Customer Reviews

Disarming Iraq

5 star:		(5)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(5)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This is a remarkably even-handed discussion of the search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and the ensuing Iraq War of 2003. With the patience of a professor outlining an argument on the board, Blix presents all sides of the issues dispassionately and, so far as I can tell, unpartisanly.

Blix originally believed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, and so he eagerly accepted his assignment to head the UN inspection team. He and his searchers targeted the areas that international intelligence agencies assured President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were repositories of weapons. Finding nothing in any of them, Blix began to suspect that both he and the intelligence agencies were mistaken. Failure to find weapons of mass destruction after the fall of Saddam Hussein further convinced Blix that any such weapons that survived the 1991 Iraq War had been destroyed by 1994. Saddam had even offered (finally) documentary evident to that effect in February 2003, but it was too late to prevent the war the following month.

Why, then, did Saddam refuse for the most part to cooperate with UN inspectors? Blix surmises that any number of reasons might've contributed to his stubbornness: pride, a sense of invulnerability, a fear that weapons inspectors were also spies, an unwillingness to accept foreign supervision. Regardless of the possible reasons, however, Blix is convinced that one of them was NOT that Saddam had anything to hide when it came to weapons of mass destruction.

Blix is also convinced that President Bush wouldn't have gone to war had he not been persuaded that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. The war was no vendetta, says Blix, and so wasn't inevitable. Had he been allowed a few more months to inspect, he's certain he could've marshalled sufficient evidence to have prevented the war.

Blix argues that the fall of Saddam is a good thing, but he also concludes that the balance sheet of the war is still in the negative. Getting rid of Saddam is a bonus, but it's outweighed so far by the increase in terrorism, the deaths of both civilians and military personnel in Iraq, and the social turmoil that continues in Iraq. Blix believes that neither the UK nor the US showed sufficient critical judgment in going to war. His final estimation is that there just weren't reasonable grounds for doing so.

A well-documented, excellently-argued book. Highly recommended.

An excellect recounting of the inspection process by the man who was there with no apparent bias. Makes very clear the problem he had with all of the political factions pushing for a particular outcome.

Disarming Iraq by Hans Blix provides some interesting insights into the Iraqi WMD debate from the man in the vortex of that pre-war debate.

As one would suspect from a book written by a scientist cum international bureaucrat, the text is somewhat turgid and at times it takes a bit of slogging to get through the text.

That being said, the book is pretty interesting. The major thing that strikes one, especially given the post-war realization that WMD's weren't in Iraq, is Blix's pre-war conviction, based more on a gut feeling rather than any special insight, data or analysis, that WMD's probably did exist in some significant concentrations.

The other interesting conclusion of the book is Mr. Blix's assertion that the fault for the conflict rests, basically, with Saddam Hussein. Granted, Mr. Blix does have some very pointed, and not very complimentary remarks to make about the positions and actions of Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair. He definitely feels that the inspection process should have been accorded more time to do its work and is pretty critical of some of the timelines the Americans and British placed upon the process. On the other hand, he explicitly points to the fact that the Iraqi regime never, at any time, lived up to either the letter or the spirit of UN resolution 1441. He also agrees that, once the military buildup had reached a critical mass having it simple sit in lace indefinitely was not a viable option for anyone. The 1441 resolution was unanimous, the force was present, the decision to comply or defy rested with Saddam. It was, in effect, says Mr. Blix, Saddam' own obduracy that, in the end, did him in.

In the end what Mr. Blix communicates is an overwhelming sense of frustration. He truly believes that, given a reasonable continuation of proximate implied force and sufficient time, the inspection regime would have worked. The fundamental question, which Blix can present but not answer, is whether, in the final analysis, WMD's were the reason or the pretext for the war. If the former, his argument for more time is persuasive. If the latter, it's irrelevant, as any of a slew of other pretexts could have-and would have-- been concocted by the Americans and British to justify invading.

I doubt this book will change many minds--those who opposed the war will find fodder for their cause. UN haters will simply see evidence of the anti-US bias they always see at the UN. However, for the objective reader--if there are any out there--this is a uniquely informative read.

The book is very good. First of all, this is not a little nobody writing some personal account. This is the man in charge of the UN inspections. Nobody better than him to offer real intelligence to the international community. He and El Baradei were in the ground. They were not sitting in D.C. or the CIA headquarters, thousands of miles away trusting in little bugs and informants. They were there, watching the ground with their eyes. They were willing to double check ALL what the US intelligence had gathered for years. Yet, they found that all that was crap. Take into account that this man started the inspection believing that Iraq HAD WMD. Yet, in the process he got convinced that he was wrong. And that is what apparently exasperated Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. I don't include Bush here because he is the main spokeperson of the administration, not the policy maker (and I am a Republican!). In summary, Blix could have offered the best possible intelligence available by all means. So, whatever the literary accomplishemnts are (I guess he wasn't interested in a Pulitzer), just pay attention to the facts. It will help you fill the gaps in your understanding of what was going on and what is going on now in Iraq. Compare the content of those who gave 1 star to this book and those who gave 4 or 5. And you will see that no matter what review you read, you will end up buying this book.

