11 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Great effort, but not all right, May 27, 2011
This review is from: Divorce and Remarriage in the Church: Biblical Solutions for Pastoral Realities (Paperback)
David Instone-Brewer's book, Divorce and Remarriage in the Church, offers a fresh approach to the issue of divorce and remarriage. Unlike traditional interpretation, Instone-Brewer argues that the Bible not only allows divorce on the ground of adultery, but also other grounds such as violence. By using his knowledge of the customs of the first century Palestine, he claims that the traditional interpretation has misread the relevant biblical passages. In this review, I will attempt to examine whether his argument is convincing or not.
Praise
One of the most helpful advices Instone-Brewer (I-B) gives in this book is for the church not to judge who is guilty or who is innocent in a divorce. (p. 114) Outsiders are really incapable of making such judgment. In most cases, there is no one who is completely innocent or guilty. The church should teach them principles about marriages, and let them deal with their sins before God. Even in instances where reconciliation is impossible, forgiveness should be granted. In practical situations, however, I-B leaves a loophole untreated. He says, "... a believer should only divorce if they have biblical grounds ... and that all divorcees may remarry unless their innocent ex-partner wants a reconciliation." (p. 159) But how does the church decide if the ex-partner is innocent or not? It is a problem that needs to be resolved, but I-B does not get into.
Thanks to his research, I-B clears up a lot of misunderstandings of the first century Palestinian cultural values. Remarriage was clearly allowed then, but later generations interpreted the silence of the Scripture to mean prohibition of remarriage. To aid his argument, in Chapter Seven, I-B offers a strong case against the idea that marriage relationship always lasts lifelong. He mentions several passages that have been traditionally used to argue for the permanence of marriage and prohibition of remarriage except in cases of death of the partner, and repudiates such interpretation.
Regarding the criteria for a valid divorce, I have some criticisms, which are presented below.
Criticism
I-B says that after his Ph.D. work, he has become aware of the cultural background of the NT Bible, and thus can read relevant biblical passages in a different light, and his findings make sense to him. He offers an example in Chap. One. Churches have been saying that Jesus said, "Those whom God has joined, no man can separate." But he could not find it in the Bible. Instead, the Bible says, "let no one separate." (Matt. 19:6) Thus divorce is possible, but discouraged, and divorce is simply recognizing the reality of the broken marriage vows, thus no guilt should be put on the victim who initiates divorce.
I have several responses. First, there are not many churches that claim that marriage is permanent, as I-B implies. Most of them recognize that marriage ends upon death or can end upon adultery. Secondly, though I agree that victim should not be blamed for initiating divorce, this is not a necessary conclusion of Matt. 19:6. One can still use the correct understanding of it to discourage the victim from divorce (let no one separate, including the victim). Thirdly, in later chapters, I-B still encourages the victim to seek reconciliation and offer forgiveness to save marriage. So, in some sense, divorce is a positive action that actually changes something, not just recognizing something that has happened already.
In Chapter Three, I-B appeals to Ex. 21:10-11 for three grounds for divorce other than adultery. I-B acknowledges that this section is about female slaves being taken as wives, but he argues that we need to look for principles in this case law. What I-B does not mention, is that this text is not interested in defining valid divorce between two equals, but the right of slaves, who are seen as properties. In 21:4, a divorce is not only permitted, but required when a male slave goes free. This divorce is not preconditioned by the fault of either spouse, but by the fact that the slave's wife (supposedly another female slave) is the master's property. This case law finds no application in today's marriage because we are not someone else's slaves. Thus, marriage between or with slaves is of different sort than regular marriages.
Slaves desire to be free, and Moses' stipulations acknowledge this and therefore grant them ways to be freed. Thus if the master is displeased with her, she can redeem herself by paying a price (21:8), and if the master neglects her, she can go out without any payment (21:11). There is no concept that such relationship should last life-time. Instead, Moses lists out ways when slaves can get what they want: freedom. But today, we don't get into a marriage hoping that one day we will get out of it. Thus, the three reasons found in 21:11 can hardly be used to validate divorce today. Not to mention that violence or abuse, which I-B talks about throughout his book, is not even included in any of them! He can only argue that abuse is implied in the text, (p. 64) in which case he does not even need to require that Ex. 21 be applied today. He simply needs to say that abuse and neglect are implied in Jesus' permission of divorce in the event of adultery.
