Customer Reviews

Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security

5 star:		(12)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

If you're not angry when you finish reading "Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security," then you didn't read it carefully enough. Written by two Wall Street Journal reporters -- Christopher Cooper and Robert Block -- this book offers context for the federal government's failed response to Hurricane Katrina last year.

Anyone who's ever worked for the federal government won't be surprised to learn that operational results are often less than the sum of their bureaucratic and even well-meaning parts.

But finger-pointers take note: Highlighting the federal government's miserable performance is not tantamount to forgiving an ineffective state and local response. Identifying federal failures merely confirms that, in the end, there's more than enough blame to go around.

"Disaster" is about much more than the anguished wait of those at the Superdome or the Convention Center for days after last August's storm. It's about the bureaucratic bungling that eventually led to FEMA being utterly unprepared to handle the crisis it faced last summer.

"Disaster" is more than a history of failure of the levees and floodgates around New Orleans. It's a detailed recounting of how different arms of the federal government failed to protect an urban population for which it had primary responsibility and how, once disaster struck, that same federal government demonstrated itself to be equally incapable of offering aid.

Aside from a slow-motion retelling of the mistakes that led to the crisis that was post-Katrina New Orleans, "Disaster" is also a disturbing articulation of how national emphasis on homeland security (read: protection against terror attacks) seems to have come at the expense of preparing for the more likely scenarios of hurricanes, floods, fires and earthquakes.

Given the volume of resources hurled at the Department of Homeland Security since its formation after September 11, it may be reasonable to expect that department to handle disasters of both types, but the book's most damning message comes from its conclusion:

"When disaster strikes, we are all on our own."

"Disaster" is a superb, authoritative work that readers of any (or no) political persuasion can appreciate. It focuses on the federal response to the disaster--a catastrophe within a catastrophe--but also gives an excellent background on the history of FEMA and of the levee system around New Orleans. I am from New Orleans. I have read many books on Hurricane Katrina and about the levees, the river, and Louisiana's environmental and ecological predicament. Cooper and Block know New Orleans (Cooper lived there 10+ years as a Times-Picayune reporter) and they know FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security. This is a book of reportage: the authors manage very well to keep opinions out and let the facts speak for themselves. They show that the 80% evacuation of metro New Orleans was a resounding, unprecedented success; that the Bush administration severely and repeatedly cut federal funding for ongoing reinforcements of the city's flood protection system; and that the U.S. government through the Army Corps of Engineers failed to protect the city, whose citizens never imagined the canals' floodwalls would ever collapse. Cooper and Block also show that placing FEMA within the counterterrorist Department of Homeland Security reduces its effectiveness as a disaster response agency. Michael "Brownie" Brown had his flaws, but he at least recognized that FEMA needed better funding and more flexibility as a disaster response agency. Now FEMA is ignored down in DHS's basement while DHS secretary Chertoff, along with the administration he serves, concentrates on counterterrorism--an important job but less frequently needed than response to natural disasters. By letting the facts speak for themselves, and without directly so advocating, Cooper and Block's account makes a strong case for restoring the independence of FEMA and returning its director to the cabinet-level status that James Lee Witt was granted during the Clinton administration. This is a richly documented work by veteran reporters who have no particular agenda but the improved protection of Americans everywhere. As they demonstrate, if New Orleans is not safe, neither is any other major American city. --www.LeveesNotWar.org

As a New Orleanian who lost "everything" to the faulty levees, I have followed this story closely for a year, and have read as much as possible about the episode. Even so, I highlighted practically every page of this book. It did an excellent job of busting myths and providing context, in a surprisingly absorbing but factual narrative.

Here's as plain as I can put it: Cooper and Block have written the finest "top-down" book on Katrina to date, and I don't expect it to be surpassed anytime soon.

The research is impeccable, and I would love for the D.C.-area (1-time reviewers) who pan this book to give examples of the "fictions" about which they complain. Not only is "Disaster" must-reading for anyone who cares about the Katrina story but, also, for anyone who is interested in the priorities and effectiveness of the Dept. Homeland Security.

I give this work my highest recommendation.

Cooper and Block begin by reviewing the years of complacent and misdirected efforts by those responsible for levee and floodwall maintenance, then proceeding to the disaster itself, followed by the subsequent finger-pointing and continuing malfeasance.

President Bush's first budget (2001) proposed cutting .5 million from FEMA's $2.5 billion. He also reversed Clinton's precedent of putting someone experienced in charge, and returned to Bush I's placing an inexperienced politico in charge - ending up with the Hurricane Andrew disaster). This appointee (Allbaugh), in turn, drove out many talented and experienced Witt protégés. Then, in 2004 federal, state, and local officials participated in a large-scale planning exercise (Hurricane Pam) in preparation for a severe hurricane striking New Orleans. While better than most (and close to what happened in Katrina), it ended up as only the latest of many such exercises - accepted with little comment and filed on a shelf. Then came 2005 and the real thing - Hurricane Katrina.

