Customer Reviews

Does America Need a Foreign Policy?

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You may agree or disagree with Henry Kissinger. You may think Kissinger is the modern day Prince Metternich or the modern day Napoleon III. You may read this book and say to yourself, Kissinger is saying exactly what we should do, or is giving the wrong advice on foreign policy. You can argue any of these points. You can love Kissinger or hate him. You can agree or disagree. But what you can not deny about Dr. Kissinger or his book is that he knows foreign policy and diplomacy and his ideas right or wrong are food for very serious thought.

I am not going to lie and say this book is as exciting as John Grisham or Tom Clancy. It is not. Nor is it as exciting as Diplomacy was. And yes, Diplomacy is an exciting and masterful book. And his chapter on Europe is extremely dry. But the information giving, the background, the possible solutions are very important to read, understand, and debate.

Kissinger's whole premise of the book to is the need for America to have a long range, well thought out foreign policy. Whether you agree with what he says about how this policy should be shaped is debatable. But what he makes a strong case for in his introduction and throughout the book is the need to have a foreign policy with specific goals, and not a foreign policy based on public opinion at the moment and by the seat of your pants. I think, right or left, realpolitik or Wilsonian we can all agree with that.

Again, I felt his chapter on Europe was dry but he makes up for it with his chapter on Asia. His thoughts on China, Taiwan, and India to me were the most interesting of the book. Also, in light of the recent events in the Middle East I was glad to read his thoughts on the situation between Israel and the Palestinians.

I will not recap Kissingers ideas, but again go back to the premise of the book. America needs a foreign policy, a well thought out one. We can argue Balance of Power, realpolitik, Wilsonian, etc. all day. We can argue how to handle Russia, Brazil, Israel, China, South Africa all day. But we should all look beyond Kissingers specifics, the guy knows his stuff but I agree his specifics are open for debate. But what we can all agree on, what I think Kissinger is calling for is a foreign policy that is thought out and serves the best interest of the US around the world and not a foreign policy based on CNNY polls and media spin.

Again, not a light read. Not the most exciting read. But an informative and thought provoking read.

And if you have not read Diplomacy by Kissinger, read that as well.

Edit to revisit Kissinger's role and add book links.

Revisitation: We've always known Kissinger is brilliant, and there is no reason to revise that view. However, in light of what is now known about Viet-Nam, we must find Kissinger guilty as a war criminal (first link below).

The book begins with a lamentation that foreign policy has been neglected in the last three Presidential campaigns; that the American public is terribly apathetic about foreign affairs; and that Congress is overly interventionist--he refrains from adding the obvious caveat regarding most Members lack of knowledge of the world. In brief, we have a long way to go as a Nation before we can devise and sustain a credible foreign policy.

The core point in this entire work is that both economics and technologies, including Internet and communications technologies, have so out-paced politics that the world is at risk. Globalization, terrorism, and other threats cannot be addressed with our existing international, regional, and national political constructs, and new means must be found--new political solutions must be found--if we are to foster security and prosperity in the age of complexity, discontinuity, and fragmentation.

There are some useful sub-themes:

1) Each region must be understood in its full complexity, with special attention to both emerging powers and to the subtleties of relations between regional actors--we should not confine ourselves to simply addressing each actor's relationship to the United States.

2) We must take great care to never interpose ourself or allow ourselves to become a substitute for a regional power, e.g. in the dialog between North and South Korea, or India and Pakistan.

3) We must strive at all times to ensure that the historic context is clearly appreciated and underlying every policy formulation, at the same time that we must recognize and define the vast cultural differences between US approaches to foreign policy, and the approaches of others, such as China.

4) Military compromise, whether in the Gulf War, Bosnia, or Kosovo, leaves a strategic vacuum that will inevitably require attention.

5) Africa is the true test for whether a world community can be devised and new solutions found for addressing the severe conditions in Africa that ultimately threaten the well-being of the rest of the world.

6) Our foreign service officers and the political leaders they serve must have history and philosophy restored to their diets, or they will fail to devise long-range concepts, global strategies, and sustainable policies.

Dr. Kissinger ends with what some might overlook and what I found to be absolutely core: no economic system can be sustained without a political basis. However much major multinational corporations may care to buy their comforts and their arrangements of convenience, at root, they prosper only because some set of political arrangements among great nations is providing a safety net, including the financial system with one major node in New York.

The books ends with an appeal for American humility and discretion as it makes it way forward--we must act as if we are one of many co-equal nation-states, while recognizing that our pre-eminence demands more of us than might be expected from others.

