This monograph series is dedicated to publishing works that systematically analyze legal-economic issues. The series intends to formulate and/or criticize alternative theories of law and economics including the new law and economics, the economics of property rights, institutionalist and neo-institutionalist law and economics, and public choice theory. This series will also analyze a variety of public policy issues related to the interface between judicial decisions and/or statutory law and the economy. It will explore the economic impact of political and legal changes brought about by technology and environmental concerns and examine deregulation from a legal/economic perspective. Finally the series will analyze the systematic effects of legal change on incentives and economic performance. This volume takes for its subject the resolution of disputes and arrival at settlements. The search for efficient paths to settlement remains as critical as the problem is complex. A better understanding of the impediments to settlement is needed to facilitate the development of rules and policies designed to bridge the settlement gap. This book presents theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to support or dismiss various reasons for settlement breakdown and proposed methods of encouraging settlement. Subjects range from settlement behaviour to allocation of legal costs and from legal bargaining to arbitration techniques.
David A. Anderson received his B.A. at the University of Michigan and his M.A. and Ph.D. at Duke University. He is currently the Paul G. Blazer Professor of Economics at Centre College, Kentucky, USA. His scholarly articles address the valuation of environmental assets, natural resource dispute resolution, and the determinants of municipal solid waste, among other topics.