Every time that Hans Blix, who was in charge of the UN team to disarm Iraq, made a statement to the United Nations Security Council, both hawks and doves found material to support their positions. This book, which tells of his efforts to disarm Iraq from 1991 to 2003, is likely to do the same.

The initial impression is twofold: that the intelligence presented to support the war was questionable; and that Mr. Blix was unlikely to lead the aggressive inspections that the American administration claimed were necessary to find Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Soon, however, there is much more of the first and less of the second.

To be sure, Mr. Blix is a civil servant and not a politician. As such he tries to avoid getting into political discussions; when he does turn political, he is clearly at his weakest. His various jabs, usually aimed at the American government, and his interjections often distract from the narrative and even invite readers to wonder how much his views have colored his professional work (not much is my take).

All the same, Mr. Blix gives a very balanced assessment of the pre-war intelligence. He admits that his gut feeling was that Saddam Hussein did have weapons of mass destruction. But he argues that there was never any concrete evidence to support that hypothesis; and he goes point-by-point to the various facts claimed by the Americans, British, and his own team to substantiate his position.

In all, "Disarming Iraq" is neither an easy read nor burdensome. Much of the information in the book is in the public domain; yet the way that Mr. Blix has brought everything together, alongside with his commentary and perspective, is undoubtedly going to make "Disarming Iraq" an indispensable read on the war in Iraq.

For some reason this book did not generate a lot of interest but the book was actually a good read. I learned a few new things from a different perspective and would recommend the book to get an alternative viewpoint.

In summary his basic comments were that Iraq was not a threat and it was essentially contained and dis-armed since 1992, and the inspectors should have been allowed to complete their mission. Personally I found his arguments compelling and it seems to me that a month or two here or there would have made little difference since Iraq was not in compliance for almost 10 years or more and a few months more was not that important. The book can be read in one evening and it is mostly a good light read, and you will not be disappointed. Often I give away my books, but I kept the Blix book.

In any case, to check on Iraq and the WMD's the UN hired Hans Blix late in 2002. Dr. Blix is not the most dynamic guy but he is solid. He was a Swedish diplomat, US educated at Columbia where his son goes now, low key, highly competent, and he was the IAEA chief for twenty years - now just retired. On paper he is a world expert. Blix was subject to a lot of criticism in some US media and by Vice President Cheney who called the inspectors "useless" and Blix was portrayed as a bungling fool like the famous French detective Inspector Cluseau in a Peter Sellers movie. But really this is far from being an accurate portrayal. He was in fact head of the IAEA for 20 years and one of the world's experts on nuclear programs. This book is Blix's chance to answer his critics all in his own words, no media translation.

As a book it is an easy to read and surprisingly fast moving. It covers the inspectors, Resolution 1441, talks with the US and others, the spring deadline of 2003 and the start of the Iraq invasion - all from his perspective. I thought it might be a bit plodding but it is not. It is a quick light read of about 275 pages and very well written that can be mostly covered in one evening. In short it is a good book and deserves at least 4 stars.

The book is excellent but probably not as good as the book by Craig Unger - House of Bush, House of Saud. That is the best read of the current crop of books. Also the Richard Clarke book is better, but the Blix book is up near the top of the list and I think that it is a must read. I made a 25 book listmania list of the best books on the subject or closely related. But a book review is no substitute for reading the book.

Worth the buy and the read. Recommend.

After nearly three years, we seem to have accepted the common wisdom that the intelligence was manipulated and Bush/Cheney convinced the American public, and especially the Congress, that Saddam was a threat that couldn't wait. Funny, but that's not the way I remember it.

There were a lot of people who questioned the cherry-picked intelligence at the time. Richard Clarke, for instance. And Brent Scowcroft. Most of the rest of the world, as represented by the United Nations, wanted to continue weapons inspections. With Saddam boxed in by no-fly zones, weapons inspectors, and a ton of spy technology aimed at Iraq, he really wasn't much of an immediate threat, and most people knew it. Still, it is interesting to revisit those pre-war days, just to make sure I didn't imagine the whole thing.

Hans Blix spent a lifetime as a diplomat, and as you would expect, he couches his criticisms in pleasant-sounding phrases. Much of the time he does just that, but every now and then, he lets fly with a real, unadulterated opinion. Near the end of Disarming Iraq, he "suggests" that Tony Blair and George Bush and their advisors misled the public by asserting categorically that weapons of mass destruction existed. In the world of international diplomacy, I suppose that is what passes for a slap in the face.

In the run up to the war, there was a lot of behind-the-scenes maneuvering and endless analysis by pundits and the press. It is fascinating to be able to read one inside player's report on what was said in those private meetings. I was surprised to find that Blix has great regard and admiration for Condoleezza Rice. I was less surprised to find that he has respect and perhaps pity for Colin Powell, and no use at all for Dick Cheney or Paul Wolfowitz.

