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Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics

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In his latest study of terrorism and its tactical implications, H. John Poole draws upon diverse threads to suggest that Islamist terrorist groups are drawing support and possibly tactical expertise from the PRC. While his conclusions are at odds with mainstream analysis, his argument is well constructed, and the implications are well worth considering.

Even for those who do not agree with Poole's strategic analysis, this book is a useful study of advanced light infantry tactics. In previous books Poole layed out his vision of a "strategic hamlet" practice to be adapted to the urban battle ground of Iraq. It is worth noting that the current "surge" strategy carried out under GEN Petraeus resembles Poole's strategy in broad outline--but that Poole beat him to the punch by several months. Poole goes farther in "Dragon Days" by considering the tactical implications of a well-trained infantry squad with indigenous support. In Poole's vision, a light infantry unit cut off and surrounded by hostiles need not call in heavy firepower in an attempt to break out. Rather, Poole provides tactical guidelines that would allow the beleagured unit to slip away quietly, thus preserving the lives of both soldiers and civilians in the combat area. While much of the book is devoted to urban terrain, Poole does not neglect the application of his tactics to more rural areas. In addition, he provides guidelines for how American troops could be trained in methods that are currently unfamiliar to them.

As always, Poole's tactical recommendations are more progressive than anything coming out of the Pentagon. While Poole's studies are conducted with an extremely limited budget, he has consistently managed to provide effective analysis and appropriate tactical responses. In this, he is similar to the insurgents he studies. It is high time that military commanders consider applying the techniques that Poole has been advocating for three decades.

I am an infantry officer currently serving on my second tour in Iraq. Dragon Days provides a lot of new and useful information to American Soldiers and decision makers. Using his proven, effective formula, Mr. Poole beings his analysis at the strategic level and works his way down to tactical details. At the strategic level, his estimates and conclusions about the sources of contemporary conflict are disturbing, especially because they are well supported by research and fact. His tactical lessons provide a practical solution to many of the strategic problems he identifies. First, he focuses on developing a new, westernized version of sapper reconnaissance, and then goes into great detail about escape and evasion techniques for both rural and urban environments. Such techniques could prove very valuable to infantry units in the future. Dragon days is already having a positive effect on the soldiers in my unit.

This book is an incisive look into the War on Terror, its sources, rammifications, and ways to combat the enemy. John Poole is current. He takes the Iraqi "surge" and proposes small unit tactics that are not currently employed and that would be even more effective in dealing with a non-uniformed and unconventional opposition. He is concrete in his suggestion of how to teach small unit guerrilla tactics at the squad and company levels. He also describes a type of leadership attitude that has rarely been followed in western armies, but has been overwhelmingly successful when employed.

This is the latest in an outstanding series of Posterity Press publications, each one of which has been read and reread many times.

Everyone from students to DC insiders must read and study Dragon Days.

Dragon Days peers into how a rising superpower (China) may be using Islamic insurgency to screen Maoist expansion. It tells us what must be done to curtail this "unrestricted warfare" adventure.

As we slowly learned in Iraq, America's armed forces are only well suited for high tech-kinetic and conventional operations. Dragon Days advocates using unconventional and "combined action platoon" thinking in affected countries.

Dragon Days implies the need for permanent professional "Advisory Corps" to conduct host country training and operations. The emphasis is on unconventional fourth generation warfare coupled with law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Dragon Days underlying operative approach envisions specially trained squad-sized units that anchor widely dispersed combined action platoons. The focus of effort is assisting indigenous host country law enforcement and military personnel (security forces)in reestablishing and maintaining local security.

Without collective security,there is no viable counterinsurgency.Dragon Days contends that infantrymen must know about gang mentality, forensics, and criminal investigative TTPs. This is key to denying the insurgents' anonymity insuring the "bad guy" does NOT remain nameless, faceless, and anonymous.

The idea is to thwart the insurgents' attempt to just "blend" into the local population. Dragon Days recognizes that terrorism is a fourth generation warfare technique and delineates what parts of unconventional warfare (UW) infantrymen must know and practice. The original (East Asian) version of UW is new to the literature and not covered in any U.S. military manual. Without this new kind of insight offered by Dragon Days, the U.S. military will remain a conventionally addicted, high-tech force that uses only massive-kinetic bombardment and escalation.

