East. Baer's conclusion is that destroying Iraq was the greatest strategic blunder this nation has ever made, and we should now ally ourselves with Iran instead of continually goading it.

Our first problem in dealing with Iran is that we don't understand it. Its population growth has fallen from 3.2% in 1986 to 1.2% in 2001, only slightly higher than the U.S. Further, its religious parties generally only receive about 10% of the vote. Iran's current belligerence can be traced not to innate aggression, but the fact that wars are being fought on two of its borders. American are not hated in Iran - just that we occupy large portions of the Middle East.

Iran got the confidence that it can beat the West from its 1982-2000 experience in Lebanon, when its proxy Hezbollah forced the Israelis to retreat.

Iranian surrogates have already started to take control of Iraq's oil by stealing hundreds of thousands of barrels/day, as well as getting Iraq's Shia oil minister to cancel Kurds' oil contracts because Iran does not want to strengthen that group.

Saddam's T-72 tanks and helicopters were all that kept him from falling; without those resources, whatever regime replaces him will not be able to hold the nation together. The U.S. further acerbated control problems by allowing Iran to take over from moderate Shia clerics via assassinations and taking over various sect bank accounts.

Baer expects Iran to play off the differences between Iraq's major Shia parties and use Iraqis that had been exiled to Iran, imposing its own order through money and arms. Meanwhile, its objective is to bleed the U.S. so it will not interfere with Iran.

Iran has armed itself via fire-sale prices from Russia - new and refurbished tanks with heat-seeking missiles, MIG-29s with accompanying missiles, and Chinese missiles. Much of this armament is buried underground. Fiber-optic cable technology that can't be intercepted is used for communications, and of course they are well known for having learned to create EFPs (explosively formed penetrators). Finally, in 2007 Iran sent emissaries to all Gulf states telling them that if the U.S. attacks us we will destroy your oil facilities. Thus, Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons to play an important role.

Iran is further strengthening itself politically and economically by signing a 25-year large natural gas contract with Turkey, and allowing Turkmenistan to transport its natural gas across Iran to markets. Baer further believes that Iran will be able to control a proposed gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, and that a similar situation is arising with Caspian Sea oil. Meanwhile, the Straits of Hormuz across from Iran through which at least 20% of world oil flows are only 21 miles wide.

Iran is the overwhelming military force in the Gulf region, capable of quickly putting one million into uniform; Saudi Arabia, the next largest force, can field only one-quarter that force. Iran could quickly take over Saudi Arabian oil fields, and though eventually be pulverized by U.S. air forces, the resulting damage would seriously impede oil flow for two years.

On the other hand, Baer does not believe Iran has to invade to create chaos. The Persian Gulf rim is populated by 90% Shias and vulnerable to Iranian meddling. Oil-rich Dubai is mostly Shia, and Baer foresees they could overthrow the rulers and call for help from Iran.

Consensus in the Gulf is that the first Arab sheikdom to fall will be Bahrain, with a tap by Iran. Its population is 700,000, 70% Shia, and Iran funds its Shia clerics, charities, and schools. Further, until 1782 it was part of Iran. Losing Bahrain would force the U.S. Navy to relocate to the Indian Ocean.

What does Iran really want? Baer says they primarily want to unify with parts of Iraq, and to be left alone by the U.S. As for sanctions aimed at bringing regime change - its regime still stands after 30 years of sanction, and Turkey and Japan ignore the sanctions entirely.

Baer's Recommendations: Let the Iranis do most of the patrolling of the Gulf region, stop efforts to change its regime, and grant them a defined role in Iraq and Afghanistan. The alternative is for the U.S. to continue its financial bleeding in the area, bring Iran, Russia, and China closer together, and continue to escalate Iran's arms buildup in the region to include possibly nuclear submarines.