There is one major gap in this book, and I suspect it was deliberate: there is no discussion at all of the means by which American foreign policy is to be devised. As America moves into the early months of the "war on terrorism", it would have been helpful to have a really well-qualified rant on how it is impossible for this great Nation to have a foreign policy when we have gutted almost into extinction what passes for a Department of State today. Our Foreign Service, our Embassies, our foreign assistance programs, our Peace Corps, our external research, our sponsorship of international conferences on topics of vital importance to the US, have all faded into decrepitude. If ever there was a time when Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Powell should come together and champion a major restoration--at least a $10 billion a year increase--in Program 150 (our soft power), this is that time. That they have all failed to do so troubles me--that Senator Biden was castigated publicly for speaking the plain truth about how the world perceives us--troubles me. The attacks of 11 September represent, primarily, a failure of our ability to monitor and understand the world. That failure must lie heavily--and equally--on the shoulders of the foreign service (State), the clandestine service (CIA), and the counterintelligence service (FBI).

See also:
The Trial of Henry Kissinger
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy
The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (The American Empire Project)
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush
Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam

Interesting reading. I don't suppose this book has much value for an American, but for outsider it helps explain many things, and also offers an insight into American foreign policy goals. The style is very accessible. The mid-east chapter is especially interesting for obvious reasons. Being an Indian, I found his analysis of relationship with India pretty positive and interesting. I could give it 3 1/2 stars if I could.

At the dawning of the new millennium, the United States faces a paradox. It finds itself basking in a success unrivaled by history's greatest empires. In popular culture, finance, weaponry, science, technology and education, the country dominates the worldview. The country considers itself both the source and the guarantor of global democratic institutions.

Yet, Kissinger argues, the United States finds itself at a juncture with irrelevance to many of the issues affecting and changing the world order. Interest in foreign affairs, he notes judging from media coverage and congressional sentiment, is at an all time low. As a result the United States finds itself facing some of the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever witnessed, yet unwilling and uninterested in developing concepts relevant to the foreign policy reality.

Our relations with Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East require subtle responses rendering the traditional American quest for an all-purpose, magic foreign relations formula irrelevant. Unfortunately, the former Secretary of State argues, three forces in domestic politics drives American foreign policy in the opposite direction.

First, Congress legislates the tactics of foreign policy and seeks to impose a code of conduct on other nations by sanction. These legislative actions drive American foreign policy towards a unilateral and, what Kissinger describes as, occasionally bullying conduct.

Second, coverage of these events by a ratings-driven media does not help. Their obsession with the crisis of the moment rarely fosters discussion of the long-range historical challenges. They prefer to portray today's crisis as a morality play with a specific outcome and then move on to the next new sensation. Even though the underlying trends continue, growing in their unmanageability on a daily basis, they receive little attention.

Finally, the deepest reason for America's failure to develop a coherent strategy is the presence of three different generations, each with its own approach to foreign relations dominate the foreign policy debate - the Cold Warriors, Vietnam Protestors and Generation X, whose experience makes it hard for them to understand the perceptions of the previous two.

The inability of these three groups to articulate an unapologetic statement of enlightened self-interest results in what Kissinger refers to as "Progressive Paralysis." Certainly the country must fashion a foreign policy consistent with its democratic heritage and concerned with the democracy's world wide vitality, he writes, but it must also translate these values into answers to difficult questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What wrongs is it essential to right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?

Henry Kissinger, one of the men most responsible for the shape of foregn policy in this country over the last several decades shares his thoughts on the world climate and the U.S. response to it in the present and future. In a thouroughly readable way Kissinger breaks down, region by region, all of the aims and goals, successes and failures of our foreign policy and offers his views on where we should be headed now. The new chapter on the 9-11 attacks provides a needed and helpful postscript. Highly recommended.

Henry Kissinger presents a detailed and thorough examination of the world "at this writing" (as he says many times through out the book) and very much so as the BusinessWeek review says he seems to "take the globe in his hands, turn it slowly, and explain everything he sees on each continent." Indeed, the world's situation - and the actions of foreign governments thereof - was made much more clear to me.

For example, on pg. 40 he explains why Germany's government often seems topsy-turvy in whether or not she is a close ally to the United States: Germany, now united, is trying to continue to grow into an international power, and while she may be "far less prepared to put at risk her links to the United States," Germany also wants to "seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play in the Atlantic Alliance." I also think he makes a good point when he explains that the reason for much European disagreement with American foreign policy recently is that with the fall of the Cold War there is no longer a common enemy. We are seeing a re-emergence of nationalist-driven foreign diplomacy we saw in the 19th century.

The books goes on from more than the west. Kissinger moves on to Asia and explains Japanese, Korean, and Chinese relations with the United States (and why Japan and China should be considered necessary attendants of any Korean talks). He also talks about the Middle East and Africa, and I think he is right when he says that they are modern nations still politically stuck in the Middle Ages, with conflicts whose "emotional impetus derives from forces comparable to those of Europe during the 17th century." (pg. 164) If anything, Afghanistan is a perfect example of a nation with an internal structure still trapped in centuries gone past.