Blix is thorough in describing the history of arms inspection and the history of the U.N.'s dealings with Iraq. Certainly this is useful and important information, but for me the appeal of Disarming Iraq is the description of what was happening in the weeks and days before Iraq was invaded in 2003.

Blix's accounts of his meetings with Cheney and Wolfowitz are chilling. Cheney coldly threatens him by telling him that if his weapons inspectors don't find some evidence and fast, Cheney will not hesitate to discredit Blix. Blix's meeting with Tony Blair is less chilling (Blair offered him crumpets), and the meeting with Bush, revealing.

Blix, in ultra-diplomatic mode here, writes of how Bush's manner contrasted sharply with that of Cheney's, how he makes a "boyish impression" and "frequently changes his posture in his chair." He told Blix and ElBaradei that he was no wild Texan bent on war, that he would let the Security Council talk about a resolution, but not for long. Bush "mentioned the League of Nations." You get a picture here of Bush, impatient and fidgety, making non-sequiturs about the League of Nations, and eager to get this useless meeting out of the way.

It isn't surprising that congressmembers and senators would like to think (or would like us to think) that they couldn't have known what was really going on, but even people like Blix, who says he thought Iraq had weapons programs, could see that in March, 2003, there was no need for an invasion.

Issues raised, but not entirely answered are:

1. Saddam was given the task of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had no weapons of mass destruction. Was that a fair requirement?

2. How proper is it to start a war after giving evidence for its necessity that would not stand up in court?

3. Why were certain US government officials so determined to put forward, publicly, weak evidence of weapons of mass destruction, despite warnings from their military and intelligence experts that the interpretation of the evidence was not clear?

It is clear to me that these issues will recur in the future. Blix gives a good account of their history in the Iraq situation. I am convinced from it, that the US policy was not the result of intelligence failures but the failure to be intelligent.

In all of the distortion of facts, lying and obfuscation that occurred surrounding the Iraq war Hans Blix came out with a highly tarnished reputation. Yet, he was truly a great diplomats and statesmen.

In Disarming Iraq, Blix gives account of his experiences leading up to the war. He does so in a manner that is unbiased and pluralistic. I suspect in times to come this book will be held as one of the authoritative accounts of the lead up to the war.

Without going into the details of this book there is really little else that I can say. Blix's account is a truthful relation of his experiences that he dealt with in a critical and unprejudiced frame of mind. This book is well suited to anyone who is interested in the politics leading up to the war. However informative, it is a bit dry and not the most entertaining read so it would not be appropriate for people who are interested in partisan rhetoric.

A few notes on Blix's book [i]Disarming Iraq - The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction[/i]. He was 'director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997' ... and from 2000-2003 'executive director of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission' until the inspections were suspended in March 2003'. Published 2004, and in paperback 2005 with an added chapter 'After War: Weapons of Mass Disappearance'.

I'd received the impression that Blix was an honest broker, a serious hard-working chap with the interests of humanity at the forefront of his Swedish democratic mind. This book (a charity shop purchase!) shows he's just another part of the problem.

Just a few notes:
* He has no doubts at all about 9/11, or 'September 11' as it's indexed. For someone investigating technical issues, this alone shows he's useless.
* He has no doubts (and produces no evidence) that Iraq was the most murderous regime since WW2 - [i]One of the bloodiest regimes the world has seen was eliminated. ... a giant statue of him [Saddam Hussein] was felled.. before the ... television cameras of the whole world.[/i] The naive detail about the statue - the accompanying detail was of course faked - is typical of Blix. What about mass slaughter in eastern Europe, in India and Bengal, in Nigeria, in Vietnam and Cambodia?
* Israel is only mentioned twice; there is nothing on Vanunu or 'ZOG' - this must be deliberate censorship policy on Blix's part, since anyone serious about nuclear matters must have views on Vanunu.
* He gives absurd unevidenced descriptions, which is standard media policy of course. Such and such a man is a 'brilliant negotiator', for example. People like Blair, Rice, Colin Powell are given this sort of unhelpful treatment.
* It's suggestive of his mentality that laughably irrelevant personal stuff is included - an operation, what his wife thought, how his hotel had no satellite link - but not whether this mattered.
* His accounts of UN procedures, such as they are, are impossible to judge reliably; there are anonymous briefings, meetings, reports, but no way to tell the status of these events.

Looking over this book, and considering his 16 or so years heading the IEAE, one has to wonder if he was just a gullible simpleton, or a carefully selected well-informed front man. Obviously it's easiest just to arrange promotion for someone naive - they never need know. But there's a risk that search a person might awaken and latch onto some topic and not leave it alone.

I'm not even sure it's his own book. The English is formally correct - for example he distinguishes 'illicit' from 'elicit', something many English speakers can't do. How heavily edited was this book? I don't know; but its mass deception is painful to read.