The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science [Paperback]

John Dupré (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 19, 1995 | ISBN-10: 0674212614 | ISBN-13: 978-0674212619

The great dream of philosophers and scientists for millennia has been to give us a complete account of the order of things. A powerful articulation of such a dream in this century has been found in the idea of a unity of science. With this manifesto, John Dupré systematically attacks the ideal of scientific unity by showing how its underlying assumptions are at odds with the central conclusions of science itself. In its stead, the author gives us a metaphysics much more in keeping with what science tells us about the world. Elegantly written and compellingly argued, this provocative book will be important reading for all philosophers and scholars of science.

Editorial Reviews

Review

Dupré's book is original, lucid and confident, without being eccentric, polemical or arrogant. It deserves close attention...Dupré insists that there is no general scientific method, process, or attitude...He pins down the notion of the unity of science as a form of scientism appropriate only to a Utopia or to totalitarianism. He notes that 'paradoxically, with the disunity of science comes a kind of unity of knowledge.' That is why, to my mind, this is just the kind of philosophical teaching that is needed to close the gap between the two cultures.
--John Ziman (Nature )

The thesis of 'disorder' has revolutionary implications for the practice of science...[This book] should be read by every student of the subject as an antidote to current philosophical correctness, and it should indeed suggest to professionals that many of the fashionable empires of analytic philosophy as well as philosophy of science are not well-clothed.
--Mary Hesse (International Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science )

About the Author

John Dupré is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University and the editor of The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality.

Product Details

• Paperback: 320 pages
• Publisher: Harvard University Press (March 19, 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0674212614
• ISBN-13: 978-0674212619
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 2.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #849,206 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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35 of 54 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars A rather blase work, January 8, 2000

By 

D. Roberts "Hadrian12" (Battle Creek, Michigan United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science (Paperback)

This book is primarily an attack on reductionism. It is not the first such attack, and I am quite sure it will not be the last. The subtitle suggests that its scope will cover sundry branches of science (Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of science). However, that is a bit misleading. The primary discipline which Dupre engages is biology, with a few references (in passing) to quantum mechanics along the way. Not that this is bad, mind you, but those who are looking for a book that deals with the philosophy of science in general as opposed to just biology should look elsewhere. Overall, I found this a rather boring book. Not a bad book, but boring. It seemed to be on the redundant side & I can pretty much sum-up its thesis in one sentence: there are too many variables at work for reductionism to be a plausible working paradigm in the taxonomy of species. Dupre believes that too many times the classification of species is not as straightforward as one would think, but are instead based on the personal preferences of biologists rather than on barriers supplied by Nature. In other words, all (or most all) boundaries imposed by scientists to categorize species are inconsistant and are at best artificial. The faults of Reductionism are nothing new anyone involved in the philosophy of science, but Dupre does do a good job of expanding on and giving his own spin to some of the more trenchant objections to the paradigm. All in all, I would only suggest this book if one has a keen interest in either biology or the philosophy of science. A lack of enthusiasm in either of these areas is likely to make this book a tedious read.