The results of massive-kinetics often fuel the very insurgency one is trying to stem. Heavy high-tech kinetics do little to win the hearts and minds of a population. In these times of "clear and present danger", Dragon Days is well worth reading if you are interested in our military and the survival of our Nation.

John Poole see's the cycles of "modern" warfare well before even the military services and three letter agencies are willing to shift focus of effort; especially in pre-deployment training programs. I used his "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" as a primer for my team before we deployed into Ramadi in 2005. It was extremely accurate and my men were able to operate without delays as soon as we arrived.

"Dragon Days" brings us around full circle to meet an organized and nationalized global threat that has proclaimed "total war against the U.S." and allies itself with insurgent and terrorist organizations as its surrogates. It won't be long before the State Department has to admit the DOD will be needed for other "troop deployments" as the Chinese continue to shape the world through asymmetric warfare. This book of Poole's has it all in there. Open source intel to study and verify and the proper tactics, techniques and procedures to meet the variety of threat we should expect to encounter once our infantry and SOF operators are distributed on the ground.

Mark S. Mosher
MSgt. USMC (Ret.)
Program Manager
Combat Training Systems Division
BMI Defense Systems

If you're interested in examining a way the U.S. military can draw down its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan while still bringing the fight to the insurgents and building up Host Nation forces, this is the book for you! Infantrymen trained in the skills Poole presents, combined with Host Nation troops to form Combined Action style platoons, manning widely dispersed combat outposts across Iraq and Afghanistan would present a formidable challenge to the insurgents and would go a long way to establishing the conditions needed for our success there.

H. J. Poole, in DRAGON DAYS, turns attention to beating our opponents in "The War on Terror". His basic approach is to enforce International Law utilizing Unconventional military techniques.
First, Poole addresses the question of whether or not the Red Chinese are involved in promulgating terror. Given that Afghanistan is proximal to its border, and that Pakistan has been a long time ally against its traditional foe India, Chinese involvement with Islamic radicals may well reflect their regard for their own interests. From a strictly national perspective, the Chinese are cogent to counter increasing U.S. and Indian influence in their own back yard. While radical Muslamic terrorists have their own agenda, Chinese involvement may not be based on ideological concerns. Indeed, a total U.S. disaster may mean that the Chinese won't receive a return on money borrowed from it by the U.S.(!)
The "War on Terror" - is it a military struggle - or International Law enforcement? Here, Poole is on solid ground recommending, in the second section of his book, that the U.S. and its allies approach terrorism in a law-and-order context. A relevant illustration is a recent event in Indonesia: after a night club bombing that claimed the lives of several western tourists, as well as Indonesians', the Indonesian authorities brought the radical Islamic perpetrators to trial and subsequent conviction. Though largely a Muslim nation, Indonesia wasn't rocked by civil unrest after the terrorists were convicted.
The techniques profiled in Poole's book are similar to those the TV viewer can find on "CSI" type programs. Poole rightly compares how a criminal case is pursued by the NYPD versus how a U.S. military unit would respond to a similar incident in Afghanistan or Iraq. Civil authorities in the "Big Apple" - and their elected representatives holding national office - would be justly outraged over military operations in New York City as these are conducted routinely in the Mid-East. Repercussions for such conduct would be swift - and career ending.
International terrorism is a breach of International Law. When the international terrorist is regarded as the equivalent of the serial rape-murderer, rather than the representative of a just cause, all societies, Western, Eaastern, Muslim, developing world - all societies will pursue his elimination. Trial by World-recognized judicial authorities, based upon forensic evidence with internationally-agreed upon validity, is the surest means to undermine any moral authority of the terrorist.
When Poole discusses small unit tactical operations, he is on his own turf in the final section of his book. While one may question his political analyses, there is no denying his experience and post military career tactical studies. The sources of Poole's tactical craft are Asian in origin. He relies heavily on North Vieetnamese/Viet Cong, Japanese Ninja and North Korean "Light Infantry Bureau" sources in his depiction of appropriate techniques, even providing the outline of a training program on "unconventional warfare".
Poole holds that U.S. "Special Operators" need a different direction in their tactical techniques, and that these unconventional skills should be promulgated to the level of the common infantry units. He stresses the significance of tactical finesse at the squad level versus the large-unit operations favored by the U.S. Military establishment. He decries the unnecessary reliance upon technology and firepower at the expense of good field craft and tactical skills. While the applicability of his touted "flying column" assault may be questioned, the tactical competence required to execute it is one the U.S. ground forces should definitely seek to achieve.
More astute readers may pay closer attention to Poole's focus on China's role and debate its applicability. There is room for a wide dispersion of viewpoints on these matters. Poole has presented his conclusions. Others may agree or disagree with him. His discussions in the tactical realm will doubtless draw more criticism: many western-inluenced military enthusiasts will, no doubt, decry his approach to "unconventional tactics". Certainly the U. S. Military establishment's predilection for hi-tech and lots of firepower aren't reflected in Poole's techniques.
However, two aspects are to be noted: 1) The current conflict in Central Asia and the Mid-East call for a much more sophistacated law enforcement-cum-light infantry approach, especially when operating among a civilian population. Enraging this population is counter productive; and, as has been noted by other observers, the U.S. forces cannot "kill their way" out of their tactical problems. 2) If only at the outset of their employment, Poole's recommended "Unconventional Tactics" may just succeed, simply because our current foes would never expect a tech-heavy, firepower-reliant U.S. force to fight in such a manner.