Saturday evening the mid-level FEMA manager in New Orleans (the only representative on-site) realized that efforts were less intense than appropriate - eg. there was not even an effort to organize a bus evacuation. Fortunately, the lead government weather forecaster took the initiative to call local and state leaders to motivate their getting more serious. Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin then appealed to N.O. ministers to emphasize evacuation, and their self-help message got many out. Meanwhile, the Superdome had no food stockpiled, FEMA's pre-staged supplies were three hours away, limited to one day's worth of food and 50 generators (half that promised in the Pam exercise), and included no buses (vs. 400 buses and 800 drivers called for in Pam).

The Louisiana National Guard (LNG) center had never flooded in 170+ years - yet, it was under 8 feet of water 7:30 A.M. Monday, rendering its high water transport trucks unusable. Chertoff, Bush, etc. later maintained the levees didn't breach until the day after the storm. However, this major break was reported to FEMA at 7:30 A.M. by the New Orleans' disaster chief, and by 8 A.M. TSA reported to the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) that the Industrial Canal was breached. Unfortunately, the Army Corp of Engineers (COE) representative buried the topic in page 5 of a 6-page report that covered pay and congratulatory prose more prominently. The local FEMA man cadged two late Monday afternoon chopper rides to get a better assessment - saw water over most of the city, people on rooftops, and a quarter-mile levee gash - his report to HSOC was discounted as hype.

Tuesday: Efforts to have the Pentagon fly in 8 water rescue teams from California failed - Rumsfeld could not be located (was at a ballgame). Brown videoconferences Bush, Chertoff, Cheney at 8:30 A.M. Tuesday - 90% of N.O. people displaced, job "too big for FEMA and the LNG." Mayor Nagin then gave FEMA's Michael Brown a list of equipment and support needed, and later that morning Governor Blanco requested buses to get people out of the Superdome. (Due to paperwork, etc. delays they did not begin to show up until Friday A.M.) COE officers saw a several hundred feet long breech in the 17th St. Canal, with a small state crew tossing 25 lb. sandbags into the breech (immediately swept back out) - asked if they needed help, and when they said "No," left the area and did not become involved for two more days. Secretary Chertoff became angered that Brown did not answer his phone, and when he finally got through, ordered him to the FEMA communications center in Baton Rouge (located there because the staff did not realize that dry roads existed into N.O.).

Blanco's assistant spends most of the day getting Pentagon approval to use four idling choppers at Fort Polk - after finally succeeding, is unable to use them because the pilots' allowable "flight hours" were exhausted. FEMA promises buses will arrive Wed. at 7 A.M., so Governor Blanco's staff drops there efforts to get buses. Meanwhile, requests for Gulfport, MS. evacuees to get water/ice were delayed 36 hours - the trucks sate 43 miles away while paperwork was completed. (Similar results for the requested generators to operate their sewage system.)

Wednesday: At noon the buses had not arrived, nor was there any word about where they were. A chopper sent up to look for them did find 35 school buses marshaled through Blanco's efforts (FEMA discouraged their use - not comfortable enough), and directed them to proceed. By this time it was clear that FEMA was making things worse by not living up to its promises - thus delaying real help.

Blanco had also asked Bush for 40,000 troops to help with logistics and rescue efforts - late that night General Honore arrived with a staff of about twelve to "survey" the situation.

Thursday: FEMA withdrew its staff by noon out of fear of violence - greatly overstated by many, including the N.O. Police Chief. This also delayed delivering food to the Convention Center and Superdome. Meanwhile, the HSOC was unaware of the Convention Center crisis - thought was part of the Superdome; regardless, Broderick (its leader) refused to forward any information that did not come from what he thought to be a reliable source. FEMA had been working to start airline evacuations - delays due to working out schedules and destinations, TSA insisting on searching all passengers and luggage and the presence of undercover air marshals stretched out to take up two more days.

Near midnight, Mississippi learns that only 86 of the 900 trucks promised were on the road. Meanwhile, Brown finds himself increasingly irrelevant as Governor Blanco brings in his highly respected FEMA predecessor (James Witt), Chertoff assigns his deputy to be in charge, and the Army ignores him.

Friday: The buses start arriving. HSOC gets the Convention Center situation wrong again - claims only 1,000 there, with food and water. Bush twice tries to get Blanco to federalize the disaster (just as things were starting to work out) - Blanco suspects he is trying to grab credit at this point, and refuses. (Mississippi's Governor also refused - neither governor saw any added resources that would result.)

Saturday: President Bush announces the 82nd Airborne was being sent to N.O. - they had been waiting for days. Negotiations to bring in cruise ships for temporary housing bogs down - could not agree whether the Pentagon or FEMA was in charge. Rations arrived from Germany, but were immediately impounded by the FDA, pending inspection. A Wal-Mart executive calls to complain about the National Guard looting its warehouses - a mid-level FEMA manager defuses the anger by getting Wal-Mart (with its excellent distribution and tracking system) to supply needs and bill later. The manager is later threatened by FEMA lawyers, and resigns when a similar proposal is turned down.

