Disarming Iraq: Monitoring Power and Resistance [Hardcover]

Michael V. Deaver (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0275972615 | ISBN-13: 978-0275972615 | Publication Date: August 30, 2001

The implementation of disarmament requirements imposed by the Security Council after the Second Gulf War established a strong and unequal power relationship between the United Nations and Iraq. Although the ensuing struggle over imposed disarmament has been a major issue in world politics, international relations theorists continue to ignore it. Deaver argues that this case has important theoretical implications. Using sociological insights and a behavioral approach, he examines the power relationship as well as Iraqi resistance from 1991 to 1998. Theorists are likely to find these analytic tools useful since they provide a ready means of studying the micro-foundations of power relations in generalized terms. Behavior such as supervision, surveillance, inspection, and monitoring are widespread and growing in world politics. A focus on tactics demonstrates the role of monitoring in maintaining and strengthening the relationship between the United Nations and Iraq. An analysis of dynamics makes comprehensible Iraqi losses of sovereignty and the eventual collapse of the relationship. Contrary to popular opinion, whoever escalated tensions hurt their own cause: Iraqi resistance contributed greatly to United Nations gains, while the United Nations successes led to the collapse of its relationship with Iraq.

Editorial Reviews

Review

“This study offers a rare insight into the diplomatic and military postures each side has taken over the last decade....a fascinating story in itself....Recommended for upper-division undergraduates and above.”–Choice

About the Author

MICHAEL V. DEAVER is Visiting Lecturer and Academic Coordinator of the Civic Education Project in Russia.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 168 pages
• Publisher: Praeger Publishers (August 30, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0275972615
• ISBN-13: 978-0275972615
• Product Dimensions: 9.7 x 6.2 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 15.5 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #4,661,070 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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2.0 out of 5 stars Disarming Iraq: Monitoring Power and Resistance, March 9, 2006

By 

Michael Rubin "Middle East Quarterly" (Washington, DC) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Disarming Iraq: Monitoring Power and Resistance (Hardcover)

Saddam Hussein has posed the United Nations (U.N.) with its greatest test since the Korean War. Security Council Resolution 687 may have mandated that Iraq eliminate its chemical and biological weapons programs and curtail its ballistic missile capability, but Saddam has treated U.N. weapons inspections with disdain, routinely preventing full, unfettered access, and finally, in 1998, refusing to comply altogether.

Deaver, academic coordinator at the Civic Education Project in Russia, correctly identifies international diplomacy's failure to limit Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program as worthy of study. Rather than analyze the history of the inspections regime or detail the U.N. Special Commission's success and failure, however, he examines power relationships, resistance, and the applicability of academic theory.

Disarming Iraq begins with a succinct overview of Iraq's weapons programs and the international response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (though his summary does little more than regurgitate Anthony Cordesman's uneven work). However, some of Deaver's subsequent speculation is curious. Who outside the sheltered world of academe would state that Saddam objected to chemical and biological weapons disarmament out of fear of being left defenseless in a tough neighborhood? (The Iraqi army retained its sizeable conventional forces and those ballistic missiles with under 150-kilometer range.)

Deaver then examines the monitoring duel between Iraq and the U.N., relying almost entirely on U.N. documents and granting them a legitimacy possible only from someone who has never observed U.N. fieldwork firsthand. Analyzing U.N. monitoring in isolation, Deaver fails to consider how the U.N.'s willingness to compromise encouraged Saddam's widespread obstruction. For example, in May 1996, the U.N. and Baghdad agreed to a memorandum of understanding diluting the substance of Security Council resolutions to enable the oil-for-food program. Iraqis who I interviewed repeatedly pointed out that if the U.N. responds to Saddam's obstruction by reducing his obligations, then Saddam will simply increase obstruction with regard to the weapons program the U.N. holds most dear.

Also missing in Deaver's study is any attention to Saddam's trade politics. It is no secret that Saddam directed billions of dollars in oil-for-food contracts to France, Russia, and key Arab states in exchange for Paris, Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus turning a blind eye to unrestrained erosion in sanctions.

Disarming Iraq is an example of academic self-absorption that provides little satisfaction to real-world international relations practitioners. It illustrates the growing schism between university and practical politics. Theory should never substitute for on-the-ground research.

Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2003