Robert Baer continues to delight with his extraordinary base of knowledge on the Middle East. His analysis of Iran both past, present, and future, leads one to question how the u.S. has been dealing with this country since before the Shah of Iran. Baer primary argument is that Iran has changed from the Iran of hostages and indiscriminant terrorist actions to a pragmatic and calculating nation state. Baer's writing style is easy to read and, if anything, almost journalistic in nature - I found at times that his sources were poorly defined and wondered if his former employer reviewed the manuscript (I don't think so...). Other reviewers have done a great job of summarizing Baer's points - I'll simply cast my vote for the book as a great read for anyone wishing to know more about Iran and the future of the Middle East. Baer paints a bleak picture for the U.S. and our "allies" if we do not engage Iran.

Obviously, this book addresses a need that is critical to our understanding of key players in this global drama; however, there are too many inconsistencies and contradictions to fully trust it. For example, Iran is said to have stepped away from terrorism to embrace assymetrical (including guerilla warfare). In many cases, is there REALLY a difference? If combatants are the only targets and civilians are protected, maybe so. If not, as another reviewer pointed out, does it REALLY matter, if civilians are indiscriminately killed, whether it was a terrorist or a guerilla action? Does it change the nature of the action? Does it change the nature of the actor? I think not. Another point, did Saddam lose the Iraq/Iran war or not? Review what the author says in multiple places and it seems like he did and he didn't. I need to have confidence an author is in full command of his viewpoints, has a consistent understanding/recollection of what he is reporting, and remembers what he wrote from one chapter to the next if I am to trust his opinions/perspectives/viewpoints. This is not the only contradiction in the book especially in regard to his quotations from key players with which he has spoken. The book does make extremely valuable points about how what we SEE and HEAR from Iran may not be what actually IS, but you can say that about a lot of nations. As an inside actor during the period, I am VERY familiar with rhetoric during the Cold War that made the Soviet Union appear to be a larger than life enemy. As we all know, it was a legitmate threat but not an invincible one. This book endows the Iranians with that same mystique. Be wary of that. My recommendation is to take the good from this book and dismiss the bad. To do that, you will have to read more than just this book so you can see that what you discern are, in fact, truths in regard to Iran. That points to one good lesson from this book that should be applied to all your reading: be discerning. Sometimes that requires that we put aside preconcieved notions and prejudices to get to the REAL truth. I know I have to remind myself of that.

The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower

I read Robert Baer's previous book, "Sleeping with the Devil", so I was familiar with his style and depth of knowledge about the Middle East and then I heard him discussing this new book on NPR. His thesis is that the Iraq war is over and Iran won, may be a little over the top but his perspective on Iran's position in the Middle East is certainly credible and thought provoking. The book is well written and there's plenty of detail to support Baer's thesis. Anyone who wants a better understanding of what the United States is facing in the Persian Gulf in the coming years should read this book.

If you're REALLY interested to know what time has reserved for world in the Middle East, then this is definitely the book to read.

This book provides you with an analysis of why Iran is the hegemon of the Middle East, how it has succeeded to maneuver herself to this position against all the odds, and why USA supporting other countries of Middle East is simply illogical and bad investment.

Highly recommended for those who want to avoid media skewed stereotypes and want to understand the power structure in Middle East.

In Baer's view, Iran isn't a devil -- and we don't know it at all. And that, he argues, is the heart of the problem that America faces. He agrees with neocons that Iran presents a formidable challenge (even threat) to the United States, but disagrees -- vehemently -- with how we should react, both militarily and diplomatically.

The book's greatest value lies in the broader points that Baer makes -- specifically, the need to move past our preconceptions and recognize that the Iran of 2008 is not the same country that the Shah fled in the midst of a theocracy-led rebellion. It's also valuable to recognize the degree to which our other preconceptions -- that nation states shape identity because being American is at the core of our personal identities -- may distort our ability to negotiate and act in our collective best interests internationally, where very often allegiances have little to do with being a member of a nation-state. Iran is a nation state that is ruled by the clergy -- but it is a Shia nation, with a history stretching back millennia to the days of the Persian emperors, and one whose boundaries stretched over large swathes of territory that myriad other Middle Eastern nations. That past has shaped their world view, just as our battle for liberty from Britain shaped ours -- and we should not fail to recognize the fact and its implications.

