Customer Reviews

Divided Government (New Topics in Politics Series)

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An interesting book. . . . As usual, Morris Fiorina is something of a contrarian. He examines "divided government" and comes to a different conclusion than many citizens, pundits, and political scientists.

What is divided government? When different branches are under different party control. For instance, there was a time when, under Bill Clinton, Democrats controlled the White House and Republicans the House of Representatives. Or Dwight Eisenhower, an R, had to contend with both the House and Senate in Democratic hands. That's divided government. The standard view is that this produces gridlock and an inability by government to "get things done."

Fiorina addresses this in a number of ways. For one, he observes that divided government has been around for a long time. He notes that there have been several time periods featuring considerable divided government: 1840-1860; 1874-1896; 1952-1992 (and beyond).

Second, he observes that divided government does not prevent major action from being taken. During those three periods, even when divided government existed, many major pieces of legislation were passed.

He also asks why divided government occurs. Is it because voters don't trust either party with full power and create divided government as a check? Or. . . . What?

A provocative work. It helps the reader think about less obvious aspects of divided government. . . .

Fiorina contends that divided government has become the norm in American politics, especially in the form of a Republican executive and a Democratic legislature. He attempts to explain why divided government occurs, and the subsequent consequences.
Fiorina explains divided government from two directions. The first suggests that divided government stems from "structural or otherwise nonpolitical features of the political process and/or institutions that advantage one party relative to another" (156). The second suggests that a "balancing logic" shapes the vote choice of individuals and leads them to "split" their vote between the two parties.
In regards to structural or nonpolitical features, Fiorina claims that the professionalization of legislatures - higher salaries, longer sessions, full-time careers - have lowered the benefits of serving in office for Republican candidates, while increasing the benefits for Democrats. He contends that full-time careers "have higher opportunity costs for Republicans, who have more attractive alternatives in business and the professions" (58). On the other hand, for Democrats, full-time public service is a sound move as opposed to their usual career alternatives. Furthermore, like Jacobson and Kernel (1983), Fiorina argues that "once Republicans fall to minority states [the result of poor candidates], their chances of achieving programmatic or ideological goals decline, further diminishing the attractiveness of a legislative career" (58).
In regards to "balancing logic," Fiorina contends that voters choose divided government intentionally. He discusses three balancing models. First, voters may tend to see Republicans as better at macro-economic and defense issues, while Democrats are perceived as likely to ensure more equitable distribution of goods and services, hence the division between a Republican executive, and Democratic legislature. Second, Fiorina poses a model based on desire for change, that is, - especially at the state level - when voters are no longer happy with the current state of affairs; it is far easier to change one executive than a full legislature. Third, Fiorina examines a model with examines how ideologies are balanced. Party polarization affects ticket-splitting. He writes, "When the parties are relatively close, near the center of gravity of the electorate, ticket-splitting declines. When the parties move away from each other...they open up a large policy range in which ticket-splitting is the voter response" (81). In part, this stems from the fact that moderates are the most likely ticket splitters.
Fiorina also examines the consequence of divided government. In particular, he takes issues with the premise that divided government may promote inefficiencies, and may obscure "the accountability of government officials for policies adopted and outcomes realized during their tenure" (85). This is counter to arguments of many adhering the responsible parties' model of government. Fiorina also claims that divided governments are no more activist than their unified counterparts, and that both are about the same in regards to productivity. In part, this is supported by Jones (1994) in that legislating continues regardless of executive. Furthermore, Fiorina claims we do not see a disproportionate level of confirmation rejections by the Senate. He also illustrates that divided governments may break up "Iron Triangles," issue networks, etc. especially when the party of the executive differs from the congressman involved and conflict occurs.

Fiorina's classic work is both insightful and simple. Divided Government changed the way I think about American politics, yet the concepts are remarkably easy to understand. A must read for students of American government.

Fiorina's text provides a straightforward and concise explanation of why the U.S. has experienced an increase in divided government (i.e. a President of one party and a Congress dominated by the opposite party) after World War II. In critiquing the ideas of James Sundquist (and others), Fiorina examines competing explanations for this phenomenon and ponders what this ultimately means for America. An indispensible read for both the political science student and the lay reader interested in understanding the composition of American government.