While I'll admit Chapter Six ("The Politics of Globalization") bored me, it is only because I am horrible at understanding any thing economic. However, the next chapter ("Peace and Justice") opens with a great study on the evolution of American foreign policy, from the development of European balance-of-power in Jefferson to the "Roosevelt corollary" and to the split between "Wilsonians" (interventionalists) and "Jacksonians" (isolationists) - I would highly recommend this part of the chapter. It then gives a good thesis on whether or not "noble" causes such as Rwanda, East Timor, or Somalia are worth time, money, and effort. As Kissinger says, there's nothing wrong with humanitarian efforts so long as Americans have "a readiness to pay the necessary price, in casualties or in financial sacrifice." (pg. 258) If any thing, Somalia is a perfect example of this, where troops were sent in to assist humanitarian efforts but at the death of 18 men were pulled out, stopping all efforts to ease the plight of the Somalians.

The main theme of this book seems to be equilibrium - America's ability to balance power in all regions while maintaining her foreign influence. As a result, I find many of Kissinger's ideals to be quite fair; for example, in the Israeli conflict, he suggests that Israel may have to make sacrifices but should not return to the security-threatening 1967 borders, while Palestine may be independant but needs to cease terrorist attacks and get rid of anti-Semite propoganda. (pg. 184) Yes, he does tend to criticize Clinton, but only Clinton's foreign policy, and nor is there any great critique against Democratic presidents. Kissinger praises Clinton for enacting NAFTA and other treaty organizations, but just didn't think he did enough. He also speaks well of Kennedy's and Carter's administrations, and even uses Carter's Camp David Accords as a better example of Middle East peace-talks when compared to the rushed and overambitious Berak-Clinton Peace Plan. I seriously doubt Clinton would even mind the criticism: while promoting his book Clinton said it was perfectly fine if some one disagreed with him, just so long as instead of brandishing him "a monster" they gave their reasons in a logical manner. Kissinger has done just that. I have to also comment if you are offended there seems to be an American bias in this book...you should look back at the title.

In summary, I enjoyed this read, and I wouldn't mind reading it again. Here we have a concise, detailed review of our world situation and it's historical context. (a very important effect to Kissinger) If you are interested in American foreign policy or where it is headed, I would highly suggest this book, even if it is just to get another opinion.

Whatever your views on Henry Kissinger as a practitioner of international relations, it is difficult to deny his genius as an academic in the field. One may disagree with his politics or with the ultra-realist approach he used in guiding U.S. foreign policy as Nixon's secretary of state, one may even go so far as to call him a war criminal. But as a chronicler of modern diplomatic history, he has few rivals. Having read his seminal work Diplomacy, a masterpiece in which he traces diplomatic relations from the time of the Treaty of Westphalia through present day, it was with eager anticipation that I awaited his most recent work, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? What could be more exciting for a student of international affairs than a prescription for 21st century American diplomacy from America's consummate diplomatist?

The book, unfortunately, does not even live up to its own title, much less the expectations it inherits by virtue of its author's reputation. Kissinger does not truly attempt to answer the question implicit in the book's rhetorical title - namely, that assuming America does need a foreign policy, what should that foreign policy look like? Instead he traces historical developments and foreign policy trends, divided neatly into geographic regions, and ends each discussion with a brief, all-too-vague, and not-at-all bold prescription for how our country's leaders should proceed in the future. For instance, in his discussion of Europe and trans-Atlantic relations, his boldest assertion is that the U.S. should support the strengthening of the EU as a means of keeping Russia in check. In Asia, he argues that close relations with Japan will be more productive in preventing the emergence of a hostile, dominant China than the current course of inflammatory rhetoric and aggressive policies. And in his chapter on globalization, he focuses most of his attention on a thorough excoriation of the IMF and its failures in the Asian, Russian, and Latin American financial crises, without offering much in the way of solutions. It is ironic that his most opinionated chapter - the one on peace and justice - is also his most predictable. Is it any surprise that Kissinger, who in recent years has been accused by some of war crimes, would argue strongly against the authority of the International Criminal Court, and take up the legal crusade of Augusto Pinochet?

In its favor, this book is certainly very readable. But don't we expect more than that from the likes of Henry Kissinger? When I read the work of such a brilliant mind, I almost feel disappointed if I don't feel a need at the end to go back and re-read passages or even entire chapters. In this case I felt neither the need, nor the desire, to do so.