There are those who will argue (and have argued in some reviews on this page) that Baer is an apologist for Iran. On the contrary. I don't see any evidence that he is turning a blind eye to Iran's excesses and absuses -- rather that most of those outright terrorist or military aggression lies in the past. (And in his eyes, the regime has lots of popular support at home.) "Iranians murdered my CIA colleagues in Beirut in cold blood," he notes, adding they probably would have killed him as well had they laid hands on him. Unusually, Baer rises above those personal considerations to focus instead on what is possible and achievable, and what is in the best interests of the United States.

This book takes a more forward looking perspective than Baer's two previous non-fiction works. Sometimes he struggles with his multiple roles and identities -- if he is acting as a journalist, he should be able to attribute or provide some evidence for some of his more startling assertions (one example -- that Iran is poised to buy Russian surface-to-air missiles and the two countries are just waiting for Washington to be "distracted" by something to complete the deal). We may be benefitting as readers from Baer's access to sources that few journalists would have -- but we have to take the information he provides on trust. Certainly, this is a book to prod others into discussing the topics that he raises rather than one that can be trusted to provide authoritative answers.

I have given this book four stars rather than three because of the importance of his fundamental argument (versus the sometimes overwrought analysis that accompanies it). Baer is the ultimate pragmatist here: drawing on his knowledge of the region and its players, and an equally pragmatic assessment of our own propensities, he concludes that turning a cold war with Iran into a hot war would be disastrous -- for us. Winning the war is one thing, as he points out in the discussion of Iraq in this book -- winning the peace is far more difficult and something at which, with the possible exception of World War II and the Marshall Plan, we have historically failed at. Even when we have been on the winning sides of a military conflict, our lack of attention to soft power issues harms us. Yes, we drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan -- and in their wake, due in part to our lack of attention and in part to our own lack of understanding of the region and the issues, we helped to create the Taliban. Baer is spot-on in his assessment of what has happened in southern Iraq in the wake of the defeat of Saddam Hussein; while American troops focused on military issues, Iran's emphasis on soft power -- on the Shia identity that they share with residents of Basra and Najaf -- won the loyalty of Iraqis.

Baer's assessment of Iran's actual objectives may be accurate or wobbly, but it is at its core a pragmatic one. "It's time not to surrender, but t rather to deal." If the policy debate can revolve around what is, and what is possible, rather than ideals, as a nation we may all be much better off. He makes a reasonable argument that Iran has shown a willingness to abandon ideology in favor of pragmatic compromises (such as with Sunni groups that share common objectives); why shouldn't we? Even Iran's past terrorist attacks had an element of pragmatism about them, he argues -- they were designed to achieve a policy goal, not random terror for terror's sake.

So where does the utopian come into the picture? Well, at heart, Baer is a utopian, in part because of his belief that such a foreign policy debate based on pragmatism can thrive. And he is a dreamer; perhaps he is looking for some kind of positive outcome to decades of chaos and bloodshed in the region. Why, he muses, couldn't Iran serve as a counterweight to Russia or China throwing their weight around in what is likely to become an increasingly multipolar world? Going further, he wonders, why not turn Jordan into a Palestianan state? Encourage Iraqi Sunnis in Anbar Province to federate with Saudi Arabia, where they have tribal ties? Give Gaza back to Egypt? Hold a referendum in Bahrain, and have it returned to Iran as a province?

It's hard to argue with the fact that the growing array of problems in the Middle East appear to be the most intractable and potentially the most dangerous -- or with the idea that a pragmatic approach is the one that is most likely NOT to end by excacerbating the situation. And Baer's advocacy of that, coupled with his inside knowledge of the region and the intelligence world, is what makes this a valuable read.