I-B mentions that God files for divorce in the Old Testament. He is right to assert that divorce is possible if contract is violated. But he fails to see that the only reason God gave in divorcing Israel was that Israel was unfaithful to Him, not that Israel failed to keep the other three obligations mentioned by I-B
Chapter Five is the core of the book, yet it is the most problematic chapter. I-B claims that in Matt. 19:9, Jesus is responding to debate between Hillel and Shammai,
Jesus was answering their question in plain language, and he wasn't making a universal statement. Therefore, when he said, "nothing except `Sexual Immorality'" he was saying that the phrase "a cause of sexual immorality" did not include the extra ground of `Any Cause', and he didn't mean "there is no divorce ever, in any part of the Bible, except for `Sexual Immorality'". (p. 50)
The most obvious problem is: Jesus did not say "nothing except `sexual immorality'". It is astonishing that after debunking the idea of "no one can separate", I-B commits the same type of error. What Jesus says, is this: whoever divorces his wife, except for immorality, and marries another woman commits adultery. (NASB) The legal phrase "nothing except `sexual immorality'" is not found here because Jesus did not include the word "nothing".
I-B's argument is still plausible since the context does talk about this debate between Hillel and Shammai, but he gives no room for the traditional interpretation, that Jesus might have really meant that remarriage after a divorce, except for sexual immorality, is adultery. Let us assume that Jesus indeed wants to express this viewpoint. How would He express it? Would He not say exactly what He says in the text? In other words, by adopting I-B's interpretive method, even if Jesus wants to express this viewpoint, we would not be able to get it.
I-B describes the reaction of Jesus' listeners as surprised. But this hardly makes sense. If this was a current debate, why would anyone be surprised that a rabbi took one of the two positions? The logical answer is that these people did not hear Jesus supporting one of the two positions, but a third one: any divorce is invalid except sexual immorality.
Astonishingly, in discussing Matt. 19:9, I-B leaves out Matt. 5:32, in which almost the exact expression is found. In 5:32, it is clear that Jesus was not in a dialogue about debate between Hillel and Shammai. The meaning is plain. Unless I-B wants to go against the normal ways people communicate, it is very hard to interpret Jesus' words "everyone who divorces his wife, except for [the] cause of unchastity" (NASB) as "everyone who divorces his wife, not limited to the cause of unchastity."
The only reason why I-B thinks this traditional understanding is wrong is that it contradicts 1 Cor. 7:15 (p. 50). But this argument fails. Paul's point in that text is not that believers can initiate divorce once they are abandoned, but to allow their unbelieving spouse to divorce them if they insist. To live in peace is the purpose. Such advice only makes sense because Paul cannot impose his Christian ethics on unbelievers. It is hardly a contradiction to the traditional understanding of Matt. 5:32 and 9:19. I-B later in the book also admits that in this verse, "[Paul] is saying, if an unbeliever leaves a believer, let them do so because, after all, there is very little the believer can do about it." (p. 66). It is unclear why I-B feels he is justified to use an uncontrollable divorce situation to argue for another valid reason for divorce other than adultery.
In Chapter 8, I-B presents a circular argument. He interprets Jesus' silence on abuse and neglect as something that Jesus finds no need to repudiate. Thus, I-B claims that Jesus accepts such grounds for divorce. Then, I-B uses this as basis to interpret Matt. 19:9 as only rejecting "Any Cause." But I-B assumes what he wants to prove. If the traditional interpretation of Matt. 19:9 is correct, I-B cannot say that Jesus never comments on neglect and abuse - He comments on them indirectly by excluding everything except adultery from grounds of divorce. The traditional understanding may be wrong, but I-B cannot first assumes that Jesus accepts multiple grounds of divorce, and then comes back to repudiate the traditional interpretation of Matt. 19:9 as wrong.
In p. 87, I-B argues that since Paul refers to Ex. 21:10 in 1 Cor. 7, he teaches four grounds for divorce. This connection is arbitrary. First, it is true that in both passages,...
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