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Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953

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Richard Whelan's 1990 diplomatic history, Drawing the Line, seeks to explain why the United States was not only willing to go to the brink of World War III in order to rescue the "repressive and only nominally democratic" regime of South Korean President Syngman Rhee, but also why the Truman administration deliberately limited its strategy such that the total, resounding victory that American had come to expect with World War II was impossible to achieve. Whelan's 379-page study examines the Korean War in its global Cold War context. The focus is particularly political, although it includes enough detail on the military aspects of the conflict to explain political concerns and how enemy action supported numerous Washington assumptions-whether or not the assumption proved sound. Whelan's thesis is that the Korean War was "a turning point in postwar history, with momentous repercussions worldwide." (xv) Whelan credits the Korean Conflict. with: the transformation of NATO from a paper alliance to a powerful military force and the resultant intensification of the Cold War, the ascendancy of the United States within the United Nations and the weakening of the UN as a US tool, the justification for quadrupling the American military budget and the impetus this gave to the arms race, the creation of an adversarial relationship with Communist China and the recognition of Nationalist Formosa, the end of two decades of Democratic monopoly of the American executive branch and the integration of the Army. Whelan believes "the Korean War had far less to do with Korea than with Japan and Germany." (xv) It was a World War that pitted seventeen anti-Communist nations against North Korea and Communist China. Whelan counters the popular view that the war was a failure; by his measures it succeeded in resolutely "drawing the line" against communism without starting World War III.

Whelan takes his title from President Truman's 25 June 1950 meeting with his top military and foreign policy advisors at the Blair House. General Omar Bradley said that "we must draw the line [against Communist expansion] somewhere...[and because] Russia is not yet ready for War...the Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else." From this conspicuous beginning Whelan demonstrates throughout the text how strategic policy was contingent upon Russian reaction in the Cold War context. The Chinese were seen as Russian pawns. Actions taken, at times unilaterally, by MacArthur resulted in intense scrutiny of Russian reaction in Washington. Truman, Bradley and the other Joint Chiefs remained fully cognizant of the potential for escalation that the theatre commander (MacArthur) frequently downplayed, or emphasized if it suited his purpose. NSC-68 and NSC 88/1, with their often erroneous assumptions of Russian or Chinese intent and capability provide crucial support to Whelan's argument.

Although Whelan does an excellent job of framing administration motivation and hesitation in terms of global context, we are given a narrow view of that context-particularly those parts of the Cold War that related directly on Asia. The Berlin airlift, the Marshall Plan, actions taken by France, and West German initiatives receive short shrift or are disregarded. In short, Whelan takes little or no time to discuss alternatives to his thesis-that the Korean War was only one of a number of factors in empowering NATO, that the rapid expansion of American military capability would have occurred without and may have even been slowed down by Korea, and that the Republican resurgence was based as much upon popular perceptions of Democratic corruption, budgetary issues, and the aura of stability that Ike and Mamie projected as antiwar sentiment.

Whelan's diplomatic methodology gives no voice to American society. We are given little information on how societal pressures molded the Truman administration's actions, or how America reacted to the war. The average American is given no voice. Even his chapter, "Referendum on Korea," on the 1952 election, is presented from Eisenhower's standpoint. Rarely does Whelan extend his interest beyond the most senior commander and certainly goes nowhere near the front-line troops point-of-view.

Whelan is at his best depicting the outbreak of the conflict and the reasoning that lead figures in American foreign policy took at the time. However, Whelan hearkens back to a Cold War interpretation when he defends the U.S. intervention, arguing that the invasion by North Korea was "a Soviet test of American willingness and ability to oppose further Communist expansion." (119) An engaging narrative does not save Whelan's argument from a rigidity that smacks strikingly of the extremist positions that drove each side into the Korean Conflict.

Mr. Whelan succeeds in describing the important aspects of the Korean War without succumbing to the usual bug-a-boo of war books - losing the non-military reader in an avalanche of military unit designations and troop movements. What he does do is provide an excellent recounting of how we as a nation stumbled into something we were not prepared for by exploring the reasons behind the "a loss to communism anywhere is a loss to communism everywhere" sentiment so pervasive after Stalin showed his true colors at the end of WWII. Two sections stand out clearly in my mind, and it's been years since I've read it (it's one of the few books I might just read again). During a succinct discussion of what lessons were not learned in Korea to be applied later in Vietnam, he summarized our failure in Southeast Asia as no other has when he wrote that we did not recognize the impossibility of fighting a moral war, that it is extremely difficult to fight a technological war against an enemy largely independent of mechanized transport, and that we failed to grasp the difference between communism and Asian nationalism. Wow! The other memorable phrase, appearing in a discussion on extremism, was that the best defense against extremism is self-protective firmness and a willingness to compromise. If you want the nitty gritty details of who-shot -who this book might just leave you with a Purple Heart; however,if you desire to gain thoughtful insight into the underlying reasoning and motivation of our political and military leaders during a crucial period of our national history, this book could be a valuable addition to your library.