The author is well-known in the military and academic environments. With the last FM-100, it was supposed that everything was now mentioned. But, not. A tradition, inherited from the Civil war, exists in the USA, of saving grunts lives, avoiding the combats at close distances and using with profusion the heavy fire support to win always.
It does not serve to gain the hearts and the minds of the people, intermingled with the rebels in cities or open land, thanks to a degree of constraint that always exists from the rebels. Henry Poole offers a heap of counterinsurgency tactics. He also speaks about the own character of the possible rebels. And, especially, he creates the mixed units, at a very low level of action, of proffesional soldiers, self-defense forces and civil elements of construction, promotion and education. With them it is possible to interpose a "swarm", more active, effective and professional of loyal units, to the swarm of the guerrilla units. And to go isolating them slowly, reliably and progressively from the people, of their bases and of the rest of their operational and strategic goals.

John Poole knows how to combat Islamic and Chinese-backed insurgencies by blending in both measured military & police actions. In his newest & my personal favorite book, "Dragon Days" Poole weaves in various apsects of unconventional fourth generation warfare, to include how aspects of police anti-gang operations would serve the infantrymen to disrupt the IED networks that are causing most of US casulaties. Operations in Iraq must become focused on investigating the various "networks" (terrorist & criminal) to disrupt them & turn the people against the behavior that does not allow them to return to a normal life, and their children are not killed by US forces in an attempt to dislodge militants. Police operations focus on identifying & eliminating the "bad guy" from the neighborhood. Use of force is used only IF the suspect(s) do not comply & actively resist. As in gang "hoods" in the US, even if the police are right & kill a suspect, the residents blame the police. As Poole states in the latest edition of his great books on unconventional warfare, this condition also exits within Iraq or Afghanistan. We are still considered the Great Occupiers in Islamic lands & all bad things come with this title.
Poole's book also goes over how to improve multiple counter-insurgency fucntions & methods & what has not worked in the past & why. All of his book are great reading,and full of very useful information for military & law enforcement professionals involved in 4th GW. My advice is to recommend Poole's book to fellow professionals, and buy an additional copy for yourself since once your copy is "loaned" out, it'll be passed on to others, which is how all great knowledge should be treated. Pass it on!

I think that John Poole set a good example for us all to follow.
If we all were as productive and current in our analysis, and furthermore managed to put out tactical and technical advice to our troops in the field, the current conflicts would end sooner with much less casualties.

But wait, we don't need to do that. Because John Poole does this for us. We only need to pick up his latest book and start to apply the tactics that he describes.

I think that John Poole's later books are improving in readability but they still keep that cutting edge of current and life saving advice.

I urge you all to pick up this book and learn.