Afterwards: The last of the trailers FEMA ordered for shelter will be produced in 3.5 years - no matter, they do not comply with flood-plain regulations (should have been campers), so they all sit on an Arkansas field. FEMA contracts for roof repair provide highly inflated funds for middle-men.

"Disaster" ends with stories of some of the local officials and volunteers that just jumped into the fray with a "get it done" attitude. Unfortunately, their excellence is not able to make up for FEMA's ineptness. So, FEMA then busied itself by trying to take over management of several subsequent minor hurricanes (irritating competent local leaders), and trying to shift the blame to Louisiana and New Orleans' officials.

Many books have been written and many more will be written about the causes, effects, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. I have even outlined one myself, though I doubt it will come to fruition. Among such a large company, Cooper and Block have done an outstanding job of cataloging and analyzing the failures of the Federal response. They sound clearly the warning bell that the Federal government is ill-prepared to support disaster operations, particularly in the less-prepared states.

They have put together a wonderful timeline of events before, during, and after Katrina. They noted such contextual factors as the local response to Hurricane Dennis, which has been overwhelmingly ignored by the national media. As an early Katrina evacuee, I found it very interesting how much debate was going on in Washington, even as my family was on the evacuation trail.

No book could comprehensively cover a disaster the scale of Katrina. The authors made only passing attempts to chronicle the activities of local and state officials, and those only when the activities impacted the Federal decisions or efforts. They also kept the focus largely on New Orleans, while noting the similarities to the response in other areas. Their narrowness of focus is both a strength and a weakness. The book did not address the fundamental philosophical issues of the role of government in storm response.

The authors have done a wonderful job of providing insight into the personalities and organizations that shaped the national response effort. The chapter on people who worked around the system was an extremely good read as evidence that good people can make a difference when they do the right thing. Overall, the book is worth the read just for the insight into the Katrina timeline from a Federal perspective.

This account doesn't rely on sensationalism, but instead meticulously documents and cites every source in constructing what really happened before, during, and after Katrina.

If I was a prosecuting attorney, and I read this book, I would start seeking indictments for many, led by Michael Brown and Matthew Broderick.

Of all the Katrina books I have read, and all the shoddy, sensationalistic tv documentaries, this one stands out at the top of the heap. It's factual, and probably the fastest read of any non-fiction book I've read in years.

Every American with a conscience and even those without one should read this book. Many people still think that it was hurricane that flooded New Orleans. It wasn't. Now, I'm thick headed and share some the stupidity currently in fashion in this great country of ours, but I'm not that stupid. This book tells the true tale of the greatest and most shameful Man-Made disaster in the history of this country. So goes New Orleans, so goes the rest of the mythic melting pot. Read this now. You'll know a lot more about what really happened and continues to happen.

This is a well written tale of how government can get out of touch with reality.

I was completely flabbergasted by the obsession for irrelevant detail Mathew Broderick demanded in the Homeland Security Operations Center. I thought the Marines worked from the idea of the 70% Solution. On the battlefield or in a Disaster you are never going to have the full picture. You just have to go to war with the 70% you do know. This is well covered in "Corps Business: The 30 Management Principles of the U.S. Marines" by David H. Freedman.

The hero of the book for me was Craig Fugate the man who rose from being a firefighter and paramedic to become Florida's Emergency Manager. It is a tragedy for you Americans that he did not take the post of head of FEMA.

At the end of the day the message you get from this book is you are on your own. You might want to dust off your copies of Mel Tappan "On Survival" after you read this.

I say this because the book was very difficult to put down, certainly surprising because it is reporting on a recent event with known results. Certainly, the book is not a dry recitation of events.

I will say this right off - some of my opinions about who was at fault from the Federal response changed as a result of reading the book. I am less inclined to blame the Bush White house (and I am no fan of Bush Administration). However, it is also plainly obvious that the response failed on Federal, State and local levels - primarily because of bureaucracy. This is not to say that some things went well - New Orleans was 80% evacuated for example when the storm hit.

The authors have also listed many of their references both in the book and on their website. Two of the big ones are readily accessible on the Internet - the Bipartisan report and the White house report. Anyone may review those documents who care to. The link is:

http://www.disasterthebook.com/links/

Yes, this book provided an in-depth review of Hurricane Katrina, pre and post.
It accounts for all the key players. It hurls blame at all the same people.

What the book DOESN'T do is explain why the rest of the Gulf Coast, hit as badly as was New Orleans, did not have 1000s of people waiting for FEMA buses, didn't have mass looting, and returned to normal much faster than did New Orleans. Indeed, N.O. is a "chocolate" city, as Mayor Nagin declared, and like all chocolate cities, it is full of people who have come to expect government to help them in all areas of their lives. The "vanilla" Gulf Coast saw community groups helping community members, without a government handout.

The problem with New Orleans was that is was New Orleans, governed for 30 straight years by Democrats. The chaos during and after Katrina is a reflection of a Dem city, filled with people with a hand out.

An epilogue to Katrina is that crime in New Orleans decreased markedly, but crime in Houston increased markedly, as N.O. residents settled in Houston and began doing what they knew how to do: take free things and hurt each other.