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The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's first strike back at Japan (Campaign)

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Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun, a professor at the US Army War College, offers an interesting summary of the Doolittle Raid on Japan in April 1942 in Osprey's Campaign #156. The volume is enhanced by Dr. Chun's detailed writing style and his access to declassified US Air Force records, as well as the usual high graphic quality from Osprey. Primarily, this volume is intended to provide a model of a how a joint-service operation can be successfully conducted with limited time and resources available - in this regard, the volume is a success. However, there are aspects of purely historical interest that appear to be slighted herein, and readers with interest in this topic should consult other sources as well.

In the opening sections, Dr. Chun lays out the reasons for the raid after the string of Japanese victories in the Pacific, as well as opposing commanders and forces. Although Dr. Chun provides a decent overview here, he really should have provided a bit more about the capabilities of the Japanese radar net that he mentions (e.g. what was its range?) and the star of the show - the B-25B bomber - gets little discussion of its capabilities (particularly when it comes to the modifications to extend its range). The section on the planning of the raid is good, particularly on intelligence support for target selection, but omits some key details - like how the bombers were placed by cranes on the USS Hornet (no small matter). Dr. Chun succeeds in laying out the groundwork of this joint service operation came together, but has skimmed over some important technical issues. I found Dr. Chun far too succinct about Doolittle's later career or what happened to the other survivors of the raid. I also wonder why no Japanese sources or historians' views were included - did they see the raid in the same terms of historical importance?

The actual narrative of the raid is complemented by the usual 3-D and 2-D color maps that Osprey uses in the Campaign series. The two color scenes depict the attack on the Japanese picket ships and two scenes of B-25s over Japan. The flight profile and target of each aircraft are discussed succinctly, but carefully. It is also a first for Osprey to use 3-D BEVs to depict air-only operations. In the concluding sections, Dr. Chun discusses the fate of the air crews and the safe return of Halsey's task force. I believe that Dr. Chun's conclusions are a bit contentious, in that he states, "the United States was able to change its strategic stance from a defensive to an offensive one, and showcased its military capability to all of the Axis Powers." First, both the Coral Sea and Midway operations that followed involved US defenses of forward bases -not attacks on Japanese bases - and thus the shift to an offensive posture took months to occur after the Doolittle Raid. Furthermore, the initial offensive effort in the Solomons was so strapped for resources that we quickly lost momentum and became involved in a see-saw attritional struggle. The US was not indisputably on the offensive in the Pacific for almost a year after Doolittle's bombs fell on Tokyo. Second, the other major Axis power - Germany - could hardly be impressed by a small-scale raid while US ships and planes could not even defend their eastern seaboard against the on-going U-Boat offensive Operation "Drumbeat." Germany would not begin to respect US military capabilities until well into 1943.

Finally, the idea that the Doolittle Raid precipitated the Japanese attack on Midway and thus brought about their reversal of fortunes puts far too much historical weight on just the raid. The tide turned in the Pacific primarily because of US code-breaking and our superior industrial resources which allowed us to replace losses faster. Even without the Doolittle Raid, it is probable that the US and Japanese fleets would fight a major fleet action or two in the central Pacific in 1942-43, since the Japanese were not simply going to wait for the inevitable US tide of material to sweep westward. The US Navy had some lucky breaks and Midway was a big win, but it could have been more of a draw like Coral Sea or Eastern Solomons, in which case nobody would be writing that Doolittle's Raid began the march to victory. While the raid probably did speed up Japanese intentions to move on Midway, it was probably better for the Japanese to strike while they still had a numerical edge in carriers, rather than wait until they were outnumbered. Thus, the historical value of Doolittle's Raid must be placed in proper context with other influences and not examined in a vacuum.