...this school teacher, Mr Kissinger"..thats a quote from my father after one of the several sober television statements Mr. Kissinger baritoned on the issue of the Nixon administrations' explanation the status of the USA in Vietnam in late 1960's. A generation later I am repeating my fathers assessment to my son "This guy is not just smart he is clever! Mr Kissinger has turned a life time of first hand information and knowledge into insightful wisdom...." Mr. Kissinger was once call `the master of negotiations' he was able to absorb massive amounts of collected information on his rivals and use it to control the process. One of his traits was to speak for hours on end until the others would virtually agree to anything just to get out of the room. Not a good tactic to employ in authoring a book. In fact he applies the opposite in these concisely written pages. A quick, clear thought inspiring read. You have to admire the focus on the subject that Mr. Kissinger has maintained for the past thirty years. His global grasp of the role the USA will have in future international affairs makes this a must read. If you read nothing but the chapters and reference to the future of the United States in the emerging Europe Union you will have gotten value. Mr. Kissinger raises more questions then he attempts to answer. A refreshing approach from the `all knowing' pundits of the talk shows and daily new paper editioials. Will the USA continue to maintain a Super Power dominate role in this arena? Or will they develop a policy more passive and lead by example. Is the USA trying to police the free world by shear super power dominance? Are they in the process alienating 40% of the non-political adult population and inadvertently aiding in the growing demonstrative anti-globalization movement. A (call it by another name) repackaged `new and improved' Nationalistic driven `peoples political party'? Remember the consequences of the German government's movement when it imposed its super power idealism on it weaker neighboring countries under Hitler? Can this happen again? Will the USA repeat the errors of Empires through out history, by creating an disenfranchised unrepresented minority and then fuel their vehicle of discontent by attempting to dominate and control instead of lead by example? Will our foreign policy (or lack of) be the atomic catalyst in the formation of this anti globalization political party at home and in our partner nations? The words "Yankee go home" is nothing new.... Mr. Kissinger just reminds us that its chant is getting louder by put some new music to it in his latest book: Does America Need A Foreign Policy?

Personalities and politics aside this book is a `wisdom' waiting to be read.

Does the US Need Foreign Policy? Good question. Unfortunately you won't find the answer in this book.
In this book, Kissinger takes the reader around the globe region by region reviewing Cold War history. I was quite disappointed. Not all is lost though. If you can make it through Kissinger's dense and entangling prose this book makes quite a good primer for world politics.
Kissinger's well thought out attack on the International Court is the one redeeming aspect of the book. I disagree with Kissinger's reasoning, but he does give an excellent, intellectual case against the ICJ. His argument is predictable though - finding its roots in the peace of Westphalia - and he has good reason to argue against such a court - with old foreign pals from the Nixon administration finding themselves in hot water (e.g. Pinochet).
Surprisingly, a new development has occurred in Kissinger's analysis. He has recently made a new acquaintance of "low politics" - namely economics. It's reassuring.
I could only recommend this book to someone new to IR studies or someone that wants a quick review around the world - this book would make an excellent primer. But that's all.

Dr. Kissinger describes a United States that is militarily and economically ascendant, uninterested in foreign policy, directed by domestic concerns . . . yet drawn into global peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. What should we be doing?

The book is a virtual country-by-country look at the historical foreign policy issues, current situation, and potential future economic and security concerns of the United States. Most people will find the historical references helpful. Many more will disagree on the prescriptions for tomorrow.

The book's overall theme is how to combine idealism and realism in a consistent way that foreign countries can rely on. The tests he suggests are:

(1) Should be universally applicable

(2) Should be sustainable by American public opinion

(3) Resonates with the international community

(4) Has some relationship to the historical context.

Reasonable people can differ on how to apply these points, so I'm not sure how helpful they will be.

Where most can agree with in the book is that the United States cannot act without listening to and responding to the concerns of other nations in its international relations. Act like we are king of the hill, and everyone else will gang up to topple us from that spot. It's also counter to our principles, more importantly.

Dr. Kissinger is skeptical about tracking down those who have violated human rights and trying them. In that and many other ways, he seems more comfortable with pragmatism than with idealism. If we believe in democracy, peace, fairness, and prosperity, why shouldn't we lobby for, encourage and invest behind those aims? The more the world operates in those ways, the safer and more economically successful the United States will be. Would leaders who do great harm try so hard if they knew the United States would lead coalitions to see justice done. Isn't the problem with Iraq that the leader was not held accountable for his many murderous activities?

If we look back on the history of the 20th century, few would argue that more short-term pragmatism and less idealism would have worked better. Heading off abusive governments is easier done before they do the bulk of their harm.

Obviously, the United States cannot do everything for everybody everywhere. And I think few want us to. Our example and encouragement can, however, help us get some company from other nations in moving towards a better, more humanitarian world. Isn't that kind of idealism more pragmatic than falling back on the old balance-of-power game that has failed so often in the past?

Who can write on a clean slate of what we can and should accomplish with foreign policy? I don't know the answer, but I do not think it is Dr. Kissinger.

Learn from the past, what not to repeat in the future!